

North Korea: Human Rights Ground Zero: Transcript

COMMISSIONERS: MICHAEL K. YOUNG, PREETA D. BANSAL, ARCHBISHOP CHARLES CHAPUT, FELICE D. GAERRICH, LAND WITNESSES: MR. ROGER WINTER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DAVID HAWK, SENIOR RESEARCHER, THE U.S. COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA, SUZANNE SCHOLTE, PRESIDENT, THE DEFENSE FORUM FOUNDATION, REVEREND ISSAC, PASTOR, THE CORNERSTONE MINISTRY, MR. KIM YONG, NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE, TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2004 (transcript by: Federal News Service Washington, D.C.)

MICHAEL K. YOUNG: Ladies and gentlemen, we're delighted to welcome you to this hearing tonight, a hearing that we consider particularly timely, a hearing that will focus on the North Korean crisis, "Human Rights Ground Zero." That's how we've entitled this hearing tonight. And we want to first extend our thanks to the dean of the UCLA Law School, a good friend, and our commissioner, Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl, who is in fact a professor here at UCLA Law School, for the use of this room, and we appreciate that. Secondly, would like to extend our great appreciation for all of our panelists, whom I will introduce in a few moments, who have taken the time to be with us tonight, some coming from long distances. We also express our thanks tonight to the Gilsu family, the artist of the drawings you see displayed here in the hearing room, and we invite you to look at those after the hearing is over. They're moving and informative at the same time. We also express our deep thanks to the Korean-American community here in Los Angeles who have helped spread the word on this hearing, especially Mr. Jay Lee, who is president of the Korean Congress for North Korean Human Rights, and to the Korean Studies Center of the University of California at Los Angeles for all their efforts in inviting students and faculty to be with us as well. The United States Commission on Religious Freedom was established by Congress in 1998 to monitor the conditions of religious freedom around the world, and most importantly to make recommendations to the President, to the secretary of State, and to the Congress as to how U.S. policy can most effectively advance the cause of religious liberties around the world. We're an independent, bipartisan agency whose members are appointed by the president and the Congress, but separate from the executive branch. And, equally important to understand, we propound the principles of religious freedom around the world, those based on international human rights treaties and documents; not just the American view of religious liberties, but in fact those religious liberties that are articulated at the U.N. Convention on Human Rights, the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and so forth. The Commission first recommended North Korea as a country of particular concern, which is a statutory designation indicating that the country is engaged in systematic, egregious, ongoing abuse of freedom of religion. We first suggested naming North Korea in 2001, and since then our commission has continued to speak out about the abysmal condition of human rights in North Korea and the need for U.S. policy to address those conditions. The Commission has testified before Congress and raised these issues directly with senior administration officials in successive administrations. Members of the Commission have traveled to the region to speak to North Korean refugees and to representatives of the organizations that assist them. In January of 2002, the Commission held its first public hearing on North Korea and then issued a detailed set of policy recommendations in April of 2002. Those recommendations and our report are available outside along with more information about the Commission. Up to 300,000 North Koreans have fled their country in search of refuge and asylum in the past several years. The refugee crisis is a terrible humanitarian crisis, but it's only the tip of a much larger humanitarian iceberg. North Koreans live in unspeakable conditions: suffering hunger, disease, and brutal oppression by a cruel totalitarian regime that pursues military might and the weapons of mass destruction. Let us make no mistake: the North Korean refugee crisis reflects the profound human rights disaster inside that country as well as the intense disregard by that regime for the dignity and the needs of the North Korean people. That's where it all begins. North Koreans have suffered through five decades of failed social, economic and political policies, as well as grave human rights abuses. The extent of the degradation is startling. An estimated one million are dead from famine in the last decade. I recently learned of a report that the North Koreans have lowered height requirements for adult male military conscripts from 4'11" to 4'2" due to the widespread stunted growth of the population. We will hear this evening about an extensive system of prison camps in North Korea as well, where the government imprisons political prisoners and their families, including anyone who attempts to flee the country or anyone associating with religious organizations. Conditions are so bad in some prisons that 25 percent, fully a quarter of the prisoners, die each year. In short, life is cheap to the North Korean government. There are no individual freedoms of any kind, no religious freedom, and what little religious activity is permitted by the government is staged for the benefit of foreigners. Tragically, the North Koreans who risk their lives to enter China face continued persecution. China has labeled the North Korean refugees as economic migrants, and repatriates those who are caught. At the hands of local police, North Korean refugees are subject to extortion, and female refugees are often sold and trafficked as wives or as prostitutes. Men are often used for low-paid or unpaid labor in Chinese factories, and children are sold into debt bondage. The Chinese government has also cracked down on nongovernmental organizations who assist these refugees, and have arrested and punished members of those organizations. Any alleged contact with foreigners makes a North Korean a traitor to the regime and leads almost invariably to a long prison term or summary execution upon their return to North Korea. It's time for the Chinese authorities to give serious attention to this humanitarian crisis and take affirmative steps to work with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the NGO groups in developing a process for helping these refugees. Within the last 18 months, North Korean leaders have stepped up their nuclear weapons program as well and publicly withdrawn from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. U.S. policy on North Korea continues to focus primarily on the issues of nuclear proliferation and security. While these are critical and important issues, the nuclear ambitions and reckless behavior of the North Korean leadership stems from the same disregard and non-responsiveness of the regime to the needs of its

