The United States and Pakistan: Navigating a Complex Relationship

June 30, 2005
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Federal News Service
Washington , D.C. PREETA BANSAL: Good afternoon. We're just getting settled here with our witnesses. We're waiting for Mr. Haqqani who will join us, I assume, shortly. My name is Preeta Bansal and I'm the Chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. I'd like to welcome you here today to our hearing on Pakistan to examine U.S. policy towards Pakistan.We have a very full program today, so I will keep my opening remarks relatively brief. You can see from the names on the signs of the other Commissioners present, we have Vice Chair Felice Gaer; Commission Vice Chair Nina Shea should be joining us shortly, and we have Michael Cromartie, the Commissioner who is the incoming Chair of the Commission who will, as of noon tomorrow, become Chair. And also present is Joe Crapa who is Executive Director of the Commission.The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom was created in 1998 by Congress to monitor the status of thought conscience and religion or belief abroad, as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international instruments. So the standard that we use in analyzing religious freedom is an international one. We'll also give independent policy recommendations to the President, to the Secretary of State and to Congress, on how U.S. policy can most effectively advance freedom of religion or belief and related human rights. The Commission is an independent, bipartisan, advisory body made up of Commissioners that are appointed by the President and by the leadership of both the Senate and the House in a formula that always ends up that five of the Commissioners are members of the president's party and four are of the other party.The Commission has long been concerned about the situation of freedom of religion or belief in Pakistan. These concerns include the continued inadequate response of the government of Pakistan to persistent sectarian and religiously motivated violence, which mainly targets Shi'a Muslims, but also Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and other religious minorities. Official government policies, such as anti-Ahmadi laws, which prevent that group from engaging in the full practice of their faith, and the highly-abused blasphemy laws, which result in the detention of and sometimes violence against religious minorities as well as a individual Muslims on account of their religious beliefs. And third, the largely unchecked growth of Islamic extremist organizations and political parties, whose members frequently take part in violence targeting religious minorities in Pakistan and abroad.Today, however, we're not here to examine further the conditions of religious freedom and other human rights in Pakistan. Since 2002, the Commission has deemed those conditions serious enough to recommend that Pakistan be designated a country of particular concern, or CPC as it's called in the statute, for the severe violations of religious freedom that take place there. Instead, it's the second of the Commission's two principle mandates to make policy recommendations to the U.S. government that is the reason for our hearing today.It's not really an exaggeration to say that the United States' relationship with Pakistan is among the most complex for U.S. foreign policy in today's world. Since Pakistan's independence, the United States has had what could be called an on-again, off-again relationship with that country. Pakistan was a strong ally during much of the Cold War, however, U.S. concerns about Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons and the 1999 military coup against the civilian government, resulted in the suspension of U.S. assistance and other ties at various times.September 11 th and related events markedly transformed the relationship, and now, Pakistan is considered a key ally in the war on terror, particularly with regard to the administration's efforts against al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants, which have retreated into the largely impenetrable Pakistan-Afghanistan border.The State Department's report on terrorism in 2004 that was just released in April 2005 states that, and I'm quoting, " Pakistan continues to be one of the United States' most important partners in the war on terrorism." After 9/11, remaining sanctions were waived, and large amounts of U.S. aid began to flow, including a $3 billion aid package, announced in July 2003, which involves five annual installations of $600 million each, split evenly between military and economic aid. In March 2004, Secretary of State Powell announced the U.S. government's intention to designate Pakistan a non-NATO ally. The benefits of this status include exemption from suspension of U.S. military assistance, access to certain cooperative training agreements with the United States, and eligibility for expedited processing of export licenses of commercial satellites. The proposal was endorsed by Congress and the formal designation was made by President Bush in June last year. And in March of this year, the U.S. government announced a plan to resume selling F-16 fighter aircrafts to Pakistan.An increasing number of observers though are starting to raise questions about the current state of affairs in our relationship with the government of Pakistan. Some have contended that the focus on security matters has resulted in the muting of virtually all criticism of other policies of the Musharraf government, even those policies that may ultimately be undermining our terrorism efforts. The Musharraf government's policies on democracy and other human rights continue to generate criticism, as well as its religious freedom record. Since overthrowing the civilian government in 1999, General Musharraf has taken a number of undemocratic actions, including altering the constitution and pointedly sidelining the non-religious democratic parties, in order to bolster his own

power. What is more, some contend that his government has done little to combat Islamic extremism in Pakistan, and instead has forged political alliances with religious extremist groups, thereby strengthening them.And everyone here probably today is aware of two very recent and very public incidents of human rights violations on the part of Pakistani officials in the last several weeks alone. Last month, in response to an attack on women athletes by Islamic extremists, a number of human rights activists gathered in the city of Lahore to protest the rising incidents of violence against women. The protestors, who included Asma Jahangir, the former head of Pakistan's Human Rights Commission, and also who happens to serve as the United Nations' Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief. She and Joseph Francis, who is an activist on behalf of religious minorities in Pakistan, were met with an outrageous level of violence from police. Over 40 persons, all of them noted for their human rights activism in Pakistan, were attacked by the police, beaten, and arrested. In the second case, which has received headlines in the last several days, a woman who had been brutally gang raped as part of a horrifying tribal punishment custom, was refused permission to travel abroad and put under house arrest, because the government appeared to be more concerned about protecting its image than about protecting human rights.Clearly, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship presents a confluence of concerns, perhaps competing concerns. The Commission is aware of this complex mix and the critical issues that are involved and the complexity of those issues, and we hope to examine them in depth today with our very distinguished experts. Some of the questions we hope to have addressed include: Are religious freedom and related human rights being given the necessary focus in current U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan? Should the United States be pressing the Pakistani government more strongly on its human rights concerns, or would this threaten our counterterrorism interests? Is the substantial increase in aid to Pakistan and the other benefits, non-NATO ally status, for example, the right course of action? Is the Musharraf government doing enough to combat Islamic extremism, and if the answer is no, what is the consequence of that inaction for the U.S. war against terrorism? And as a counterpart, does United States criticism of Pakistan on religious freedom and other human rights issues, does it actually strengthen the hands of extremists?To speak to these and other issues, we are pleased to have before us a very distinguished panel of experts from a variety of backgrounds. Before we hear from our witnesses, let me just say a little something about the structure of our hearing. We've asked each of our panelists to speak for approximately ten minutes or so, which should leave us plenty of time for questions and answers and follow-up questions. Each of our witnesses has been invited, however, to submit longer statements, which will be available on our website. So with that, I think what I'll do, I'll introduce each witness right before they speak rather than doing it as a group, if that's okay.We're going to start with Ambassador Karl Inderfurth. Ambassador Inderfurth is a professor of the practice of international affairs, and the Director of the International Affairs Program at the Elliott School of International Affairs, which is part of George Washington University. From 1997 to 2001, Ambassador Inderfurth served as Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, and before that, he was U.S. Representative for Special Political Affairs at the United Nations, where he also served as Deputy U.S. Representative on the UN Security Council, so he's very well positioned to address the relationship with us and we're very honored to have him we're with us. Ambassador Inderfurth? KARL INDERFURTH: Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman, and members of the Commission. Thank you for this invitation to join you today for this discussion. I'm delighted to be sharing this panel with those on my right, who are far more expert than I, so I look forward to hearing their statements this afternoon and learning from them. I would like to commend you also on your statement. We may have had the same speechwriter in certain parts of your statement and what I'll be saying, but I would like to place this discussion of navigating this complex relationship in a broader historical context. So if I may, I will proceed with my opening statement.In 2003 an Independent Task Force cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society released a report entitled "New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan." In its chapter on Pakistan, the Task Force began with this observation, and I quote:"Pakistan represents one of the toughest and most complex policy challenges that the United States faces anywhere in the world. The record of bilateral relations of the past fifty years has been checkered and volatile and the United States has been unable on a sustained basis to accomplish its key objective: a stable Pakistan at peace with itself and its neighbors."Now I cite this passage because I believe it places the subject of our hearing this afternoon, "The United States and Pakistan: Navigating a Complex Relationship," in its proper context. To understand our current relationship with Pakistan, we must have a firm understanding of its past. For this reason, I would like to take a brief moment to review this "checkered and volatile" history.Again, I am drawing from the report of the Independent South Asia Task Force, of which I was a part, and I quote:"Interaction between the U.S. and Pakistan is handicapped by a half-century of relations that have been like a roller-coaster ride. Driven by a Cold War search for alliance, the United States made Pakistan a military ally against communism in 1954. Later, Islamabad served as the bridge for President Richard Nixon's dramatic opening to China in 1971 and Pakistan was the key partner in the struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Today, the Bush administration talks of Pakistan as an 'indispensable ally' in the war against terrorism. Yet, during the 1960s Pakistan burgeoning friendship with then-enemy China angered Washington. In the late 1970s and again in the 1990s, Pakistan's search for nuclear weapons triggered the suspension of American military and economic help. As the new century began, Islamabad's support for the Taliban and for the insurgency in Kashmir, its nuclear weapons tests, and the army's ouster of the elected civilian leadership further strained ties. The extraordinary volatility of past relations, especially the U.S. refusal to back then-ally Pakistan during the 1965 war with India and Washington's imposition of nuclear sanctions in 1990 after the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan, has convinced many Pakistanis that the United States is a fickle and unreliable friend."Now, given this brief summary, I think it is not surprising that the best diplomatic history of U.S.-Pakistan relations, written by Ambassador Dennis Kux, is entitled Disenchanted Allies. Understanding why there has been this "disenchantment" is, in my view, a prerequisite for any discussion about how we should proceed today in navigating this complex relationship. If we do not, I am convinced we are sure to run aground again.Now let me proceed from this brief diplomatic history to where we are today, and I want to cite another report that deals with Pakistan, this one by the