people that have produced the humanitarian disaster, the degradation of freedom, and systematic and severe abuses of human rights. We should not allow the unpredictable nature of the North Korean regime to divert us from the need to remain focused on humanitarian and human rights concerns. Human rights and helping North Korean refugees should be prominent objectives of U.S. policy. U.S. officials have raised the issue of refugees in China, as well as the issue of human rights in the United Nations. The U.S. government has responded to the humanitarian concerns of North Korea. As you will hear today, the U.S. Agency for International Development remains engaged in attempts to provide food aid to North Korean citizens who need it most. But the U.S. government needs to do more. The United States has taken the lead in forging the six-party talks on nuclear disarmament of the Korean Peninsula, and these talks provide an opportunity for the U.S. government to take the lead in spearheading efforts to address the refugees, famine, and human rights issues including religious freedom. Bipartisan legislation has been introduced in Congress by Senator Sam Brownback, a champion of human rights in North Korea, and others, that reflect several of the policy recommendations of the Commission, including expanded broadcasting into North Korea, funding for organizations addressing human rights concerns of North Koreans, and greater access of North Korean refugees to the U.S. refugee program. We hope that both houses of Congress take up and adopt this legislation. On the Commission's part, we hope that tonight's event will be the start of a series of hearings that we intend to hold on North Korea to raise the profile of the issues of human rights, including freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as well as the situation facing North Korean refugees. We thank you all very much for your attendance tonight at this evening's hearing, and we look forward to hearing from all our distinguished panelists. Now let me turn to our panelists and introduce them. Our first witness is Mr. Roger Winter, who is Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development, and former Director of the U.S. Committee on Refugees. He has also served as USAID's director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. We also have with us today Mr. David Hawk, a senior researcher at the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, and author of the recent report, "The Hidden Gulag," exposing North Korea's prison camps. I understand that Mr. Hawk recently returned from South Korea where his report has been released in the Korean language. Following Mr. Hawk will be Ms. Suzanne Scholte. Ms. Scholte is the president of the Defense Forum Foundation, the organization that was responsible for bringing several high-level defectors from North Korea to the United States to meet with senior U.S. government officials. Our next witness has asked that his identity not be revealed, and we will refer to him as Reverend Isaac, a pastor at the Cornerstone Ministry here in the United States, and he works with North Korean refugees and on behalf of Christians inside of North Korea. We thank him for his courage in testifying tonight. Finally, we'll hear from Mr. Kim Yong, himself a refugee from North Korea and a survivor of a term in a North Korean prison camp. Again, thank you for all being with us tonight, and we look forward to hearing from you. Now, as we commence our hearing, before we hear from Mr. Winter let me also take this occasion to introduce my fellow Commissioners who are with me tonight. I have, to my left, Commissioner Felice Gaer, who is with the Jacob Blaustein Institute for Human Rights and in her second term as a Commissioner, and she is currently serving as vice-chairman of the commission. And to my right is Dr. Richard Land with the Southern Baptist Ethics and Public Policy Commission, who is also in his second term as a Commissioner. To my far left is Archbishop Charles Chaput of the Diocese of Denver, who is in his first term with us as Commissioner. And to my far next right, Preeta Bansal, who is a former solicitor general of the State of New York and a practicing attorney in New York City -- in your first term as a Commissioner. And to her right is Joseph Crapa, who, after many years of service on the Hill, is now the executive director of our Commission. We have other staff with us, and extend our thanks to them as well for all their assistance in putting together this hearing tonight. So we will now commence with the testimony from our distinguished panelists. We have asked the panelists to hold their remarks to 10 minutes, and we intend to be somewhat ruthless about that tonight because we would also like to have an opportunity for questions and answers. There's much that we would like to hear from them and learn from them. So each of our panelists will speak for 10 minutes. We will then have questions and answers. You may also note at your seats are note cards. For those of you who would like to direct questions to the panelists as well, we have note cards available. Please write those questions. Our staff will be around at various times during the hearing to pick those up, and we will, with what time we have available, see if we can organize some of those questions to be directed towards our panelists as well. Now, with that, let me turn to Mr. Winter. Thank you very much for joining us tonight. ROGER WINTER: Okay, thank you. Is this on? MR. YOUNG: Yeah, it's on. MR. WINTER: All, right, thank you for having me here. My portfolio at the U.S. Agency for International Development involves most of the U.S. government's humanitarian programs, and it's that humanitarian aspect that I'm going to focus my comments on tonight. First of all, as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, in the introduction, North Korea is a problem for the entire international community, and the nuclear antics of the government are just the most recent iteration of its problem nature. However, the problems of the international community pale in comparison to the problems that the government of North Korea presents for the people of North Korea. With the collapse of worldwide communism, the North Korean government experienced a collapse in its strategic trade relationships and aid relationships with the former Soviet Block in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. When it collapsed, it became very, very focused on its own survival in a very difficult and transitional period of time. It remains a very strange and bizarre government, largely disengaged from the international community, excessively reclusive, self-imposed in its isolation, threateningly militaristic with a quarter of its GDP being used for military purposes. It seeks total control of information within the North Korean society, maintains an elaborate gulag system for political prisoners, is thoroughly abusive of human rights, religious freedom, and also internationally accepted standards for humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. In the aftermath of this major shift, a famine occurred from roughly 1994 to 1997, which killed up to 10 percent of the entire population of the people. At that time, access to food was politically controlled through a public distribution system, which has now collapsed. However, food is still very much politically controlled in North Korea. The widespread famine is now over, and international food aid is a major factor in bringing it to a conclusion. During that period of famine, the U.S. was the major contributor of food aid. In

the last decade, over two million metric tons of food were donated by the United States to North Korea. That's about \$700 million worth. As recently as Christmas Eve, we donated an additional 60,000 metric tons of food to meet the current crisis. More than 50 percent of all WFP food programs, food deliveries in North Korea have been supplied by the United States. All of this, however, doesn't dissolve the situation. The food crisis continues. We're in this circumstance in which some people are more equal than others in North Korea. It is the case that those who are most in need of food aid, for example in such parts of the country as the North and Northeastern counties, are not actually receiving it. Where there have been improvements in nutritional rates, they can be concentrated in select areas, Chungyang (sp), Nampo, in particular, which have half the rates of malnutrition as exists in the North. However, in 2004, six-and-a-half million people in North Korea will require food aid. One-third of the pregnant and nursing women in the country are malnourished; 40 percent of the children in the country are chronically malnourished, which means that they are becoming or are already learning impaired; 70,000 of the children in the country are severely malnourished, which means they are good candidates to die. It is for these reasons -- that is, the inequity in food distribution -- that the issue of targeting food deliveries and monitoring those food deliveries becomes to us critically important, especially when you take into account that of the 106 counties in North Korea, we have no access whatsoever to 42 of them. And even when we have access to the people in those counties, that access is severely curtailed. For example, we're seeking to monitor the equitable distribution of food. We have to give the government a week's prior notice of where we wish to go and what we plan to do. Whatever interviews occur by us, or Food for Peace, or the World Food Program must take place in the presence of North Korean officials. We cannot select the people we want to interview and bring them; they are selected for us by the government. We cannot have a non-North Korean speaker do the translations for us at all, and we cannot visit the farmer's markets and other informal commercial capacities that exist to see exactly what is the state of affairs there. For these and many other reasons, we have not got a good picture or a good monitoring system that helps assure we have the equitable distribution of food aid. The food program does its best, but it is effectively blinded and deafened by the North Korea government's actions. We don't know, frankly, what we don't know about the situation. This is not new. Over a period of time, almost all of our partners in the humanitarian programs have left the country. Who am I talking about? Who is it that has withdrawn from the country that was previously engaged? (Inaudible) - Frontier, OXFAM, Action - (inaudible) -- CARE - (inaudible) -- and an entire coalition of U.S. private voluntary organizations. In May of 2003, the food program had a major donor consultation. Every single donor expressed major concern about the level of manipulation of international food assistance in North Korea. Since then there has been no noticeable improvement, and this is seriously affecting the way donors make choices with their resources. That is one of the reasons why we see the level of food aid diminishing in terms of donations in North Korea. It is no stretch to say that North Korea is the international community's greatest humanitarian enigma. Our hope at USAID is that we will come to be in a position where we can fully respond to the urgent humanitarian needs in North Korea. We are prepared to enlarge our program very substantially, we want to be put in that position, but it requires the cooperation of the North Korean government. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, North Korea is a threat to the entire international community, but it is an absolute disaster for the people of North Korea. It's those people that we seek to serve. Thank you. MR. YOUNG: Thank you very much. Let me now turn to our next witness, Mr. Hawk. DAVID HAWK: Can everyone hear in the back? (Cross talk.) MR. HAWK: Is this audible? MR. YOUNG: That seems to work. MR. HAWK: All right, then. Thank you very much for inviting me to be here with you this evening. In the course of my research into the political prison camp system in North Korea I encountered two areas that might be of particular interest and concern to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. The first has to do with what the Koreans call the kwan-li-so, or what can best be translated into English as the political penal labor colonies. There had been 12. They've been consolidated into five or six large-scale encampments, holding tens of thousands, up to 50 thousand persons in the valleys of the mountains in the northern sector and central northern sector of North Korea, where people without having been told of the charges or the offense -- political offense that they committed, without any judicial process whatsoever, are sent for lifetime sentences at hard labor, usually mining coal or gold or iron ores, lumberjacking, or collective state farms for a lifetime sentence; not only the perceived political wrongdoer, but for up to three generations of that person's family. So this is a system of guilt by association, of collective punishment where the perceived political wrongdoer is sent to one camp and the family, up to three generations, are sent to other camps. In the kwan-li-so system it's believed that at the outset of the DPRK, when the regime sought to smash religions, many of the religious leaders were sent to the camps. And again, after the Korean War there was another round of religious leaders that were sent to the camps, along with many other kinds of political prisoners as well: various sections of the party that were being purged, large numbers of Koreans who had voluntarily repatriated from Japan back to North Korea and ended up in the camps as well. But two of the persons that I interviewed for this report were able to confirm the ongoing existence of people in the kwan-li-so camps who have been imprisoned, essentially for their religious beliefs and affiliations. One of the former prisoners, Kang Chul Hwan, who was imprisoned at camp number 15, called Yodok -- he was imprisoned there for 10 years, from 1977 to '87 -- said that when he, as a 10-year-old boy -- because it was his grandfather who had committed the political offense -- first arrived at Yodok, there were many believers in Yodok camp, but they were old and many had died by the time he got out in 1987. And our fellow here, Kim Young, who was imprisoned at kwan-li-so number 14, and kwan-li-so number 18 before he escaped, reports that there were also numbers of religious believers who were imprisoned in kwan-li-so 14 and kwan-li-so 18. The other area that might be of particular concern to the commission is the punishment meted out to Koreans who fled North Korea into China and were caught by the Chinese police and forcibly repatriated to North Korea, face a system of punishment that is considerably more severe if they confess to having met South Korean Christians or attended church while in China. The area of China where the North Koreans flee to has a very large Korean ethnic minority. That area of North East China is also heavily populated with South Korean businessmen, with students, with tourists, and with humanitarian aid workers, and with Christian pastors, and missionaries, some of whom are there to service the local communities, but some of whom are there for the