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.The 9/11 Commission identified three countries that are most critical to the U.S. in countering the terrorist threat. The first cited was Pakistan. The Commission correctly listed the most pressing issues on the U.S. agenda in Pakistan: countering the al-Qaeda and Taliban threat, both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan; preventing leakage of nuclear weapons technology to black markets - this, of course, refers to the A.Q. Khan affair - and shoring up Pakistan's weak political, judicial and social institutions so it can become a properly governed and hopefully democratic, moderate Muslim state. I should add to this list encouraging the peace process that is currently underway between Pakistan and India, which, I believe, is showing great promise.Now, for reasons that require little explanation, during its first term the Bush Administration largely focused its high-level attention with Pakistan on the first of the issues identified by the Commission, namely the war against terrorism. Ties with Pakistan improved dramatically after President Pervez Musharraf became a key partner in that effort immediately after 9/11. Since then, Pakistan has provided invaluable assistance in countering al-Qaeda, and for that the Bush Administration, as Madame Chairwoman pointed out, responded by lifting existing sanctions and promising a $3 billion, five-year package of economic and military assistance. Today, U.S.-Pakistan relations are, in my view, the best they have been in many years. The Administration's recent decision to sell F-16 aircraft, ending a decade and a half of controversy with Pakistan over these planes, will further strengthen U.S.-Pakistan ties.Now, given this significant improvement in our relations, I believe it is now time for the United States to broaden its policy with Pakistan to focus more directly on those other issues identified by the 9/11 Commission. This is both the challenge and, I believe, the opportunity the Bush Administration has during its second term.Broadening our policy would mean several things, including being more actively engaged in assisting President Musharraf deliver on his stated policy of "enlightened moderation" for Pakistan. In that regard, let me offer three examples of those things we should be doing. Each of these would, I might add, put the United States in a better position to address many of the concerns raised by this Commission on issues relating to religious freedom and human rights in Pakistan.First, the United States should provide expanded economic and social development aid to Pakistan, more than the $1.5 billion over five years that the Bush Administration has offered. Education should be the principal focus of this aid. Pakistan's primary education system ranks among the world's least effective. The average Pakistani boy receives only five years of schooling; the average girl just 2.5 years.Of particular concern, highlighted by this Commission in its 2005 Annual Report, has been the madrassa system of religious schools in Pakistan. Many of these schools do serve a legitimate function, providing some education to children who have few other options given Pakistan's failing educational system. Others serve to radicalize the young, indoctrinating them with extremist and anti-American views. Unfortunately, the government of Pakistan has not lived up to its promises to regulate madrassas properly, or to close down those that have proven links to militant groups. The fact is, however, that the magnitude of the task to reform and expand access to public education in Pakistan far exceeds both the external and Pakistani resources devoted to it. Much more must be done, and on an urgent basis.Second, the U.S. should also work more directly with Pakistan to open up the political process well in advance of the national elections, which are to be held in 2007. Democracy counts in Pakistan, and we should be doing more to advance it with programs aimed at strengthening the country's weak political institutions. As Ambassador Teresita Schaffer has said in an excellent CSIS report entitled Pakistan's Future and U.S. Policy Options, and I quote, "The United States should speak out in support of Pakistan's parliament and political parties and should urge that they play their full role in the political process. These institutions will continue to atrophy if the United States and others continue to act as if they do not matter."Third, the United States should also devote more attention and resources to other institutions that are critical to Pakistan's political and social development, including the judiciary, the police, the civil service, the election commission, and provincial governments.I noted that this Commission also recommended in its Annual Report that the U.S. government support, in conjunction with other donors, judicial reform and law enforcement training in Pakistan. Doing so could, over time, have a significant and beneficial impact on promoting human rights and the rule of law in that country. This also relates to the tragic case we are currently watching that Madame Chairwoman mentioned, with great interest and concern, that of Mukhtar Mai. Now that this matter is before Pakistan's Supreme Court, let us hope that justice will finally be served.Now, having argued the need to broaden our relations with Pakistan, how should we go about achieving this U.S. objective, and U.S. objectives in general? More to the point, in addition to the 'carrots' of frequent and high-level engagement and economic and military assistance, should the United States also attempt to pressure Pakistan with 'sticks', including the threat or imposition of sanctions? Returning to my brief history lesson at the beginning of this statement, we certainly have experience to draw on in answering that question. As Dennis Kux points out in Disenchanted Allies, quote, "Few supposed U.S. friends, let alone allies, have been on the receiving end of as many sanctions as has Pakistan."Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Khurshid Kasuri, was recently in Washington. In an interview prior to his arrival, he was asked whether the United States was pressuring Pakistan to pursue the current peace process with India. Kasuri's response was very blunt, and very instructive. He said, quote: "We are not being pressurized. There is nobody who can tell Pakistan to talk to India or else. It is humiliating. We will never take it. We are talking because we think it serves our national interest. No country can dictate to Pakistan."Whether on talks with India or other sensitive issues, Pakistan has demonstrated that it will firmly resist being dictating to by the United States, or by any other country. In fact, our 50-year "checkered and volatile" history with Pakistan suggests that sanctions have rarely furthered U.S. objectives and sometimes proved counterproductive.While in Washington, Foreign Minister Kasuri suggested an alternative approach. Quote: "We cannot be targets and partners at the same time," he said. "We'd rather be your partners."With U.S.-Pakistan relations at their best in many years, the Bush Administration has an opportunity to assist Pakistan to become the modern, tolerant, democratic Islamic country that its founders envisioned, and I believe the vast majority of the Pakistani people want. To achieve this, the United States should be prepared, as the 9/11 Commission recommended, to make a "long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan...so long as Pakistan's leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own."And that means working together as partners. Thank you very much. MS. BANSAL: Thank you very much. We'll

now hear from Danielle Pletka. And like I said, we'll hear from each of the witnesses, then we'll have a period of engagement and questions. Ms. Pletka is Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Before moving to AEI, she was for ten years a senior professional staff member of the Near East and South Asia Subcommittee on the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. So Ms. Pletka, please. DANIELLE PLETKA: Here we go. Madame Chairwoman, Commissioners, thank you very much for inviting me here today. I have a strong sense that there will begin to emerge a certain theme in our statements, and I hope that, as Rick noted, he was covering some of the same issues you covered in your opening statement. I too will cover some of the things that Rick covered and that you covered. I had a joke prepared for if I was going to be last, but since I'm only third from last, I can't use it. So I'll just go ahead and repeat myself and everybody, and I'd be happy to share. I'll pass it on down to Husain. (Chuckles.) It involved Elizabeth Taylor. It was pretty funny.I think it is no understatement to suggest that Pakistan is one of the most dangerous places in the world today. It has teetered between quasi-democracy and autocracy for decades; it is home to a significant stock of nuclear weapons; it has gone to war three times and almost more with its nuclear-armed neighbor; and it has a small - and I do emphasize small - but committed minority of extremists bent on killing the Pakistani president and taking over the country.The U.S. government is reluctant, for a whole variety of reasons that we've already touched on, to dwell on Pakistan's powerless state. But we do our friends in the Pakistani government no service with our reticence. This is a country, which is not only home to many senior al-Qaeda officials, including possibly Osama bin Laden and former Taliban leader Mullah Omar, it is also increasingly a headquarters for terror traffic into Afghanistan, and, of course, it is a nation that until recently honored its most senior nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, named its main nuclear research laboratories for him, and likely - likely, I believe - as he proliferated nuclear technology to the world's rogue states. These are problems that need to be faced and resolved.In addition to the political insecurity problems, socially, Pakistan is in dire straits. Until its most recent budget of this coming fiscal year, Pakistan was one of only twelve nations in the world that spent less than 2 percent of their GNP on education. They have a goal of getting up to 4 percent, but this year, they'll only actually get to 2.7 percent. As Rick noted, many Pakistani children never even go to school at all. As a result, few will learn to read or write. In fact, Pakistan rivals sub-Saharan Africa in the poor quality of its care for its young.Pakistan's public school system is itself so corrupt and so broken that the alternative schooling offered by madrassas, some of which - not all of which, but some of which teach unbridled Islamic extremism and anti-Americanism, has become appealing, has become a natural alternative for the poor. But the public school system - it's very important that we note this - the public school system itself has until very recently also embraced a curriculum that is much like those of the madrassas that teaches extremism, that teaches religious bigotry, that teaches anti-Westernism, and doesn't have an analog of teaching reading, writing, and arithmetic. Pakistan has recently contracted out for work on a new curriculum and it seems that they are quite serious about that.U.S. assistance has made education reform a priority in Pakistan, and I think there should be little doubt in our minds that most Pakistani leaders are at least nominally committed to those reforms. The question is, are they really committed enough?This month, Pakistan's annual federal budget upped allocations for public sector development 35 percent over the previous year. It also upped defense spending by 15 percent. Outside observers and NGOs, however, report little progress in achieving the goals that have been stated since 2001, particularly in registering or closing down madrassas. Some observers insist that the social, economic, and political situation is improving in Pakistan, and there is some evidence to indicate that it is. But if that is the case, it's fair to insist that those improvements need to move faster. U.S. assistance, as you mentioned, Madame Chairwoman, will top $600 million this year. Half of that money will go to social sector reforms and improvements, mostly health and education, and half will go for foreign military financing. By the way, in the health and education sector, $200 million of the $300 million will actually go in budgetary support. In other words, it's not project-tied assistance; it's assistance that goes into the Pakistani general budget, and what the U.S. government is looking for is equal outputs and that's why I cited that 35 percent increase number. Those are important, but we have to ask ourselves whether budgetary support is the best way of delivering education reform in Pakistan. Perhaps it is, but perhaps it isn't.In any case, the aid has been criticized, most recently by my neighbor here, as being out of balance, with too much going for budgetary support and for the military. Frankly, it's easy to sit, and Monday morning quarterback U.S. assistance to Pakistan. I've certainly spent many years doing it, but at the end of the day, arguments against providing this assistance or for ignoring the security component and devoting most aid to health and education don't make sense. In an ideal world, the concept is very appealing. In the real world, it doesn't work. Pakistan needs to improve its social sector and it needs a military that can suppress extremists. There are serious limits also to Pakistan's ability to absorb development assistance, and we shouldn't pretend that by throwing more money at the problem, we are going to solve it.For its many flaws, and they are many indeed, Pakistan has proven itself an important ally to the United States in the war on terror. Pakistan's cooperation, and I'm sure we're going to all go over this at length, has meant that senior al-Qaeda officials are in custody. It's also meant significant disruption to al-Qaeda's plans to attack Western targets. We should be unequivocal; we cannot do without Pakistan's cooperation. We do not want Pakistan to fail because failure is worse than the status quo.Where the United States goes wrong is where we have gone wrong for more than two decades, and here I want to be a little bit more pointed than Rick was about this. We have allowed Pakistan to have it both ways. In the 1980s, Pakistan was an important, though ultimately, self-serving ally in the war on the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Because they were helping, we ignored their dictatorship, their cozy ties with Islamic extremists, and their pursuit of nuclear weapons, and I use that word advisedly.It was only after the victory in Afghanistan that it was safe to jettison Pakistan, which the U.S. did for more than a decade. In those years from 1990 to 2001, it was possible for the United States to do much more to work with Pakistan against proliferation and against the mounting extremism of the region. Not enough was done. Pakistan went from being too important to antagonize to too unimportant to care, and it was in those years that A.Q. Kahn flourished and the Taliban was created.I want to make a side note here. This is not a partisan criticism. This is a criticism of our executive branch. This has happened when Republican presidents have been in power