particular reason of helping the North Korean refugees, either with food aid, or to be able to escape. I talked to in Seoul last year a number of persons who fled to China, were repatriated, punished, and then released, and fled again, and this time made their way around, usually through Southeast Asia, to obtain eventual asylum in Seoul. And they described that upon repatriation they're asked a series of questions by the police interrogators, why did they go to China, what did they go there to do, but then more ominously (Audio break.) REVEREND ISAAC: (In progress.) Even without knowledge of the external world to use as a comparison, Christians are aware of the first foundation that North Korean society is built upon. Thus, it is impossible for them to conform to it. North Korean mentality has been shaped by a persistent propaganda machine that communicates warlike messages, shaped it for all ages, from birth to death. It is common to hear young cadre members in Pyongyang singing lively popular songs praising Kim Jong Il, as they show their loyalty by sweeping the monuments to the North Korean struggle. It is important to realize that North Koreans have never experienced democracy. The Japanese yoke in the first half of the 1900s was replaced by Kim Il Sung yoke in the latter half of the century. Without a model of freedom or democracy, the North Koreans have settled for what they know: totalitarian nationalism. Korea's long-established culture, based on Confucian principles of respect towards authority and conformity to the norm, coupled with a totalitarian nature of the regime and its control over external information, have resulted in the creation of a unique mindset. The North Korean population assumes the truth of the government's disinformation. North Koreans believe the government's stated position that the unequal distribution of food is caused by actions of the United States and their puppet, South Korea. While there is widespread dissatisfaction with the current situation at the grassroots level, it does not necessarily mean that there is a questioning of the guiding ideology or the established leadership. Still, the prolonged famine and the survival-level living conditions in North Korea have driven an increasing number of people to illegally cross the border into China. These days there are well over 400,000 economic refugees trying to survive in Manchuria. Unprotected by the United Nations or by China, these refugees suffer exploitation and abuse, many cases of slavery, forced prostitution, sexual abuse, torture, murder for the sale of their organs, and hunting for sport or bounty, have been documented and are well known to this commission. North Koreans have no rights in China. Many we have met live in holes in the mountains like animals. But we are hoping that the United States will recommend to the United Nations and to China that their status as refugees be recognized so that their human rights may be protected. Until then, God is answering their cries. We, along with many other Christian NGOs, are offering whatever relief is possible to these refugees. While it is illegal to help undocumented aliens in China, in obedience to God and to relieve their unbearable suffering, safe houses, orphanages, and feeding centers have been developed by humanitarians, missionaries, and NGOs. These centers of hope on the border with North Korea have lately been targeted by the Chinese authorities. In countless raids over the past six months, centers have been closed down, foreign workers given huge fines and deported, and the North Koreans forcibly sent back to the imprisonment of death. Still we continue with our works of mercy and pray that the United States may intervene on behalf of these non-persons so that their suffering may cease. In working with these refugees, we also find that North Koreans are distanced culturally from their brothers in South Korea. The degree of cultural difference can be measured by the experience of North Korean refugees entering South Korea. To date, over 3,000 North Koreans have been allowed into South Korea. Even though the government grants them housing and living expenses and they share a common core language, the refugees have been unable to adapt to life in South Korea. They are unable to find an acceptable fit within South Korean society. North Korean defectors and economic refugees are people without a country. They can no longer return to North Korea, and have great difficulty integrating with their blood brothers in the South. The challenge of preparing North and South Korea for unification is immense, beyond the government efforts. A loving acceptance by the Christian church in South Korea and the world is required to ensure a smooth integration process. In conclusion, I would like to repeat, religious freedom is anathema in North Korea. Religious freedom can only be allowed in democratic nations. So until the regime of North Korea changes and becomes democratic, I encourage that honorable members of this commission defend the rights of the 400,000 North Koreans struggling for survival in Manchuria by securing refugee status for them. I plead with you to work with the Chinese and South Korean governments to establish humane refugee centers to care for them. I encourage you to mobilize the churches and religious institutions in South Korea to take responsibility for helping North Korean refugees become accepted and valued members of South Korean society. Finally, I applaud the commission for keeping the pressure on Kim Jong Il's totalitarian regime, and hope that as a result of the commission's recommendation the United States will take an aggressive stance to mobilize the global political and NGO community in defense of human rights and religious freedoms in North Korea. I'm thankful for the opportunity to address this commission and pray God's blessing on your ongoing deliberations. Thank you. MR. YOUNG: Reverend Isaac, thank you very much. We now turn to Colonel Kim. COLONEL KIM YONG: (Through translator.) Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen, for having invited me to this precious occasion. My name is Yong Kim, who had escaped from the political prison in the year 2000 for freedom. I want to simply tell you about my opinion regarding Christianity in North Korea. For North Korea, it is only for a monotheistic -- meaning the godless government is the only entity that is the sovereign entity, and nothing else exists. It is only the Labor Party exists in North Korea. Kim Il Sung, in preparation for reunification, has a false and empty entity that is called Christian Federation. Such a title was commissioned in order to avoid the world opinion. They had built the Chilgol cathedral, called the Pongsoo Church, near Pongsoodong, near Mankyung in Pyongyang City. However, the management of this building was entrusted to the Central Party's Reunification Publicity Department, and all the members -- existing members composing of a such a department were the party members, and they were monitored by the security agency of North Korea. Therefore, other than the related members, no other people in North Korea could even be spectators, or even see nearby. It was simply a political show to maintain the dictatorship of Kim Jong Il, and also to blind the world opinion and the world press. In North Korea's security agency internal documents, the following is recorded. It is definitely recorded that Christianity had been liquidated and had been purged from North Korea in the 1960s. As far as any opinion about Christianity in North Korea, it is the following: North Korea has been brainwashing