and when Democratic presidents have been in power, and they have all been equal opportunity in making these mistakes.After 9/11, the pendulum certainly swung the other way and brought new imperatives to the relationship. And once again, we're making the mistake of allowing Pakistan to have it both ways - to maintain a friendship with us on the war on terror, while at the same time perfecting its nuclear expertise, stifling democracy, women's rights, religious freedom, and more. For as long as the United States continues to gloss over Pakistan's failure to move quickly on reforms and remains reluctant to confront the government for its willingness, for example, to protect A.Q. Kahn, it's making a mistake. For as long as Pakistan fights international terrorists and allows domestic extremists to run free, neither state's interests will be served. A moderate Muslim success story in Pakistan is possible. We've all said it. I think we probably all agree. But the necessary reforms will not take place without constant pressure and frank talk from the United States. Thank you. MS. BANSAL: That's very interesting, thank you. We're going to hear now from Christine Fair. Dr. Fair is an expert on South Asia in the Research and Studies Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Before joining the Peace Institute, Dr. Fair was an Associate Political Scientist at the Rand Corporation, where she focused on South Asia's strategic rivalries, Pakistan's internal security, the causes of terrorism, and U.S. relations with South Asia. So thank you, Dr. Fair. CHRISTINE FAIR: Thank you, and thank you for the opportunity. The folks at USIP will be very happy if I make the usual disclosure that these are my opinions and not the opinions of my Institute. That being said, and getting that out of the way, at USIP, I'm taking a fairly comprehensive survey and analysis with a colleague named Peter Chalk, who is still at Rand. Looking at issues inherent in U.S. assistance to Pakistan, my focus is, of course, on internal security and military assistance, and I'm going to actually be drawing some of the - in today's presentation, I'll be drawing from this current work at USIP, which I anticipate will be done at the end of the year.In regards to this study, I actually just came back from Pakistan last year, and while I'm not going to dilate upon it in my spoken testimony, I'm fortunate in that I am an Urdu and a Punjabi speaker, and I had the luxury of talking to all sorts of people in all different places in Pakistan, and there are some very specific opinions that I hear about U.S. policies to Pakistan, and they're in my written statement. I think they may be useful for you.The three topics that I'm going to talk about today, I've picked because either they've been severely mischaracterized, distorted, misunderstood, or frankly, just not given the attention that I think they deserve. And the first of these is actually the madrassa. And I'm going to respectfully disagree a little bit from Mr. Inderfurth. I have a very different view on the madrassa issue. Since 9/11, this has been a concern that has focused the attention of policymakers, and there are a few researchers and a few reports that are really responsible for this. Notably, the International Crisis Group from 2002, which found that 33 percent of all students enrolled in Pakistan are enrolled in madrassas. Those of us who have been hanging out in Pakistan for a while found that to be a little bit difficult. One in three students I know were not hanging out in madrassas.To my pleasure, in February of this year, the World Bank did something very novel. They actually looked at data sources, and they found that, using their own independent techniques, perhaps as few as .07 percent of enrolled students attend madrassas. Concerned that they have in fact two orders of magnitude difference from ICG, they actually went to the ICG report and they found a very serious error. The ICG misdivided by an entire of magnitude. Instead of dividing by 19.2 million as the total for all enrolled students, they mistakenly divided by 1.9, so even the ICG found only 3.3 percent of all students are enrolled in madrassas.So even though the overall enrollment in madrassas are quite low, other researchers are right in pointing out there is extreme geographical variation, with some parts of Pakistan showing very high levels of madrassa enrollment, and in other areas virtually none at all. Most disturbing is that high levels of madrassa enrollment correlates very strongly with certain kinds of violence, and to you, I think it may be of interest to note that sectarian violence is included in the kinds of violence that correlate with high madrassa enrollment.Despite the relatively small numbers of students enrolled in these religious schools, there have also been some very interesting attitudinal surveys done, both of students and teachers at madrassas, public schools, as well as private schools, a whole sector of schools that people very rarely mention when talking about Pakistan. And those data are very strong in their suggestion that both madrassa students as well as their teachers, in fact, the teachers are more so, are very intolerant relative to their peers at other institutions. Specifically, madrassa students and teachers are more likely to support open war with India over Kashmir. They're more likely to support the use of jihadi groups to resolve the Kashmir problem. And they're less likely to prefer peaceful means to resolve conflicts.So very clearly, if every kid in every madrassa ended up in a militant camp, we would have a very large problem. But that's, I think, a source of problematic understanding. Most researchers of terrorism actually discount that view. For example, the work of Sageman finds that terrorists on the whole are more well-educated than their peers. And in my own work in Pakistan, looking at militant recruitment, my work concurs with that. For example, those operating in Indian-held Kashmir are not predominantly produced by madrassas. In fact, I would say they're the exception. Afghanistan, for very historic and operational reasons, is a place we tend to see madrassa students.But this brings me to my main concern that the fascination with the madrassa problem has completely distracted us from the point that you raised that the public schools are, in my opinion, the biggest problem. They have the largest share of students and their curricula has been shown by study after study to promote the very same kinds of hatreds that we see in the madrassa curriculum. In fact, I think it's fair to say that if we shifted every kid from a madrassa to a public school, we would not have any sort of increase in tolerance or we wouldn't have an improvement in the kinds of worldviews the citizens that the Pakistani public school system is producing.I also somewhat disagree with Ms. Pletka in the sense that I don't see any movement happening on curriculum reform. The efforts that the government has said they're going to make haven't actually materialized. It has received high-level resistance, not only from the religious leadership who is to be expected, but also from allegedly mainstream political leaders. And I think, in conjunction with the government's complete retrenchment from the promises it would make on madrassa reform, I see absolutely no reason to be confident that our efforts in helping Pakistan improve its educational system are really going anywhere. And I think that to think that the Pakistanis have any incentive to remove this stuff from their curriculum would be delusional thinking. Husain Haqqani has written a very wonderful book talking about why it is that these ideologies are so important in the public school

curriculum.The second area that I'd like to talk about briefly is the Pakistan-Afghanistan border operations. We all know why this area is important. We all know that in 2004, the Pakistanis undertook a military operation. I'd like to make a few observations about this. One of the components of that operation was enforcing the collective responsibility notion in the tribal area. That is to say, if one tribe refuses to hand over a particular individual sought by the government, not only the entire tribe, but sub-tribes, even individuals who are not even in that area can be punished.As a consequence, we saw all sorts of people's homes being demolished. To my surprise, and I was in Pakistan last year, I heard people compare this to Jenin. In fact, they said it was worse than Jenin because this was Muslims destroying the homes of Muslims. And for me, this was an extraordinary comment to be heard from a wide variety of Pakistanis. But Pakistani government officials also want to point out that while what they're doing in FATA to expand their writ of law is very important. There has been so much focus on the tribal areas that we forget that in fact with one exception, the high-level al-Qaeda operatives have been caught in Pakistan's cities. And Pakistani authorities note that they don't have the resources to penetrate these sprawling mega-cities, which are perfect havens for criminal and terrorist elements alike to operate. We are devoting some resources, which I'll talk to in my third point, to police reform. But I don't think it's enough.So let's talk about police reform and decentralization. In FY04, there was $11 million allocated for law enforcement and that included $9.3 million for police reform and $1.5 million to support, generally, law enforcement agencies. There wasn't such an allocation before FY04. Now, if you know anything about policing in South Asia, you know that they've inherited - Pakistan, India - they inherited the Police Act of 1861 from the British. And this was modeled on the Irish constabulary, so this is a police force that was meant to control people, often through coercion. And with the exception of Pakistan, they still have that police ordinance on the books, and I'm going to talk about that in a minute.So as a consequence, when these states became independent, basically, the police acted coercively on behalf of the state. So in 2002, Pakistan decided to take a bold move. It tried to actually amend the way policing happens in that country. It basically recognized the police were the on-call henchmen of the politicians, and it sought to find a way of making police behave responsively to the people and independent to their political masters. And this was evinced in the police order of 2002. I've had the opportunity of speaking with many people that were involved in putting forth that novel police order, and they were all dismayed when in 2004, some of the most important and innovative measures in the 2002 Act were completely gutted. So those individuals will tell me that the current police order, as amended in 2004, is actually worse than the law they had from 1861, because the police were never statutorily, you know, the servants of the politicians. Under the 2004 ordinance, that's exactly what they are.Now, the Pakistani government, you know, I've engaged them on this issue and they have a somewhat different version. They feel that by making them subservient to politicians, they're going to make them much more answerable to the people. Of course, that does require some suspension of disbelief for anyone who is familiar with the way politics operates in Pakistan.I raise this point because much of the support that we are giving to Pakistan assumes that they are going to do their part in putting forth a legislation that permits credible and accountable policing. And I want to stress that while this may seem like a mere tactical concern, anyone who has been to Pakistan and understands the urban environment, in fact, the entire operational environment that Pakistan presents to militants, terrorists, and the like, understand that unless people feel that they can call the police, that they can report suspicious activities, the intelligence and the police agencies have very little to go on. As a consequence, cells remain undisturbed, perpetrators are allowed to operate with relative impunity in these areas.So I understand that the embassy, because of security concerns, maintains a very small footprint. And it's very difficult for them to keep an eye on what may appear to be the minutiae. But if we care about security in Pakistan, we need to care about police. And not only does this mean devoting our resources, it requires our partner to do their part and put the legislation into place. Thank you. MS. BANSAL: Thank you. Mr. Haqqani, we're going to hear from you. Husein Haqqani is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also a syndicated columnist for a number of newspapers and journals in Pakistan and India. Before joining Carnegie, Mr. Haqqani served as an adviser to several Pakistani prime ministers, and from 1992 to 1993, he was Pakistan's Ambassador to Sri Lanka. So thank you, Mr. Haqqani.And I should add, as Dr. Fair noted, he has published a very renowned book this year. HUSEIN HAQQANI: Thank you very much, Madame Chairperson. I would like to begin by thanking the members of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom for the privilege of testifying before you on the situation in Pakistan and on U.S. relations with this extremely important country. The Commission has already heard three very well informed Americans, and I think it will definitely benefit from an input from someone born, raised, educated, inducted into senior government positions, imprisoned, and beaten up, all in Pakistan.Let me begin by telling a story because Ms. Pletka didn't get an opportunity to do so. And this one is not a joke actually; it's an anecdote, although I do expect people to laugh at it. This is how Pakistan and the United States began their relationship. In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, after signing up Pakistan as an ally for the United States, came back to Washington and had lunch with Walter Lippman, the famous columnist. And he tried to persuade Lippman of the benefits of U.S. alliance with Pakistan. So he started by saying, look, Walter, we need some fighting men in South Asia against the communists. And the only men who can fight the communists in South Asia are the Gutkas, which is why I have signed on the Pakistanis as allies. Mr. Lippman turned around and said, Foster, the Gutkas are not Pakistanis. Dulles turned around and said, really? But they are Muslims, aren't they? And Lippman said, no, they are not. They are Hindus. Dulles turned around and said, who cares about the details. The important thing is we've got an ally and we should thank God for it.That, by the way, has been the U.S. approach towards Pakistan. Who cares about the details? And that is why Pakistan and U.S. relations have gone the way they have gone and are likely to go the same way again. I have a detailed statement, which is available to everybody here. I'm not going to bore you by repeating the written statement. For even greater detail, a 380-page book is going to be available tomorrow on amazon.com at $17.95 called Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. And that should suffice as the description of what I see as the problem.Let me begin by saying that the problem between the United States and Pakistan stems from Pakistan's complex nature as an ideological state controlled by the military. When Pakistan was created, it was intended to be a democratic state. It was supposed to be the Muslim majority

state in South Asia. Its founder, ironically, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was a Shi'a Muslim. Its foreign minister was an Ahmadi. Its first law minister was a Hindu. Yet, soon after Pakistan's creation, especially after Pakistan became an ally of the United States, the Pakistani military took over. And really, Pakistan's problems began there.I would respectfully disagree with Ms. Pletka that Pakistan needs a strong military to deal with terrorism because history tells us that it's the Pakistani military that has given birth to terrorism in that part of the world, rather than discouraging it. This is not the Turkish military. This is not the Egyptian military. The nature of this military needs to be understood.At the time of partition, Pakistan got 17 percent of the resources of undivided India and 33 percent of the military. So the country's security problems did not give birth to this military. The military actually needed those security problems to justify its existence as well as its large size. It has always been available to the United States for whatever may be the immediate concern of the United States, and the U.S. has never been sufficiently engaged with Pakistan to understand that Pakistan of itself and in itself is an important country with which the United States should establish relations. The relationship has often been between the Pakistani military and the U.S. defense establishment, and as a result, they have been able to, what I would say is, play the United States. And my fear is that we may be seeing a rerun of history, albeit in a different form.Now, the - (audio break, tape change) - not be able to have functioning states institutions that work according to the principles of - (unintelligible) - constitution or according to democratic principles.Since 1958, Pakistan has had three constitutions, but several massive constitutional amendments each dictated by the military. And the real divide in Pakistan is between the civilian political forces that want Pakistan - whose vision of Pakistan is that of a country based on the consent of its governed, of the consent of the people, and on constitution and on rule of law. Now, they haven't performed very well in the past but that is a detailed subject for another occasion and is dealt with in great detail in my book.The simplified version of Pakistani history is that the Pakistani military steps in to save Pakistan from the follies of its own politicians. I would say that that is not true. In fact, the Pakistani military simply does not relinquish control. It does not allow Pakistan civilian leadership ever to exercise control over the military and it certainly does not allow the civilians to determine the course of foreign policy or security policy.So what has happened after 9/11 is that the Pakistani military once again has decided to befriend itself with the United States and as a result receive a heavy payoff. This has been the pattern of the past: a big quid pro quo, in this particular case, more than $3 billion for five years. And while I do not disagree with those who suggest that the United States should continue to be generous towards Pakistan, I would point out that the nature of that generosity has to be defined much better.If it is only going to entrench the military in Pakistan's governing system, if it's only going to strengthen Pakistan intelligence services and the military again for another round, then Pakistan will not have democracy for many years to come, we will only have faux democracy like the one we have the moment.We will have some World Bank or City Bank official who has lived most of his life in New York or Washington being inducted into government and representing the country abroad, being very articulate in meetings with people like Mr. Inderfurth, and yet not representing the people of Pakistan. And such people will be able to persuade Americans that they continue to need American assistance to end problems that they themselves created a few years earlier or are even continuing to create at the present moment.The military's desire to dominate the political system and define Pakistan's national security priorities has been the most significant factor in encouraging any ideological paradigm for Pakistan. Pakistan supported Islamist militants fighting Indian rule in the disputed territory Jammu and Kashmir and backed the Taliban in its pursuit of a client regime in Afghanistan.Both were strategic decisions, not religious ones and the views that the personal religiosity of General Ziaul Haq who ruled Pakistan between 1977 and 1988 and Pakistan's participation in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan unleashed the genie of extremism is factually incorrect.There is a nexus between Pakistan's Islamist extremists and the military and it is that nexus that the United States should set as its long-term objective. I understand that in the short term, the United States needs Pakistani cooperation even if it is for the limited purpose of handing second-tier al-Qaeda leaders over to the United States. It is still something and as long as Pakistan continues to do that, it is in the United States' interest to continue to keep Pakistan engaged in that sense.However, it is important to keep the pressure on Pakistan's military as an institution to persuade it to gradually turn power over to secular civilians and allow the secular politics of competing economic and regional interests to prevail over religious sentiment. If that is not done, Pakistan will continue to be vulnerable to radical Islamic politics.It is important to understand that the military's domination of Pakistan is more or less complete. Several provisions in Pakistan, including university vice-chancellorships are reserved for serving or retired military officers. The so-called civilian component of the government is essentially window dressing for representation abroad. The United States ironically, when the civilians held some part of the government, was far more open in criticizing on a day-to-day basis what was happening inside Pakistan.And it is another irony - and I have demonstrated that irony with a chart at the end of my written presentation - that the United States - it has always benefited military rule in Pakistan rather than civilian rule. Since 1954, Pakistan has had a civilian government of some sort for 22 years. During this period, Pakistan received only $3.4 billion in American assistance, military and economic.For 28 years Pakistan has had a military government and during that military period of governance, Pakistan received more than $9 billion in aid from the United States. That works out to an average of $339 million per year of military rule and only $156 million for each year of civilian rule. So that basically shows how - the American pattern of engagement.Now, one can understand, an argument can be made that the Pakistani military controls everything and therefore we are we are better off having them. But as long as the Pakistani military knows that, the Pakistani military is in a better position to play that. So, for example, when they know that you need Pakistani cooperation in finding al-Qaeda personnel inside Pakistan, they also have an interest in prolonging the search for these personnel to continue the payoff.Similarly, they use this opportunity to get a free check or a free pass on the question of Dr. A.Q. Khan and his involvement with the spread of nuclear technology to third countries, which certainly could not have happened if Pakistan's governance was a little more open. I mean, it's not - it's incredible to believe that the country's principle nuclear scientist was able to travel with designs for nuclear enrichment centrifuges and probably nuclear materials without Pakistan's ubiquitous intelligence service knowing about it when the intelligence service usually

is pretty good at telling Pakistan's poor politicians what they had for breakfast by the afternoon.Now, what can the United States do? First, I think that the pattern of U.S. aid needs to be changed. I think that rewarding the Pakistani military with toys for the boys should stop. I think that each time Pakistan becomes America's quote-unquote, "friend" or "ally," Pakistan ends up receiving - and of course Lockheed Martin benefits - F-16s or some other weapon system, which in the end does not help raise Pakistan's literacy levels.At the time of partition in 1947, the areas of British India that went to India had a literacy rate of around 18 percent. What became Pakistan had a literacy rate of 16 percent. By 2003, India's literacy rate had gone from 18 in 1947 to 65 percent, and Pakistan's had risen from 16 percent to only 35 percent.

And Ms. Pletka rightly pointed out that this year's federal budget in Pakistan shows an increase of 35 percent for development expenditure and 15 percent for defense expenditure. But let me just point out that this has been the pattern for the last several years, that the budgeted amount for development is always much higher than the actual amount that is spent at the end of the year.So last year too, for example, 30 percent increase was shown in the allocation for development purposes but when the budget year ended, less of that money had actually been spent, whereas more than the money that had been allocated for defense had been spent. So unless that changes, the problem is not going to end.Chris Fair rightly pointed out the problem with the syllabi with the curriculum in government schools. The curriculum again is ideologically devised. It is devised primarily to create hatred for India, for Hindu India, for Zionist influence around the world. It's aimed at pointing out that Pakistan was created as an Islamic state and it basically glorifies the Pakistani military and the period that it has governed Pakistan.So going back to the recommendations -- first, change the pattern of aid, reduce military aid, increase economic assistance. Second, be more open and clear in criticism. For example, even in the case of this woman who was raped, Mukhtar Mai, if it wasn't for the bravery of Nicholas Kristof ofThe New York Times, who has repeatedly written about her, I doubt if the State Department would have opened its mouth about her. It took four columns in The New York Times to get a short comment from the State Department spokesperson, and I think that that needs to change.I think that specifics need to be pointed out. For example, when General Musharraf held his fake referendum in 2002, the U.S. government said, well, we do not approve of what has happened but we want to look forward to the future. Then the election was held, which was badly rigged and 40 days went by before the parliament as it was constituted could actually sit and an elect a prime minister, and the U.S. turned around and said we look forward to the future again.And now again Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said we look forward to the future, the election of 2007. Come 2007, the major political forces in Pakistan will still not be allowed to contest an open an honest election. The electoral process will be marred with failures and problems and the State Department will then turn around and say we look towards the future. We already have examples of countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt where similar approaches have resulted in stagnation. I think Pakistan is a country where things can change.The third thing that the United States needs to do is to end its revulsion for Pakistan's electable (ph), elected, and popular civilian leaders. Ms. Benazir Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz Sharif may not have been the best leaders for Pakistan, but both have demonstrated repeatedly that they do continue to enjoy broad political support in Pakistan. Even in the 2002 election, Ms. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party was the single largest vote getter in an election in which it was not allowed to campaign openly and its candidates were continuously intimidated, and Ms. Bhutto herself was in exile and her husband was in prison at that time.I think the United States government should publicly engage with both these leaders so that a signal goes to General Musharraf to do the same. On the one hand, Pakistani officials say that Pakistan will not be dictated to, but we have also learned that $3 billion is a lot of money to say no to and Pakistan has historically never not responded to American pressure on specifics as long as the aid continues to flow. Thank you very much. MS. BANSAL: Thank you, Mr. Haqqani.Before we go to some questions and answers, I just want to recognize our policy staff as well. We have Tad Stahnke, who is next to Mr. Crapa. Tad is the Director of Policy for the Commission. We have Patricia Carley, who is our Associate Director for Policy, and monitors South Asia and Pakistan as well. We have Christy Klaassen, who is the Commission's Government Affairs Director. And in the back I see Anne Johnson and Eileen Sullivan, our Communications Director and Deputy. So thank you to the staff for putting this together and thank you very much for your testimony.I have some questions but I'll turn it over first to my fellow Commissioners if they want to - should I go - okay, I'll go ahead and ask the first question. Mr. Haqqani, you mentioned that we should - as a policy recommendation that we should basically stop the sale of the F-16s and cut off military aid. Is that correct? MR. HAQQANI: No, ma'am, I did not say cut it off. I said basically reduce it, make it more rational in terms of - as a proportion of the total aid package. Instead of the half-and-half mix, it needs to be more economic assistance and less security assistance. The F-16s are never going to be used against terrorists because if the terrorists are living in the city of Gujarat, I cannot visualize the Pakistani air force bombing the city of Gujarat with F-16s. These are going to end up being used for Pakistan's regional influence and I don't think that the United States should be encouraging Pakistan's military in the delusion that it will be able to compete with its regional rivals on a weapon-system-for-weapon-system basis. So I think that is where we need to really check - MS. BANSAL: I am wondering how some of the carrot approaches to policy though will work. I am thinking especially of Ambassador Inderfurth's statement that the Pakistani officials regularly say, you know, we either want to be your targets or your - you either can make us your targets or your partners but you can't have it both ways, and I am wondering what your reaction is to that. MR. HAQQANI: Being a Pakistani official and having delivered that message myself a few times in the past, let me assure you that it is great rhetoric but it doesn't work that way. In the end, throughout the period of sanctions, Pakistan was constantly very anxious to get the sanctions lifted. At a time when the aid is flowing, I think there is no way and the benefits of that aid are going to the Pakistani elite.It is very interesting that the top 20 percent of Pakistanis account for 42 percent of the national income at the moment. The lowest 20 percent account for 8 percent. And of course the 20 percent include all of those who are in position right now and the economy is booming primarily because of concessional flows of assistance from around the world. So I doubt if they would look a gift horse in the mouth. They will say the necessary things but so does everybody else. I cannot visualize