North Korean people that Christianity is actually the agent of all the wars, and it is actually the foremost enemy of the North Korean people, and it is very scary, lethal, drug-like, as it was opium. Therefore, the reality is in North Korea, that if you're a Christian, not only yourself but your next generation and the next generation, the second and third generation, will all be liquidated as well. For example, I could even give you an example back in history, in the 1800s, of the Sherman - ship Sherman, in which the missionary named Thomas had been killed. And I'll also tell you about the atrocities committed against a missionary at an orchard. In an orchard farm a little child was picking up fruits, but a German shepherd dog is used to bite that child, and that child is tied up in that tree, in the apple tree. Then the child is then branded as a thief. And this was an actual twisting of the truth, and they blamed the missionary for such an atrocity. Shinchun Museum is also visited, and through which there is brainwashing education conducted. In the prison for political prisoners currently, I have seen numerous descendents of Christians incarcerated. They are suffering all kinds of violations against their humanity, and all their human rights are violated, and they are vomiting blood. And I'll give you an example of the incident involving the death of Hunsop Choy (sp). At that time he was 65 years old. He was in number 18 gulag, and he was working in the labor camp. Because of such a difficulty and hardship he started asking for God. One of the national security agents that overheard this had tied him up in front of all the prisoners, and he was beaten up and he was killed. And all the prisoners were made to pass by him, and pass by the corpse, and spit on the corpse. I will relate to you an incident in 1962 when I was in elementary school. Some people and spectators were gathered at an execution site in the Hwanghae Province, and the various people -- tens of people were gathered there under the pretense that they were Christians and they were going to be purged. And they were stoned to death because they did not want to waste any bullets. I was born in 1950, and I saw for the very first time in my life at the age of 12, in 1962, in the prison for those prisoners, that there were some descendents imprisoned there who were the descendents of such Christians, who were children as well. Like this, Christians are the number one target of purges, and this is recognized nationally, recognized by all the people, recognized by all the party members. And North Korea is practicing a politics of deification and idolatry of Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung is designated as a deity and a god that is worshipped as sun in the sky by all the people in North Korea. That's why Kim Il Sung, at the early age of 14, had supposedly set out and traveled the distance of over 1,000 steps in order for the independence of his country, and such a slogan of brainwashing had been used starting from elementary school, so all the students would also be able to experience such a brainwashing experience to add to the deification of Kim Il Sung mythology. Through this practice, the students have solidly believed, and they are reinforced in their mythological worship of the Kim Il Sung deity. In each city, by spending \$100,000s worth of all their hard earned money, they have built the same enormous statues of Kim Il Sung, as they had done in the Mansoo in Pyongyang. All the activities by the students and soldiers, and all the organizations have to be proceeded in front of the statue of Kim Il Sung, always, and they have to also worship the statue and bow before it to be loyal. Not only that, Kim Il Sung Ideology History Laboratory enjoys the utmost updated standards of modern equipment. In the Kim Il Sung Ideology History Laboratory, there is brainwashing conducted through this. And therefore, there is a tower that shows that Kim Il Sung lives forever with us, and in all the highest and best locations in each city and each places and counties, even after he had died. While the people are in such difficulties and trauma that they even eat themselves and eat the other human flesh, and yet Kim Il Sung palace was built at a cost of several hundred millions dollars, and whenever a world representative comes to the Mansoo hills and garden, they would always supposedly bow before it and, before the palace, and before the commemorative statue of Kim Il Sung. Self-identity independence of each individual is being harshly stamped on and stamped on, due to such a totalitarianism of the personal idolatry and deification. That's why you must all know the true state of events in North Korea, and please act accordingly. Thank you very much. MR. YOUNG: Colonel Kim, thank you very much for your testimony, as well. Thank you again to all of our panelists. We now hope to do a round of questioning from our Commissioners. Again, I'd invite those of you who have questions to write those down on the note cards that have been distributed by Mr. Dettoni, who has been very instrumental in setting up this hearing. He'll help collect those note cards for you. We'll start with Archbishop Chaput. ARCHBISHOP CHARLES CHAPUT: Thank you, Dean Young. Part of our responsibility as a Commission is to gather facts. We're a fact-finding group so that we can make recommendations to the State Department and to the president of our country. So my questions are really questions about facts of religious freedom in North Korea. First of all, I don't know who to address these questions to, so perhaps any of you who want to answer them you can. I might name a name as I ask the question, but others should feel free. The government of North Korea claims its citizens have religious freedom, and there is some mention of this Catholic cathedral in North Korea, and a couple of Protestant churches have been built. But would there be a government claim that there really is religious freedom, and how would they demonstrate that in terms of the ordinary life of the people? Anybody want that? Suzanne, do you want to SUZANNE SCHOLTE: I know that there was a report. It's a sham. It's all a sham. They went through this whole thing. There was a delegation that went over there several months ago (inaudible) - and they were taken to a church and there were hymnals there. But there is no religious freedom there. And I'm sure Reverend Isaac and Colonel Kim probably want to add to that. But I believe that it's all window dressing and there is absolutely no religious freedom in North Korea, other than the worship of Kim Jong Il. ARCHBISHOP CHAPUT: Okay, having heard that, most of the testimony about - Roger -- MR. WINTER: Just to respond to what you asked specifically, and they claim. I happen to agree that it's a sham. But, there was a constitutional amendment in 1992 which authorized religious gatherings, provided for "the right to build buildings for religious use," and deleted a clause about freedom of anti-religious propaganda. So there are some basis of words that they can make a claim on, although I think all of us up here agree that it's a sham. ARCHBISHOP CHAPUT: Okay. Thank you very much. There's a question from the audience here that is a question that I have, too. It's a question about the place of Buddhism in the life of North Korea. Most of the testimony has been about Christianity. In fact, all of it has. There's been no mention about the relationship of the more traditional religion in North Korea, which is Buddhism, to the state, so is it similarly disregarded and prohibited. Do Buddhists experience the same kind of difficulties in the

practice of their faith?MR. WINTER: Maybe I could say something about that, too. Just again, from the State Department's report on the country's human rights practices, what it says is the number of religious believers was unknown but has been estimated by the media and religious groups at 10,000 Protestants, 10,000 Buddhists, and 4,000 Catholics. In a country of 25 or 26 million, no matter how you slice it, religion has been thoroughly destroyed by the government of North Korea.ARCHBISHOP CHAPUT: Would you all agree that those are pretty accurate numbers? I would have the impression from what a couple of theMR. WINTER: It also talks, by the way, about the underground church where they can't estimate the numbers, and I think that's largely what we're hearing about.MS. SCHOLTE: I think these are just made-up numbers. I think any active believer is underground. Anybody who has true faith, whether Buddhist or Christian, is operating underground.ARCHBISHOP CHAPUT: So you would agree that the Buddhism experience is the same kind of difficulty as Christianity?MS. SCHOLTE: Yes, absolutely. They've tried to wipe out any faith.ARCHBISHOP CHAPUT: Yes, Colonel?COLONEL KIM YONG: (Through translator.) In North Korea there is no religion. They do have a historical temple, like Sogong Temple, that they maintain as a matter of history. I had received a few questions after I came to the United States regarding these underground organizations. If you ponder the system of North Korea, and the way it conducts its business, I don't believe that you could say there could be such a religion that exists, and you guess as much. In North Korea when four people gather, two are secret spies. And if there is any illegality that is found or impropriety that is found among four of them, then one would immediately go to the prison for political prisoners, or prison for religious freedom. There are some people who are fortunetellers. In North Korea you have Buddhist fortunetellers who exist to tell your fortune. But in North Korea even that is a crime if you get caught. That's it.ARCHBISHOP CHAPUT: David Hawk, when you were reflecting on the prison system, you mentioned Christians were imprisoned because of their beliefs. Is it true there are also Buddhists who are suffering imprisonment because of their commitment to their faith?MR. HAWK: Yes, particularly early in the regime, at its foundation, and shortly after the Korean War.ARCHBISHOP CHAPUT: Thank you. One last question: Do the people of North Korea believe the propaganda against Christianity to be true, or is it just dismissed as propaganda of the state? Is there any kind of natural sympathy with religion of any kind?MS. SCHOLTE: I think they believe the propaganda, and when you talk to people who have converted to Christianity, like many of the defectors, like Soon Ok Lee, who was not a believer; she was a real loyal party member. But one of the things that she remembered is that her mother told her when she was little, God will always watch out for you, and she was totally anti-religious in the way she was raised by the regime. But when she got out -- when she was released from political prisoner camp, the Christians all looked at her -- they looked up, because the Christians aren't allowed to look up to the sky because that would be acknowledging God. Anyway, she says in her testimony that they all pleaded with her to tell people about their story, about the persecution of Christians. But you definitely get the impression from talking to defectors who have since converted to Christianity that they did believe the propaganda against Christianity, but they also believed all the horrible things about the United States and South Korea. And I know that Andrew Natsios testified about one of the things about the refugees is when they get out North Koreans were told, don't go to China; things are worse there. There is a civil war in China. And things may be bad here, we may be facing some tough times, but it's even worse in China. When those first refugees went over the border, all the things they saw in China proved that the regime was completely lying to them. So that's a long answer to your question, sorry.ARCHBISHOP CHAPUT: Thank you very much.MR. YOUNG: Thank you. We'll now turn to Commissioner Bansal.PREETA D. BANSAL: Thank you very much to all of the witnesses for that really arresting testimony. I'd like to ask some questions directed to some of the things we've heard about the famine and the humanitarian relief efforts that are ongoing. And I guess this would be most appropriate to Mr. Winter and Ms. Scholte, but please, anyone jump in. Mr. Winter, you spoke a little bit -- or you spoke quite a bit about the fact that the United States doesn't really have a way of verifying, monitoring the way in which food and humanitarian assistance are distributed within North Korea. And my question is, what efforts is USAID doing, making, to try and ensure that it does get to the most needed recipients?MR. WINTER: The issue is it's not an adequate system. WFP, the World Food Program, tries the best it can. It is the major recipient of our food resources that are used in North Korea. They have between 40 and 50 staff there who make about 500 visits a month to try to test. The problem is that they're not allowed to do almost all of the things I listed, and so they're not actually able to go to a substantial number of the counties, which are precisely the counties that we believe are experiencing the most malnutrition, and which the food aid is being diverted away from those particular populations. So how do we try to deal with this? First of all, let me say we try to deal with it in a variety of ways, but they all have been relatively unsuccessful. We have curtailed our resources, but does the government really care that we curtail those resources? For a number of years we've had these regular meetings that tend to occur in New York at the U.N. but without any changed behavior whatsoever. Is the government does it hide the fact that it doesn't allow proper monitoring? No, they're very bold about it. They simply deny the World Food Program the access. I can't think of any country that I've been involved with, and I'm somebody who has been around a long time in this humanitarian aid, where the government is so consistently bold and bald about the way it denies both humanitarian access and adequate monitoring, and the consequences for the citizen population are quite clear. What it was also doing for the donors, though, is we are seeing a level of donor anger about this, and so the resources being made available for North Korea are dwindling right now.MS. BANSAL: Are any of those donor groups that have withdrawn from providing aid to North Korea, have any of those returned?MR. WINTER: We have donors that have entirely left, but we also have the humanitarian agencies, because it's not just the World Food Program we operate through; we operate through NGOs, nongovernmental organizations like CARE And Save The Children and so forth, and almost all of them have left. And I've got statements from all of them here which explain why they leave, how painful it is for them to leave, because they know by leaving, in effect they're leaving populations that desperately need what they have to offer, but those populations that most need it aren't getting it anyway. So it's a real dilemma. They don't want to hear in the government what we have to say about this.MS. BANSAL: We've heard reports that the North Korean people who do receive food assistance are told