General Musharraf actually putting the phone down on Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice saying don't write the next check. MS. BANSAL: What about condition - and I say this to all the panel - what about conditional U.S. assistance? If we were to give the carrot but say you have to make the following reforms? Is that kind of an approach effective? MS. PLETKA: Conditional aid is always effective. Our aid - I think there have been a lot of mischaracterizations of our assistance programs to Pakistan on the panel and it has put me in the very unpleasant position of defending the State Department, unpleasant and unfamiliar position of defending the State Department. These people aren't fools. I think they are probably as patriotic Americans as the rest of us are and are really interested in trying to do what they believe to be in our national interest. I don't think they are pouring money down Musharraf's throat or down the proverbial rat hole.Our assistance on education is conditioned but it is not sufficiently conditioned and it's not legislatively conditioned. There is something that is less than a memorandum of understand and more than a, gee, we really hope you spend the money in the right way attached to the $200 million that is provided in budgetary support that is meant to go to health and education.Husain makes a very good point that we should not rely alone on budgetary statistics to say, well, that job has certainly been done and done well. We need to see outputs where there are inputs and I think the State Department is very alive to that problem. But I really don't think we should begin to suggest that this is entirely a wrongheaded program, that money is simply being thrown at this place willy-nilly without any regard to consequences or to our own interests. Tied aid works - overly-tied aid that ends up getting cut off puts us in the same position that the Pressler memo put us in 1990.We need to be smart. I was a big supporter of the Pressler amendment and unfortunately sometimes when you point the gun, you end up pointing it at your own head before you point it at the Pakistanis. MS. BANSAL: Ms. Pletka, if I could just - you had mentioned in your testimony that a lot of the aid that doesn't go to the military, the U.S. aid currently that is not targeted for the military goes to budgetary support rather than directly to education. Does that mean it goes into a state coffer, is that what you're saying rather than - MS. PLETKA: Budgetary support is the American euphemism for a cash handoff to the government that goes into their own budget, their own treasury. We do it for a lot of countries. We give - we have a cash transfer program, for example, to Egypt. We have had one for many years and it took decades on decades before we were able to attach a memorandum of understanding to that to actually require that certain economic reforms would be made before that transfer would happen. Now I think that our own government is enthusiastic about seeing that happen but not so enthusiastic that they will assist on a signed memoranda of understanding, and that is something very important to understand.I also need to make another note, and that is that $600 million goes in ESF and FMF and I guess in DA. But there is lots of other money that goes to Pakistan. I imagine there is significant DOJ money that goes for police training. MS. FAIR: (Off mike) - not terribly much actually. MS. PLETKA: Well, I know that there is DS-ATA money that goes - it's between $10 million and $20 million in anti-terrorism assistance goes. I, when I was told that amount said, huh? Ten million to $20 million? Are you kidding? And I was told in response, you need to understand, most of that assistance is going in a form that is not visible to us and so none of us can speak to that. I would hope that that is paying significant attention to the to the kind of things that Chris Fair and Husain brought up. MS. FAIR: Actually, I would like to address that because in my work at USIP where we are trying to take a - as comprehensive as can be given the opacity. Let's take, for example, some of the assistance on law enforcement and police training. There is this peculiar thing I have noticed within our government: that the task is done when the money has been allocated. But when you actually then look at what is going on in the ground, those funds may not in fact be going anywhere.So let's take, for example, some of the justice programs. We have a huge, you know, huge, not by the standards of military support. So when I look at the enormity of the Pakistan police I don't think $10 million is very much at all to be quite frank with you given that policing is a cornerstone of counterterrorism operations. But if you look at, for example, some of the money that we have tagged through justice, it is waiting for Pakistan to put into place the necessary legislation that will allow us to give them that money. So unfortunately the Pakistanis haven't done that. There are a number of issues at stake.So when you see money allocated, it doesn't actually mean terribly much. Some of the other things that I have noticed - let us go back to the police training issue. We have language issues. You know, think what your average police in Pakistan. They don't speak English. So we have some really - it is not only the money being spent, it is how the money is being used. And as someone who has been hanging out in Pakistan for a while, you know, I see that there are some really big problems. Both as a taxpayer I'm concerned but also as a Pakistan analyst. I think that just because the money is allocated doesn't mean it's actually going there.I also want to make a point that I am literally between these two both physically and also in position about the support to military aid and the conditionality of it. What the Pakistanis are doing right now - and I think we need to be very clear - is in their national interest. There are times when there is a lot of drama, that they are doing this at great personal risk, and I am not in any way diminishing the risk that Musharraf confronts because clearly he has a challenge.But operating in FATA, trying to clean up sectarian violence, trying to have some sort of modus vivendi with the Indians, while, I might add, still retaining the option to maintain militancy in Kashmir. These are things that are in Pakistan's interests. We are not bribing them to do something they wouldn't otherwise do. And so I think we need to take greater advantage of the fact that we have a lot more room to wiggle.So it's literally, as I said, I am between these two persons. MS. BANSAL: Mr. Haqqani and Ambassador Inderfurth, let me just ask in addition, and you can answer this whenever you get a chance. Do we know - is there any way of accounting for whether the money actually goes to public education? And would it be a valuable recommendation to ask the GAO or something to try to do some kind of an audit of that, so to speak. MS. FAIR: Absolutely. I mean, whether you look at the madrassa issue, I was actually rather amused. I guess it was when Masharraf was trying to negotiate the legal framework order. Pakistan had allocated its own resources to madrassa reform, but if you actually look at what happened, that was basically a bargaining chip that he was able to use with the religious coalition, the MMA. That money went somewhere. There is no evidence that madrassa reform actually happened. No one has actually bothered going in and saying show me your progress.Despite claims to the contrary, when I go to Pakistan, I have colleagues that are also working on the madrassa issue, looking at madrassa registration.

None of that is happening, rhetoric not withstanding. Again, when you go - USAID has a $100 million education program, multi-year assigned. We are doing it in concert with the Pakistanis. RTI is one of the largest contractors. There is a lot of opacity about what has actually happened. Everything is in the planning phrase.And the curriculum issue as I mentioned, this is absolutely fundamental. The Pakistani curriculum, as our curriculum here in public schools, this creates citizens. If Pakistan's public system creates citizens that can live with its neighbors and can't even live comfortably within its own borders, we have a problem. So, yes, I think that is a superb recommendation. MR. HAQQANI: Yes, if I may just say two quick things. One is that one of the big problems that USAID has at the moment in Pakistan is that the USAID cannot have program officers for security concerns. I mean, they were - which is one of the reasons why a substantive amount - it's not like Egypt were the reason - it is more like security concerns that you can't have program officers running specific programs of madrassas in the tribal area. You can't let American citizens be there and that is one of the reasons why there is this lump-sum budgetary allocation which then gives money to the Pakistani government to determine what to do with it.The second is in the case of the Pressler amendment and its imposition, I think we must take, you know, a look at the chronology and Ambassador Inderfurth mentioned Dennis Kux's very good history of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Pakistanis felt by 1987 that their nuclear program was more or less complete.The Pressler amendment was not imposed until - sanctions were not imposed until 1990. And even between '89 and '90, there was a lot of hesitation in Washington, D.C., about imposing those sanctions. But when the sanctions were finally imposed, the Pakistanis immediately turned around and offered to cap their nuclear program. And that in itself was an advantage.So if the timing of the sanctions being impositioned or imposed or threatened had been earlier, maybe there would have been some impact. There is no way Pakistan would not have acquired nuclear weapons, let me say that. But just to say the sanctions - Pressler sanctions into it, there was a lot more to it.The detail is where - the detail was when the Pakistanis offered capping and freezing. The U.S. didn't accept. By the time the United States said, okay, if you will freeze we will remove the sanctions. By that time the Pakistanis had moved further along the road and at that time they didn't want to settle for that. So there was a lot of problems in negotiating all of that in those days in my opinion.That said, I do not support sanctions. I am not saying there should be sanctions. All I am saying is there should be more vocal reprimanding of what is essentially a client regime and a client state. And while we want to give them full respect and should, one should not forget that there is leverage and that leverage should be exercised, and by not exercising it - look, the speed with which the Musharraf administration responded to that one criticism from the State Department on the Mukhtar Mai thing.Within 24 hours, Musharraf, who had himself said, I have banned her or barred her from traveling then turns around and says, my heart and my mind has changed. Of course he hadn't seen the AP report which said Condoleezza Rice has spoken to him on this subject. He probably didn't realize this was going to come in the press. And so he immediately changed his heart after one telephone call.And I think that is leverage that should be used on issues such as human rights, religious freedoms, political rights, and not using it essentially, and praising the regime far too much all the time I think does not work to America's advantage. MS. BANSAL: Ambassador Inderfurth. MR. INDERFURTH: I think that, again, to place this discussion in context that we do need to understand the history of this relationship and keep that in mind. But I also think we need to keep in mind the present state of that relationship. And unlike a difficult U.S.-Pakistani relationship that I had to deal with in office, today I think there are far more positives in the relationship than negatives and therefore many more opportunities.For instance, I supported the decision on F-16s. I think it removes from the table a longstanding disagreement between us and Pakistan. They use to actually paint on their colorful trucks an F-16 on these as a symbol of, again, the fickleness and unreliability of the United States for many years because we neither provided, supplied the planes, or returned their money for this. So this was a symbolic thing.I also think that in terms of the F-16s that the Pakistani military, which is terribly important in this equation, that these aircraft will demonstrate to them that Musharraf is delivering on their security concerns. And I think that that probably is the most important - they need a sense of security to move forward including in the peace process that they have with India.To things that we haven't sort of focused on - three things I would like to mention. Again, education is terribly important and we should be looking at their curriculum but I have a certain hesitation for us to be so involved in another country's affairs that we are writing their curriculum for their schools. We ought to be advising, we ought to be assisting. But, you know, there is certain - it is their country and let's not forget that. It is not the United States of Pakistan; it is Pakistan.On three things that are very important that will relate to the issues of poverty, illiteracy, extremism. One is on the economic turnaround of Pakistan. The very-able-now prime minister, finance minister, Shaukat Aziz - there has been a turnaround in the Pakistani economy. It has now one of the fastest-growing GDPs in Asia. This is a good-news story. They are no longer on what they used to call the IMF-drip. They are no longer on that kind of - just-on-the-edge-of-bankruptcy relationship. An increasing focused, positive Pakistani economy will also provide opportunities and jobs and money for the budget.The peace process that is taking place is fundamentally important right now. It has been a two-year ongoing process from the hand of friendship to Prime Minister Vajpayee extended and President Musharraf reciprocated. This is showing progress in ways that we had not anticipated including on the bus service connecting the capitals of Kashmir. There is progress on the economic front. They are continuing to move forward. If this - if these two countries can truly normalize their relations, if this time they can address these issues in a sustained way, it is going to have a major impact on the whole question of extremism within Pakistan. This is a very important development.We also have the nonproliferation issue. And I do not know what the Administration - I have written on this and I have spoken about this - I don't know what the Administration has learned about the A.Q. Khan network. I imagine that whatever they have learned they are not going to put out in a press release. I am going to have to assume that the Administration is asking the right questions and getting the right information.If not, they should have a very private conversation with the leadership of Pakistan and say those things which we are doing now we will not continue doing. This is so fundamentally important to our national security interests. But these are things that you don't, in my view, legislate. These are things that an Administration should be responsible for ensuring that we are getting that kind of information. All of these will play into a continued, positive, forward-looking relationship with Pakistan.So I do think