by the North Korean government that that assistance comes from their dear leader, or that it's provided by the United States as kind of an apology, almost, for the United States' role in the Korean War. Have you heard this? Is this true? Can you tell us any information about any of these reports?MR. WINTER: Yes, it is true. We may, I don't know how familiar you are with American food aid, but we require that every bag say basically that this is a gift from the people of the United States of America. And you get basically a picture of hands shaking in red, white, and blue. And we estimate there are some 30 million of those bags that have been distributed in North Korea. We do it for the very clear purpose of purveying a message. But that's a message to the population; it certainly isn't a message to the government. The government does say, basically, that the U.S. supplies food as reparations for the damage that we did during the war, yes.MS. SCHOLTE: Yes, and also that it's attributable to -- (inaudible). Actually, in a way it is.MR. HAWK: (Off mike) - and the success of the military-first policy.MS. BANSAL: One more question on the subject of famine and food aid, if I may, to the extent that food aid is being diverted to the military and to elites, and to the political apparatus of the North Korean state, to what extent is it becoming a method of propping up a totalitarian and harsh regime?MR. WINTER: Well, I would suggest that the diversion is for the purpose of propping up the regime. That's why donors particularly find it onerous. The food aid that we provide in North Korea basically comes from the mouths of Ethiopians, or whomever, so there is an inadequate amount of food aid available to meet all the needs of the world. So somebody somewhere else we are diverting food from in order to provide it to North Korea. Then to have the government do what it does is doubly evil, but they do it to prop up the regime.MS. SCHOLTE: I totally agree with that. I was just going to add that when Hwang Jang Yop, who is the highest-ranking North Korean defector, defected in 1997, he really believed that the regime was going to collapse, and believed that had there not been this outpouring of humanitarian aid that the regime would have collapsed. We start adding up the billions of dollars that have been sent in for maintaining that regime -- in fact, we may get to this in some other questions -- but it's interesting: if you add up the numbers of the aid and what we spend on containment policy, you'd surpass the gross national economy of North Korea. That's all money that could be invested in a free North Korea.FELICE D. GAER: Thank you very much.MR. YOUNG: Thank you.Ms. Gaer.MS. GAER: Thank you very much.I have a few questions regarding the fact that as a result of the kinds of repression with regard to religious freedom, other freedoms, and the lack of security and the famine problems, that people are fleeing the country, and I want to ask a few questions about refugee issues, and then I want to ask Mr. Hawk a few things about the human rights material in his rather extraordinary report.On the issue of the refugee crisis, I'm wondering, first of all, Mr. Winter, do we have any reliable estimates of the numbers of persons who have sought refuge across the border in China?MR. WINTER: I think there are people up here that can answer that better than me. Let me say this: what is clear, I think, is that some people leave solely because of lack of food in the areas that are contiguous to the border of China, because there are a number of them that also return. Those wouldn't normally be viewed as refugees; they would be viewed as economic migrants who go there for that purpose. The refugee thing is far more complicated and is particularly problematic, as several of my colleagues have indicated, because China has signed the 1951 Convention and '69 Protocol on the status of refugees. It has UNHCR present in China; it just doesn't abide by what it has signed.MS. SCHOLTE: I would just say that the estimates average between the ones that you hear average between 50 (thousand) to 300 thousand. I would say it's probably roughly 200,000. But part of the reason why it's hard to get an accurate count is because there is no access; no one can really go in there and do that. The people that report on it are people that are working secretly.Also, there's a lot, sometimes when they're trying to figure out those figures, there was a lot of going back and forth where people would go to China and try to get food and money, and going back to their families. Of course, they've tried to seal off that border so there's not as much cross-border. But it's possible those numbers were inflated because of that, but I would say it's probably at least 200,000.MS. GAER: I was referring specifically both to human rights problems and to the food problem under -- interpretations like the recent report of Amnesty International are considered a conflict related to failure to provide the right to food, or access to food, and therefore recognize that people seeking refuge may be doing so for human rights reasons.What do you think the United States could do more effectively to put pressure on China to change those policies, Mr. Winter?MR. WINTER: I think we've tried almost everything that we know to try. People suggest that these ought to be issues that are raised in the six-party talks. I don't know that they will be. And, in general, frankly, we've tried to separate discussions of food aid and humanitarian programs from strategic discussions with other governments. So, I don't know where that will come out.We tried to work through international partners, but this is not a government that is particularly responsive to the U.N. system in any way, shape or form. We've tried to publicly bear the facts over and over again. My boss, Andrew Natsios, feels particular passion for North Korea, and is very visible about that. So public exposure doesn't seem to work with this government. They're fairly impervious to it. It's not a government that we have a lot of leverage points with. I'm not sure I can give you something that I think would be new, different, and very effective unless that government begins to change, and we haven't seen it yet.MS. GAER: Do you think that the United Nations Human Rights Commission Resolution dealing with North Korea provides any useful pressure with regard to this matter? All it calls for is the creation of a dialogue. There is no reporting function; there is no sanctions or anything like that. Do you think that has a useful role in this picture?MR. WINTER: To be quite honest with you, other than what the World Food Program and UNICEF have tried to do programmatically from the other entities of the U.N. system, whether it be the human rights entities or frankly even UNHCR, and the way it operates in China, I have not seen the U.N. system be particularly effective on these particular issues we're talking about.MR. HAWK: With respect to the refugees, the refugee situation between the North Koreans and China, China is a member of the Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, and I think the only way, which means the staff of the UNHCR is going to have a very hard time raising issues with a country that's essentially among their directors. I think in the context of the UNHCR, the United States should try to get together with the EU and Japan, and hopefully also the Republic of Korea, and raise the issue either in terms of granting access, or simply, if they won't do that, to stop the repatriation, but in the context of meeting associated with the UNHCR Executive Committee. But it's going to take other

member states to back up the staff of the office of the High Commission for Refugees, because they can't do it without support from not just one, but a number of other members of the Executive Committee, and a number of the other substantial contributors to the UNHCR.

MR. WINTER: I would just add here, as you well know, in a similar position to the Commission on Human Rights where the United Nations Human Rights Commission is really populated by all the countries that are the major human rights offenders in the world, so the asylum has been captured by the inmates.

MS. GAER: I suppose, Mr. Winter, some of us would say that it hasn't changed, some of us with memories in that regard, and the challenge is to make it work better, now that it's actually, for the first time ever, addressing North Korea. I have a question about the remarkable human rights report that David Hawk has produced called "The Hidden Gulag," and if you haven't seen copies of it, I'm sure everybody on the panel has, but if you haven't, I commend it very strongly. I wanted to ask you about your assessment of the sources of information that you were able to turn to. You referred back to the case of Ali Lamada, the Venezuelan, who was the only source of information about the North Korean gulag 20 years ago, and you've interviewed more than 30 former prisoners, which you describe in your report. I was surprised to note a couple of things: first of all, the large number of former guards in prison facilities or detention camps that were part of your sample. And I wondered if you could tell us if you have any thoughts on why there were such a large number on the group of 30 that had that experience? Related to that, you had a considerable amount of testimony, as you've described to us here, about religious believers being treated particularly harshly and being screened for in terms of their return, and I wonder if you could comment on whether there were any other groups that you found were being particularly screened in an important way? And, third of all, a lot of information about women and testimonies regarding horrific examples of infanticide to anybody who gave birth once brought to a labor camp or detention facility, and I wonder if you could comment, with your broad and extensive experience in human rights, whether you've ever encountered any examples like that anywhere else in the world, or was this unique to North Korea? Those are my questions, thank you.

MR. HAWK: I suppose, in a situation like Rwanda, where there is an ethnic component to the massacres, it's a bit like it would be even more extreme. But I've not heard of ethnically motivated forced abortion, or ethnically motivated infanticide in other country situations that I'm familiar with. It's part of the sort of bizarre nationalism where the explanation for this practice that was consistently given to the eight eyewitnesses that I interviewed was the fear that the woman had been made pregnant while in China by a Chinese man not an ethnic Korean living in China. But I've not encountered that elsewhere. The second last question, essentially as we've been discussing, there are lots of people going back and forth across the border all the time for trading, for seeking food. Some people stay longer, and they're picked up and they're repatriated. When they're repatriated leaving the country is a crime, it's a technical violation, but it's still enforced. So, the police ask, why did you go to China? The answer is, to get food, or to get money, to earn money to buy food to feed my family back in my native village. But then the other series of questions follow, did you listen to South Korean Radio, or see any South Korean movies, or have any contact with South Koreans, or with Christians? If the answer to that is yes, then the leaving of the country, which is a technical violation, and staying outside the country acquires a political component. If the repatriated persons convince the interrogators that it was just for food or just for money, then they're sentenced to up to six months in a provincial detention center called a jip-kyal-so, or else in the even shorter facility called a ro-dong-dan-ryeong-dae, where they may be held for several weeks or several months before being released. If it's perceived - if the jailers believe there's a political component to it -- three of the people I interviewed had, because of a perceived political motive, been sent to the kwan-li-so or kyo-hwa-so (sp) gulag, hard labor camps. But the former North Korean prisoners believe that some of those to whom a political motive is ascribed are executed, but there is no way to confirm that. It's not a situation like in the kyo-hwa-so and kwan-li-so where there are public executions and the other prisoners have to pass by the corpses and sometimes deface them. The suspected executions at the jip-kyal-so or the ro-dong-dan-ryeong-dae level, which I'm not in position to confirm, nor could any of the people I interviewed, were not public but they would have been privately done.

MR. YOUNG: Thank you very much. Let me turn to Commissioner Land.

RICHARD LAND: My first question would be to you. The last time that we had a hearing on North Korea we had testimony that if there was any indication from people who were being repatriated from China that they had become Christians, if they were wearing the cross or it became clear that they were in any way "contaminated" by Christianity, that there was reason to believe they were executed, just taken around the corner and shot. Do you have any evidence of that?

MR. HAWK: No. I am not denying it, but I'm not in a position to confirm it, because those are executions -- unlike the public executions in the gulag camps, these are not public, and the former North Korean prisoners believe it and assert it, but they've never seen any dead bodies either. But it's commonly believed; it's accepted that that's how it works.

MR. LAND: My question now is to the panel at large, to whoever would like to answer the question. This is an evil regime. This regime is as bad as it gets. I personally would disagree that we don't have pressure points that we can put on the Chinese government. If we had pressure points that we could put on the Soviet Union, and we did, to soften the situation, the Soviet Union was a whole lot better able to withstand pressure points from the United States than the People's Republic of China. We just need to get a little tough with them. And I'm saying that as a presidential appointee to this commission. Secondly, I think that we I'd like to know your opinion about whether or not we, as a question of conscience, as a civilized nation, can in any way, shape, or form de-link the six-party talks from the human rights part of the six-party talks? In other words, even contemplating making some kind of deal with this regime about nuclear weapons and nuclear arms without dealing with the systematic genocidal abuse of its own people. Then the last part of my question is, there's one government that hasn't been mentioned tonight that would seem to me to be absolutely critical to this whole situation. I'd like to know what they're doing, what they're not doing, and if they're not doing something why they're not doing something -- that's the South Korean government.

MR. HAWK: Large question. It's possible that the talks won't succeed at all. It's also maybe it's even likely. It's also possible that it may be limited to security arrangements and guarantees and tradeoffs. Sometimes I think that there would be elements in the U.S. government that would see it happening that way. But if I understand the North Korean negotiating position, they want more than security guarantees for trading off their nukes, or

nuclear programs. They want large amounts of foreign aid, they want foreign investment, and they want access to world markets. If they are going to try if the talks get far enough along, where any of those kind of issues are put on the table, then, yes, I think absolutely the other parties you don't have to count the six; it's probably a minority of the six that would be willing to say that if you're going to put trade, aid, and investment on the table, then international human rights standards and humanitarian considerations should be put on the table as well if the talks turn in the direction of a comprehensive approach to the multiple crises on the Korean Peninsula. I'm not sure we'll get that far, but I would certainly hope that if it goes in a comprehensive direction, and others of the six parties -- Japan, Republic of Korea and the United States -- are talking about foreign aid and access to our markets and the markets of Western Europe, then I would hope that people such as yourselves and the Congress would strongly encourage the administration to put humanitarian and human rights considerations on the table as well; exactly as was done in the reduction of tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the Helsinki Agreement; exactly as human rights and humanitarian considerations, refugee factors, were put in the resolution to the Central American wars of the 1980s; the same way humanitarian and human rights considerations were put into the comprehensive solution for the resolution of the conflict in and over Cambodia in the early '90s. I think there is a strong precedence for factoring in human rights and humanitarian issues along with security concerns in any comprehensive solution to these kinds of problems. MR. LAND: If we don't, aren't we complicit in prolonging the agony of these people being absolutely crushed by this regime? MR. HAWK: I'm glad to hear that said by a presidential appointee rather than myself, sure. MR. WINTER: Can I just add, I think what you're getting at is precisely what Senator Brownback and Bayh, and others are trying to get at. They're trying to link potential financial benefit to an elevated approach to human rights in North Korea, as part of any political process that goes forward, including the six-party talks. That's what they're trying to do. MS. SCHOLTE: I absolutely concur with the comments you made. We have got bring up the human rights issues; we're just ignoring them. And as far as China, we absolutely have some pressure points with China. I believe one that they'll listen to is money, is the economic issues with China. If you think about, look back at, when that incident happened with the spy plane they were holding and we were kind of at a standoff. I don't think it was coincidence. MR. LAND: The alleged spy plane. MS. SCHOLTE: I'm sorry. Within two days they were at a standstill, but within two days after one of the major retailers, I think it was Wal-Mart, announced that they were thinking about not selling products made in China anymore because of this, the Chinese caved. So I think there's a huge I think financially is where we need to approach China. And it's absolutely ridiculous that we're not taking advantage of that. I just cannot understand that. Another thing on South Korea: there is still the government, there's a big divide in South Korea between the legislative branch and the president. The president is very much for the Sunshine policies. Some people think he's a complete effuser of the Kim Jong Il regime. There's a lot of anti-Americanism growing in South Korea. It's a very troubling thing that's going on there now. In fact, the young people think that the U.S. is more of a threat to South Korea than North Korea. It's gotten really warped. But with our other ally in the region -- Japan has cut all aid to North Korea -- they're also at a standstill because they won't release the families of the kidnap victims. So I think we ought to be following Japan's lead on this. MR. YOUNG: I want to pick up on this question a little bit and expand it a little if I may. We've bumped around the edges of a number of sort of possible actions that might be taken by the U.S. government with respect to North Korea itself, with respect to Japan, with respect to China, with respect to South Korea -- of course are all issues. And I want to kind of open it up a little more broadly. There are a number of components of foreign policy talked about here. There's aid, there is the refugee issue and its relationship to China, expansion of the capacity of people to leave. A country, certainly was enormously instrumental in bringing down the Iron Curtain. In fact, one might say it really stems from the moment on November 4th when Gorbachev stood with Honecker and said they would not send Soviet troops to guard the Berlin Wall. That was really the end of the process. There is the question of affirmative economic assistance, access to markets, a non-aggression pact, and so forth. There's also a question been raised by one of our audience here about questions of whether we can communicate effectively to counteract some of the information that the North Korean regime itself tells its own people. What I'd just like to raise is the question of what policy levers do you see the U.S. has that you think might be particularly productive, and how might we persuade the U.S. government to use those? It really relates to another question that's been asked, which is what can the people in this audience do to advance this issue? There are a lot of people here with a deep and abiding interest in it, and one of the questions is, what can everyone do in that regard? So I'd be interested in any thoughts you have. We don't have much time, but I'd like to at least open up to some broad thinking about the mix of all those different policies. The Helsinki Process is certainly a possible touchstone, the use of more porous borders, a number of things we can think of historically have changed regimes. MR. LAND: And, Michael, if I could just add to that question. What is being done, and what is feasible to be done in terms of broadcasting in Korea the truth into the Korean Peninsula? MR. YOUNG: So why don't we take up we're almost out of time, but if each of you could just free associate for a moment on those issues we'd be very grateful. MS. SCHOLTE: Despite the repression, we know from defectors that over 50 percent of them were able to listen to Radio Free Asia. And there used to be a program, South Korea had a program from 1990 until the Sunshine policy, where they actually got radios in. They had a program to get radios in to North Korea, this was a government-backed program. And one of the defectors that's working with us now was one of the people that did the radio programs, because he had the accent to broadcast in North Korea. It is abysmal the small amount of money that we have budgeted for Radio Free Asia. I'm trying to remember what they're proposing now for Iraq, but I think it's like \$28 million or something, and we spend like I have to look up the figures, but it's incredible, it's paltry compared to what we're talking about doing in Iraq. To me we need to do when you talk human rights, we need to help the refugees, and we need to get, first, asylum status for those refugees and pressure China. But simultaneously, we need to reach out to the North Korean people, and the means to do this is just get information in there. And there was an incredible amount of information that got in there, just because of these people going back and forth across the border to China, and how much they were able to pick up just by being in China for a short period, and learning about what the world was really

like. Also I want to say, one thing that everybody can do -- April 28th there's going to be a rally in Washington, D.C. in support of the North Korea Freedom Act, and we have between 10 and 15 North Korean defectors coming over for that, but it will be a day-long activity. We're trying to get people from all over the country to come in for that, April 28th.