that as we are looking at these things - and I actually - on this taskforce report that I refer to earlier by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Agent Society, there was a recommendation which I agreed with that there should be, as opposed to a 50-50 split on military security assistance and economic social assistance, that there should be a 60-40 split. I do think that more should be in that sector, but it should not be redlined out.There should be a significant side on the security side because Pakistan does in its - through its own perspective have security concerns which must be met and they are not, then Pakistan is not going to move forward on other issues that are important to us. So, again, I think that all of these issues need to be taken into account as you look at the overall relationship and where it is going. MS. GAER: I wanted to thank all of the panelists and raise a few follow-up questions. In her testimony two weeks ago, Assistant Secretary Rocca said that she thought that Pakistan's leaders have taken the steps necessary to set their country on the path to becoming a "modern, prosperous, democratic state," and that "as a result of forward thinking and action," she said, " Pakistan is now headed in the right direction." That is a direct quote.And a few months before that, the Deputy Assistant Secretary Donald Camp said that the U.S. goals were to seek a Pakistan secure and at peace with all of its neighbors, a voice for tolerance and moderation in the Islamic world, and a country that can serve as an inspiring model for the broader Middle East and South Asia region.I wanted to basically ask three questions that follow up on that assessment: first of all, whether you agree that Pakistan is moving in the right direction and if there is any reasonable expectation that it will serve as a model for others in the region or in the broader Middle East.Secondly, in the work of our Commission, we have focused closely on the question of where the government is active with regard to abusive actions or failing to uphold freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, and where the government is inactive or negligent in that regard in failing to follow up on attacks on houses of worship, in failing to set certain kinds of limits, and in failing to investigate, and in areas where it has legislated, for example, with regard to the Ahmadis.My question, thinking of the two examples that were mentioned here, the women-in-sport demonstration that our Chairman spoke about and the A.Q. Khan network, as another example, is the government - is the problem in Pakistan one of governmental and military action or one of inaction? And I would appreciate if the panelists could comment on that.I have a third question related to that, which is Ms. Pletka has recently been involved in the USIP study on UN reform. And of course Ambassador Inderfurth has extensive involvement in that area. If we look at the Pakistani positions with regard to UN reform in the human rights area, we often find that they are the principle spokesperson, idea generator, and leader of the - I think they call themselves the likeminded group, but the group that basically would like to see things either stay as they are or avoid reform that would involve scrutiny of countries all together.We had a recent example in the last week where the Pakistani delegate in New York spoke about human rights reform and seemed rather content, whereas the delegate in Geneva, no surprise, felt that the reform proposals are just completely unacceptable because they would be much too intrusive.My question is, is Pakistan a country we can look to as a model in reform of the UN or are they part of the problem? I appreciate hearing from any of the panelists. MS. FAIR: Could I take a shot at your first broad question? This is going to be an odd explanation, but I think it actually touches on various phenomena that you identified. And I would also be interested in hearing whether or not Husain agrees with me.This is my sense of what is going on in Pakistan over the last several years. Pakistan has always had a very West-leaning and sometimes American-leaning, but not always, elite. They have a very different way of living their lives in Islamabad. You can go to their house, you can have your scotch, you can watch women smoke in public, but the vast majority of Pakistanis of course don't live like that.In recent years, and I think probably it's fair to say that because of the dynamics leashed in the neighborhood, because of the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for a whole host of historical and sociopolitical reasons, Pakistan is really changing. The religious-conservative elements have gained I think a kind of legitimacy that they certainly haven't enjoyed since Zia, and I would actually say perhaps even more than the legitimacy that they enjoyed under Zia.With President Musharraf and his complete antipathy to the two mainstream parties, it is the religious opposition, the religious coalition that is the only significant voice of opposition. It is the religious parties that are forced to make the arguments about constitutionality. And for this and a whole host of other reasons, legitimate sort of mainstream opinions that don't fall into either of these extreme camps I think are eroding.And you see this when you talk to people when I go to Lahore. Traditionally Pakistanis have been adherents of the Barelvi. It is a Sufi tradition. I am amazed when I talk to taxi drivers, when I talk to people who sell carpets, you know, the kind of folks that, you know, you would ordinarily encounter running around in Pakistan as a person doing research. A lot of people say, yeah, I used to be a Barelvi, but now I'm a Deobandi. And this is a really weird kind of thing because I think before they would interact with, say, a missionary, they wouldn't even answer that they were a Barelvi. They would just say I'm a Muslim.So I think that we really have to be cognizant that certainly, you know, since the '80s, Pakistani society has really undergone a transformation. And I think this explains why, for example, when you have - even though Pakistan would like to - it's elites in Islamabad that mostly USG folks meet would love to have women running in the streets of Lahore, the fact of the matter is that is not where the bulk of Pakistani opinion lies.And if you look - and I have got slews of survey data after survey data -- you know, this is pretty much conforming to what I'm saying. So I think that when you have a society that is increasingly becoming polarized and the middle is being hollowed out and there is not a space for consensus, and you have a regime that wants to order, enlighten moderation from the top down without having a grassroots demand for it, these are the kinds of interactions that you get.You get security forces that dislike Shia, aren't particularly compelled to take action against people harming Shia. There is no accountability and so part of accountability has to do deal with governance but the governance issues are reflective I believe of this societal transformation that is undertaken. MR. HAQQANI: I will just have a - you know, Pakistan has - I mean, there are people who have found Pakistan's glass half-full for every year that Pakistan has existed and there are people who have found the glass half-empty. And I mean, you know, I was just thinking that Ambassador Inderfurth and I should kind of do dual act from now on - the half-full the half-empty type.My thing is that - you know, the U.S., if you look back - and I have done that - similar things have been said about Pakistan before - that, you know, it's turning the corner, et cetera. So why doesn't it turn the corner? Maybe it's

time to try and understand what is at fault and that is the other day my kid bought me a glass. And I understood the problem immediately. This was a glass which has, like, two levels, and in there you can play it around and it still looks as if it has got something in it when it doesn't have something in it.And Pakistan has an elite because many of them are American-educated, many of them have worked here, half of them live in Washington, D.C., and then go and do two or three years as ministers in Pakistan and then come back. You know, there are several senators in Pakistan right now who actually live in the U.S., but they just travel to attend senate meetings and the come back.And so these guys, when they are telling you what is happening, they have their glass with them and they always show it to you and say it's half-full. So the U.S. government - now, I agree with Ms. Pletka, even though it was a very difficult statement for her to make that the State Department is basically a good institution - (laughter) - those guys aren't - yeah, I agree with that. But that problem is that the average American diplomat is essentially looking only at the short term.Now, recently I called an American diplomat who is dealing with Pakistan and I said, by the way, do you have any idea what happened in 1992 when the United States was worried about Pakistan - the U.S. almost declared Pakistan a terrorist state. And so I said what happened? And he said, you know something, the papers for that period, I have no access to, so I really don't - who do you think was around at that time that I can talk to?And that is how the institution memory in this country works, whereas in Pakistan, the institutional memory is everybody remembers what conversation Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had with Lyndon Johnson in 1963. And so therefore the pattern is very different. It's easier for the Pakistani elite to create illusions for Americans.Now, the economy, for example: 1970, in Pakistan, the economic factors were that the lowest 20 percent had 8 percent of their share in the economy and the highest 20 percent had 40. That has changed. The highest 20 percent now have 42; the lowest still have 8 percent. Somebody has lost that 2 percent and that is the middle. And similarly, poverty has been consistently rising. It is rising at a rate, according to the World Bank, of 3 percent per annum. It's 33 percent people living below the poverty line, which is less than $1 per day and 21 percent living just above it and on less than $2 a day. So that is 57 percent. It's an enormous amount.Now, I agree, Mr. Shaukat Aziz is great. He is a dear friend of mine and I find him very impressive. I would rather sit and have a meal with him than some of the opposition figures in Pakistan. But the fact of the matter is that the economic recovery he has done is essentially an account book recovery; it is not a change in the life of average Pakistanis.And those are the kinds of things that lead American officials astray in dealing with Pakistan. The moment we recognize that somebody is actually deliberately setting out to give us a half-empty, half-full illusion, we will understand the on-ground situation much better. MS. PLETKA: I have been looking forward to answer your UN question, but I do want to make one aside. I don't think that we're smarter than the people who are looking at Pakistan in our government. I don't think that we are more sophisticated either. I think that they are well aware that the glass is less than half-full. They propagate a variety of rosy scenarios for a whole variety of reasons and I criticize that in my original testimony.But I do think that, hey, you gave $300 million to education; why isn't the education system turned around? I don't understand. Hey, you gave a lot of money to child survival; why are birthrates not picking up? This is a very wrongheaded way to look at development assistance. It is slower than heck and it really is. If you look at our experience over 20 years in countries like Egypt where we have poured massive amounts of money into project-tied assistance that didn't go through the government, things happen very, very slowly.And while I think we can probably reasonably argue that things have not moved as quickly even as they might in that slow fashion in Pakistan, I do think that an expectation that things like curricula and other things should turn around quite as quickly as that. As much as I would like to see them done and as much as I would like to see us put more pressure on them, I think we shouldn't have unreasonable expectations.On the question of the United Nations - this is a terrific question - Pakistan stinks. They really do. And, by the way, the Indians do too, just sort of for equal opportunity South Asia bashing. The Pakistani ambassador in New York is certainly not somebody who should earn any of our admiration. Their stand on the Human Rights Commission is the same as the stand of - as a whole raft of human rights violators. And it wouldn't surprise me if they were fronting for their dear friend, the Chinese, and others.This is the way it is up there. This is a problem of the UN It isn't a problem of Pakistan; it is a problem of the United Nations. The non-align movement plays a pernicious role at the United Nations, a consistently pernicious role. The Pakistanis are - would, if they are part of the NPT, have been very unhelpful at the NPT review conference. As it was, we had to rely on that other aid recipient, Egypt, to front for the Iranians that have behaved badly.

But the bottom line is all of these countries behave enormously irresponsibly and badly. And I would agree with, and I think we would all agree that part of the package of being a friend - (audio break, tape change) - MS. FAIR: (In progress) -- issue altogether. My sources in Pakistan tell me - and I have no reason to doubt it; I had a contact who just came back from a militant training camp two weeks ago - the strategy is let's lower this as down as we can go, avoid a crisis with India, keep the U.S. off our back, but let's keep it at a level where we can still retain the option.So to answer your question, the policy and the commitment that we can expect from Pakistan really hinges upon the way this market is segmented within Islamabad. A couple of factors I think have really galvanized Islamabad to view this differently. You've always had this concept of overlapping membership. So for example, Jaish-e-Mohammad, which is most notorious for operating in Indian-administered Kashmir, has a lot of overlapping membership with the anti-Shi'a group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. In the past, in the pre-9/11 world, in a world before Musharraf decided to side with us, these groups kept to their own operational theaters, and what we've seen is that that really isn't so much the case. Jaish-e-Mohammad has fractionated. And there is a long, grotesque story behind it, but Jaish-e-Mohammad is, you know, pairing up with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and SSP to commit attacks against the state.So, to summarize, on al-Qaeda, yeah, I think we've got their attention, but when it comes to everyone else, it really depends upon the vicissitudes and the strategic calculus of Islamabad. MS. BANSAL: Can we go back to Ambassador Inderfurth? MR. INDERFURTH: On the question of are we moving in the right direction, I think that we are moving in the right direction but we have not arrived there yet and it's going to take a lot of persistent work to get there. We would all like to see Pakistan become a model of

Islamic democracy in the region. That would be a great achievement. But it's going to take time, and there will be setbacks, and there will be things that the Pakistani government will do, either through commission or omission, which we're going to be very upset about. But I think we are moving in the right direction.I also believe that there has been an evolution in President Musharraf's thinking. Those things which he said about jihadist activities when he took power and what he is saying now, that there has been an evolution - I think his speech, his national nationwide speech in January of 2002, was probably one of the most pointed speeches that a Pakistani leader has given about the nature of extremism and what it was doing to Pakistani society and his determination to go after this. His endorsement of enlightened moderation is something that is still a work in progress, but I think that he has been saying those things which give some hope to those of us that want to see Pakistan move in that direction. I think that he is also, through his actions - al-Qaeda, as Christine said - clearly he has recognized that we are in this together and there have been results.We continue to have discussions with him about the Taliban. Recently President Bush was on the phone with President Karzai and President Musharraf to encourage greater cooperation because of the attacks that are taking place right now in Afghanistan on the issue that is absolutely critical to the peace process, and that is the cross-border infiltration terrorism from Pakistan. The defense minister of India was here. I attended one of his speeches. The Indians acknowledge that this is at a low level and this is clearly a reflection of a decision by Pakistan to address that concern. And I trust that that will be maintained. If it doesn't, then much can unravel.So I think that - what I said in my remarks, that the United States should be - as the 9/11 Commission said, the United States should be prepared to make a long-term commitment to Pakistan to work with it as a partner - that's my addition - so long as Pakistan's leaders continue to be willing to make the tough choices, and that is the key. NINA SHEA: I also want to thank everyone for coming today and giving your very interesting testimony. There is much to ponder. We have spent a lot of time talking about militancy and security and terrorism issues, and I'd like to turn a little bit to human rights issues and religious freedom and raise the issue of the trend line in Pakistani law and the constitution where there has been an Islamization, first with the repugnancy clause that no law can be contrary to Islam, which gave Islamic courts a lot of power to veto laws, and then with the June 2003 passage of a Taliban-like Sharia law in the northwest frontier province assembly. And of course there are also blasphemy laws that carry the capital punishment.And I want to ask you for - anyone here - how this is affecting religious freedom, women's rights, due process and other individual freedoms, and is there anything the United States can do about it, and should we be doing about it? Because my own feeling is that this is not going to be helpful towards guaranteeing or securing individual rights, women's rights, so forth, and it's becoming more of a problem rather than less of a problem and it's a very difficult issue to press.Would anyone - Dr. Fair, you talked about the growing - you acknowledge that there is a trend since the ‘80s toward Islamization. MS. FAIR: To be honest, on these issues Pakistan has been bad every since I have been going. Now, because this is not my portfolio I can just tell you what it's like to be a woman. And obviously when I go to Pakistan I wear a salwar kameez. From behind you can't tell what I am. And I might add, no one ever thinks I'm American. They've got all kinds of ideas - Chitrali, Pathan, you name it, but not American.So what I've observed over the last several years is that when I cruise around Lahore or whatever, you know, women - the public presence of women I think has gone down. For example, you go to a bank, you go to the post office, you go on a PIA flight, there are times when I ask, did I get on the dude flight because where are the women? And I'm really struck - when I was a student I used to read a lot of Urdu literature, and I would read stories about Lahore at partition, and there would be stories of women riding bicycles. If you try to ride a bicycle and you're a woman in Lahore, you've got one thing coming: someone is going to run you over. And I remember when I was a student I asked, well, can I just ride a bike to class? No.So in terms of just being a women and getting around that country, it's very difficult. Pubic transportation, something which fortunately now my capacity I never worry about, but when I was a student I remember you would have these minivans; exactly two seats were reserved for women, and usually the buddies of the driver would be sitting there. So here you are a girl, you know, trying to get yourself to class. And I also remember sitting - or standing usually - at these bus areas; girls were subject to all sorts of harassment by, of course, males. And on one occasion I was so harassed and I decked the gentleman in question, and the women were utterly dumbfounded. They said, if we did that, our parents would never let us go to school. And I learned a really important lesson, that it's an environment of impunity. So these girls, every single day they go to school and this is their life.So I'm not in a position to say whether it's gotten worse of what have you; I can only say that on these issues it's been terrible. Ever since I've been going to Pakistan - you hear stories about people using the blasphemy laws to basically get their neighbors into trouble to seize their property; honor killings - this has been pervasive. Something that we haven't talked about is sexual abuse. One of the main reasons why I believe madrassas are so problematic is because it creates an environment that doesn't create good citizens. In my own work on madrassas it turns out sexual abuse is going on in madrassas. When you travel to the front - and I'm talking about male-on-male sexual abuse, to be clear. When you go to the frontier area it's a well-known tribal practice for men to rape men as a form of punishment. So the Mukhtar Mai case, as horrible as it was, there was another side to it as well. Men are also victimized in this way.So I don't feel comfortable saying that things are getting worse and I don't feel like I'm in a position to say that. I can only say that since 1991, which is how long I've been going to Pakistan, Pakistan is bad on all those counts. MS. BANSAL: Mr. Haqqani? MR. HAQQANI: I think that things have gotten worse since the 1960s and ‘70s - '60s and ‘70s were far more open. We had, for example, in the 1970s Pakistan went and opened more women's schools, and I saw more women during the days when I attended an all-boys school - because all my teachers were women, even though the students were all boys - than my daughter does now, studying in Pakistan.Things have changed. The conservatism - and there is a politics to that conservatism too that must be understood. The religious political parties, in the famous 1970 election, which is Pakistan's first election, altogether managed to get less than 6 percent of the vote. The bulk of the vote went to regional or the socialist or Social Democratic People's Party at that time, and the military didn't like them. And so the military then started encouraging the religious parties to become street protestors. So basically they can put in the street 20,000, 30,000, 40,000 people at the

drop of a hat, and that is their strength. And concessions have consistently been made by Pakistan's military and military regimes.And now, for example - it's very interesting - in the 2002 election, after that General Musharraf not only wanted to determine who he will appoint prime minister - which of course as president he probably had the right to do - he also chose the opposition leader and he preferred appointing the Islamist Maulana Fazlur Rehman as the leader of the opposition instead of the leader of the opposition chosen by the opposition in parliament, which is - basically what it does is it empowers the Islamists, who, because they really do not have the idea of how to create a new Islamist regime, they pick on these issues. Women are the easiest target for them. For example, the NWFP government, which is the MMA government, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Islamist group, what can they do? I mean, how will their economic policies be different from somebody else? How will their - so the one thing they can do is put more restrictions on women, or strengthen the Sharia laws, or focus more on blasphemy laws, and the military would rather let them have their way than allow some secular opposition to come into play.The positive side, however, is that Pakistan's civil society is also not giving up. So for example, people like Asma Janhangir are resisting it, and there are small civil society organizations, and that is how you all and we all find out about Mukhtar Mai. Otherwise it would be just an incident that never gets supported. So that's the positive side to things. The civil society is also gearing up, and if we could create some more space for civil society in the political process, then maybe they would be able to insert themselves in there. And one little comment - MS. SHEA: How do we do that? I want to know how to do that. MR. HAQQANI: Okay, we'll talk about it, but let me just make one more comment on Pakistan and the UN. It's very interesting - look at Pakistan's track record on terrorism in the United Nations. Pakistan has consistently voted with those countries that want to have a restrictive definition of terrorism, and I have written this quite often too, that it's amazing that Pakistan is, on the one hand, a U.S. ally in the war against terrorism, and that is its claim to fame and support in Washington, D.C. And on the other hand, in the United Nations, the commission that was there to define terrorism and wanted to continue to define terrorism in a very restricted way so that, quote, unquote, "freedom struggles" were not affected.And so basically they do play both sides on all questions. On the question of civil society I think the most - MS. BANSAL: Can I just add to that question on civil society and make it a little specific? MR. HAQQANI: Sure. MS. BANSAL: A lot of you have spoken about the fact that we should not be giving at least some of our aid directly to the government for non-military aid. Are there NGO groups; are there others that should be getting that aid? Is that a viable alternative for U.S. aid to be going to those - and how vibrant is civil society and how accountable is it? MS. FAIR: All right, I'm not really optimistic. I mean, if you look at some of the most important women's NGOs in Pakistan - and as a woman it's very difficult for me to say this because it even offends my ears but when you're on the ground you hear it - it's a cottage industry for elite women. Often they will concentrate on issues that mostly affect urban women.So, yes, I'm confident there probably are good partners out there. When I was a student I volunteered with an NGO that focused on human rights issues in the rural area, which is where you have some truly appalling things, but I think what really demonstrated to me where their commitment lied (sic) was that all of their products were in English, which they then sent back to their donors. So obviously an NGO really interested in making a difference as opposed to creating a nice job for themselves should have a dissemination strategy and an outreach strategy to their own citizens.So I do believe that there is a way of reaching out to civil society, but it's very, very difficult to do, and I know that there are a number of Pakistani diasporans - they are our natural allies in some sense - you know, they have the language skills, they have the - of course they have their own vested interests, but I believe that this is something that we really have to do. We have to find the right partners on the ground, we have to be vigilant; we need to check their activities - are they only producing books in English? MS. BANSAL: How do we do that? MS. FAIR: Well, I mean, this is where I go back to - MS. BANSAL: I would like to hear what Dr. - MS. FAIR: Because our footprint in Islamabad is so constrained because of the security environment, we've really lost - you know, people just don't travel outside of Islamabad or Lahore. The security office goes insane.So in the absence of better alternatives than the current environment, I think we really do need to turn to the Pakistani diaspora. When I lived in Los Angeles I was familiar with one group that ran a - it's called Developments in Literacy (DIL); it means "heart" in Urdu. They're doing a lot of work on the ground. So in the absence of being able to find our own partners in Pakistan because of the security issue, the Pakistani diaspora may be our best ally in this task but it's - this is not going to be an easy task but it is nonetheless a necessary task. MS. BANSAL: I would like to ask someone from the Pakistani diaspora who is not on our panel - (inaudible). MR. HAQQANI: Let me just say that, look, I used to be very cynical about NGOs. The point is NGOs are not a substitute for better governance. So, I mean, it's very unfair to - and look, Mukhtar Mai has now created an NGO. She is not an elite woman, and her NGO definitely - she is a woman who, because of being raped and because of being humiliated, instead of going and crying she decided to do something about it. And I think there will be more like that.The point is that some support does need to go to the NGOs, and, yes, there will be some who will be a cottage industry and they will be elitist, et cetera, et cetera, but the point is what are the alternatives - strengthening the military intelligence bureaucracy more and more? And even the Pakistani diaspora is divided between the Pakistani diaspora elite that basically wants senior positions in the military regime and wants to come back to Washington with the rank of minister or something and impress their colleagues and friends here, and who, by the way, don't own property there and own property here and will return here. How are they going to change the situation there?I think that the non-governmental organizations do have a valuable role to play, especially, if in nothing else, identifying the human rights problems. Even their reports in English have value because they enable people like yourselves to understand what's going on. They document the problems. Because, very frankly - however, this is not supposed to be - maybe I think Danielle Pletka should have done this - but the State Department doesn't do its job very properly, even on documenting human rights violations of friends. There is a trend there for the regional bureau to tell the human rights bureau to go easy on friends, you know, and the drafts always change because after the regional bureau has intervened and said, hey, so and so and so, Musharraf is giving us so much; we have to do something for Musharraf. And that's about it. But Musharraf is going to die one of these days, you know? Pakistan hopefully will still be around. It's 150 million people.And

Pakistan - and however smart the technocrats might be, we still need, on the one hand, the NGOs, but I think the political formations in Pakistan that enjoy popular support should also be engaged with whether we like them or we don't like them. The fact of the matter is that those who speak on behalf of the people of Pakistan should definitely get some hearing in Washington, D.C., which they no longer do. MS. FAIR: I'd like to expand upon that. I'll be really quick. The thing about the NGOs, they create demand to have something different in Pakistan. So let's take the issue of police reform. We're working on this issue at the top with the hope that maybe it'll percolate. But in fact, if the basic Pakistani doesn't know how to call the police, doesn't know how to get an FIR, doesn't know that he or she has the right to expect his first information report to be accepted by the police. If there is not a demand for doing business differently, then it's going to be very difficult, at least for me, to imagine these top-down issues percolating to the bottom. And NGOs have a really important role to play in that. MS. BANSAL: Let's hear from Ambassador Inderfurth, and then we have two quick follow-ups then we'll try and wrap this up. MR. INDERFURTH: On the question of NGOs and civil society, I think that that is another area that we should be supporting and finding ways to do that. I'll again call attention to Ambassador Teresita Schaffer's report on Pakistan's future and U.S. policy options. She has some specific recommendations, and I would urge you to speak with her because she has looked at that.Let me also mention, in terms of the broadening of the relationship that I have said is now the time to do. We have been focused - and I said understandably - since 9/11 on the al-Qaeda and making sure that we were getting the kind of cooperation and results from Pakistan that were necessary. But I do believe that we are at a time, because our relations are as good as they have been in many, many years, perhaps - I can't go back all the way, the 50 years, but certainly a very positive relationship - that it is time to broaden our discussions with Pakistani leaders into many other areas that we have not been speaking to the last three years.I saw that the director for policy planning, Mr. Krasner, was just in Islamabad meeting with the minister for religious affairs. They were discussing the blasphemy laws. They were discussing madrassa reform - all those things which should get higher up on the agenda. And I do believe that because relations are better, because we are demonstrating to Pakistan that we are responsive to their concerns, that we should get a more positive response to ours.One thing that we do have to continue to work on, however - and the recent Pew poll showed this - is no matter what we're doing there, we are still held in very low esteem: 23 percent favorable, 60 percent unfavorable in terms of public opinion in Pakistan. This is not helpful. It is not helpful when we're asking more things of Pakistan to have such a low opinion of the United States there. Somehow we need to be working on that, and I hope that that can be done because the more that turns around the more we could create a more positive environment for president Musharraf and others to be responsive to these additional matters that we have on our agenda. MS. SHEA: I just want to ask a quick follow-up question and then let our Chairman, Preeta Bansal, ask her question and wrap up. But if you could quickly tell me - if anyone has a reaction to this - is the "Shariazation" of the legal system, at least some parts, having a dampening effect on debate and government discussion and criticism of the government within Pakistan? Do you see that reflected in political speech, in the media or other areas - or in society? MS. BANSAL: Everybody is shaking their head but nobody wants to answer you. MS. FAIR: Everybody is saying no. No is the answer. (Cross talk.) MS. SHEA: It can be a yes or no answer. MS. FAIR: No - I think the answer is no. I mean, some of the most egregious things have already happened - the Hudood Ordinance. And no matter how much Musharraf may say to you and I that he wants that thing to be revoked, there's no effort in revoking the Hudood Ordinance. But what I do see - and I think this has been true for a very long time - (cross talk). No, I think the answer is no. There is a lot of self-censorship, mostly because they don't want to tick off the regime, but I don't think that the issue of - I don't even necessarily agree that there is a Shariazation per se. I think some of the worst things have already happened.But I do think the problem with the MMA remaining as the main opposition is the more Musharraf needs them, the more he makes concessions to them legally, and once those concessions are made they're almost impossible to take back in the history of Pakistan. I don't think - as you've defined the problem, I would say the answer is no. MR. HAQQANI: I would agree with that. Actually what sometimes we miss is that the real political debate in Pakistan is over the nature of the regime and not over the Sharia. And the Sharia is -

MS. SHEA: Why is that? I mean, is that because of the chilling effect? I mean, I've heard that, for example, it's impossible to revoke, at this point, the blasphemy laws, even though a lot of people are aware - (Cross talk.) MR. HAQQANI: Well, that's the government's version and the version of those who are kind of sympathetic to the government. The opposition in parliament came up with a new version, for example of - you know, an amendment to the Hudood Ordinance, which basically would have taken away most of the Sharia elements of the Hudood Ordinance. And the government paired up - this is the secular opposition - the PPP and the PML-N. The PML-Q, which is the government party, ended up siding with the Islamic parties and gave a majority to keeping the Hudood Ordinance.So basically the parliamentary dynamic - I mean, not that the parliament is sovereign, but to the extent that parliament can play a role, the parliament arithmetic basically depends on who the government actually makes the deal with, and the government chose and has consistently chosen to make deals with the Islamists - the same is the case with the North-West Frontier Assembly. I mean, the Islamists, with 11 percent of the national vote - ended up with 20 percent of the seats because of the way that the seats were gerrymandered, and now, unless and until somebody is willing to address those basic issues of how Pakistan's internal political dynamic is, you know - which is the debate in Pakistan. If you read the Urdu newspapers, that's what people are arguing about: should the military continue to remain in charge? Is General Musharraf legitimate? Should his constitutional amendments be accepted? Should he remain army chief and president at the same time even though the constitution of Pakistan does not allow a serving military officer to hold political office?Those are the issues that concern more Pakistanis, and then that is why the MMA, only to play to its constituency, went through this whole Shariazation, but on a day-to-day basis it doesn't change the lives of people unless and until the permanent state apparatus - which is the military, the civil service and the intelligence services, they decide to use that and invoke that to cause grievance to somebody. MS. BANSAL: That kind of segues nicely into what I hope is the final follow-up question, which is can President Musharraf be pushed by the United States on religious freedom and religious

extremism? And for the United States to do so, to be vocal about this, does that just aid the hand of the extremists? Is it counterproductive? MR. INDERFURTH: I think that President Musharraf will very much listen to what we have to say and then he will calculate what he can do and can't do about that. I think that the issues that we're discussing here, some of those I think are best done privately as opposed to publicly. I think that to articulate all of our concerns vocally and publicly can be counterproductive. Again, I think we play to our strengths right now, which is that we are working together and that this is an issue of great concern to the United States and we need to communicate that in the most effective way to get results. MS. PLEKTA: I think that is absolutely right. I think we certainly can push Musharraf a lot harder than we've been willing to on a whole scope of - range of issues, including the presence of extremism and religious prejudice. There is no doubt whatsoever that he can do better. There is no doubt whatsoever that his calculation of what is achievable is not necessarily what our calculation would be, and that pushing is not the wrong thing. The real question is how we do it, whether we make it public or not, and what we - the red lines we set for ourselves if these things aren't done. It can't just be a matter of convenience. This again goes back to the issue of having it both ways. We need to decide what must be achieved and then we need to set those goals out very clearly, not to him so much but to ourselves as well. And if we're able to do that and we are able to push him very hard to understand that we will not accept no for an answer, then there may well be some changes, but thus far I don't think that we've given him those sorts of options even in private. MS. BANSAL: Does anyone want to add anything? MR. : (Off mike.) MS. BANSAL: Okay, very good. I don't know what that means in terms of our Commission and our public reporting - but we'll take that in mind.Thank you very much. Thank you again for your time and your expertise.(END)