MR. WINTER: Personally, I think the Brownback-Bayh Bill provides the vehicle for a level of orchestration about North Korea that we shouldn't let slide. I think the focus on the money that is so clear, in at least what I understand to be the first two sections of the bill, are precisely right, in the sense that it will get a level of attention from all kinds of constituencies here in the United States, not just in the Congress but in the business community, and it will certainly be noticed by the North Korean government and the government of China. So to me the fact that we finally have a bill to focus on is real progress and we shouldn't miss it at all.

MR. YOUNG: Reverend Isaac, do you have something to add to that?

REVEREND ISAAC: I couldn't hear much here.

MR. YOUNG: The question, simply put, was -- and we're asking for very brief answers in the time available -- what policy should the United States adopt to put appropriate pressure on the appropriate countries that might have some positive effect on expanding human rights in North Korea?

REVEREND ISAAC: I have the same questions, that if they do not listen to anybody, what are the policies going to do? What I'm saying is, they just close their eyes, they close their ears, they don't want to listen to anybody but radios and more propaganda, maybe, and the economy. What do you call that? Stopping their exports. That might work. I believe that's going to that's all I can think of.

MR. YOUNG: Thank you. Mr. Hawk?

MR. HAWK: Let me just add one other element that hasn't been mentioned that I think should be put on the table. On the assumption that China is going to continue to do the minimum amount necessary to prevent the internal contradictions of the regime from leading to its collapse; that is, on the assumption that the DPRK is going to be around for the foreseeable future, I think among the other types of efforts you've mentioned there should be substantial efforts at what the U.N. calls dialogue, or even technical cooperation, which is basically education and training programs, including those aimed at North Korean officials who don't even know how to talk about human rights yet. The example I cite is the Helsinki Accords in the mid-'70s built in a human rights dialogue, and from the level of Secretary Shultz on down there were lots of discussions with Soviet officials during the Brezhnev era, and it went on for 15 years, and then we started hearing on TV, Yakovlev, or whatever his name was, and even Shevardnadze as foreign minister, sounding very different from the way that Soviet officials used to talk. And it took 10 years of dialogue before people in various levels of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, they heard about it at all sorts of levels for 10 years, but some of them actually came to believe in some of this stuff. And so I think that kind of dialogue should be put on the table, as well.

MR. YOUNG: In light of the time, I'm going to give Archbishop Chaput the last question.

ARCHBISHOP CHAPUT: This is a question that came to me as I was listening to all of this. I'd like to address the question to the two Koreans who are part of our board here. The question is a simple one: do the people of North Korea desire religious freedom? It is certainly a value to us, but is it now, because of what's happened over the last decades, a value for them? Both of the Koreans, Reverend Isaac and Colonel Kim.

COLONEL KIM YONG: (Through translator.) You don't have to agree with the idea that the people in North Korea themselves, that the majority of them are actually seeking freedom of religion. The idea of freedom of religion is right now largely distributed and espoused by people who have gone over to the border in China and have contacted missionaries, who have gotten into contact with the Christian and other religions. They are the ones espousing religious freedom, because North Korean citizens themselves, by and large, do not know even know anything about religion because they were able to keep out the religion, because if it gets into North Korea that would threaten Kim Jong Il himself. And it would be almost like his committing suicide by letting the religion in.

ARCHBISHOP CHAPUT: Reverend Isaac, can you hear us?

REVEREND ISAAC: Barely, but go ahead.

ARCHBISHOP CHAPUT: The question was, do the people of North Korea desire religion freedom?

REVEREND ISAAC: Well, personally I met the Christians out there. I had a conversation with them, and not only just the old people. When I saw them there was a 17-year-old boy, and his father was persecuted, executed, and his grandpa was killed, but he still believed in God and he's a Christian. And he's learning English because someday he is able to speak to the pilot of the United States -- Air Force pilot. So someone says, there's no Christians in North Korea. What are they then? Personally, I met -- I wouldn't say hundreds and hundreds, but through my network I have a listing of 35,000 people. I have -- I even have addresses, names, towns, everything. They are not Christian? Don't tell me that. There are Christians there. They're suffering because of their faith. And maybe not a gathering, maybe not the church building, maybe not the four or five people, but family-wise, and I've met them. And we send them back, too, and they report back to me. They don't have to lie for me, but I have proof there are Christians going on in North Korea somewhere there. This is what I've learned.

MR. YOUNG: Reverend Isaac, thank you very much. I think Dr. Land would probably like to rephrase the question just a tad.

MR. LAND: I'm prevailing upon my friendship with Chairman Young to ask one final question, and I'll ask it to the Korean panelists first, and then any of the others who would like to answer it. If it were possible to have a U.N.-monitored free and open election, where the people of North Korea could vote for this government or for another form of government, would they vote for a free government with a parliament, or would they vote to keep Kim Jong Il in power?

COLONEL KIM YONG: (Through interpreter.) You're asking me as to what they would do?

MR. YOUNG: What the North Korean people would do? How would they vote? Would they vote for freedom?

COLONEL KIM YONG: (Through interpreter.) If the election is held in a way that it is held with secret ballot, they will, of course, choose freedom.

MR. YOUNG: Reverend Isaac, did you hear the question?

REVEREND ISAAC: Well, could you shorten up and make it a little louder please?

MR. YOUNG: Short version of the question is, given an opportunity to vote in a truly unfettered way with U.N. monitors, secret ballot and so forth, would the North Korean people choose the regime they currently have, the current president, or would they choose a regime that allowed more scope of freedom?

REVEREND ISAAC: Well, some of them they would -- some of them. Most of them, they care too much for their own relatives and families; they couldn't do it. Some of them, they deny. Most of them, they don't talk about it. They just pretend not to be Christians. But when I meet them personally, they show me they use a finger to tell me that they are Christians, to put the cross on my palm. Those kind of people are there -- I've met. But I don't know if they are when I

suggest to them to go down to China or South Korea, most of them they refuse to do that. But some of them did.MR. YOUNG: Reverend Isaac, thank you.We'll turn to very short answers from our three other panelists.MS. SCHOLTE: It's interesting, I had this discussion with some defectors a couple of months ago at Radio Free Asia, the very question about what kind of things should we be broadcasting into North Korea, because, you know, even if the reach of radio is only 50 percent, and that's erratic, at least a lot of the elites listen to foreign radio broadcasts.What the defectors said was, you don't because I was talking about we should call for free elections, give people the concept that they could choose between Kim Jong Il and someone else. And the defectors said, no, no, no, don't even think about that. All you need to do is tell them the truth, tell them what's going on. Tell them Kim Jong Il didn't wasn't born on a mountain and there wasn't a full eclipse of the moon, that he wasn't born in a refugee camp, and just tell them the truth about what's going on.And what we find out from talking to defectors is when they find out just a little bit of news and information from the outside, whether it's about -- one defector, Kim Chul Wan, talks about overhearing a radio broadcast of a strike for higher wages in South Korea -- completely shattered his whole vision of South Korea: people had the right -- there are jobs, they got paid, they had the right to strike. That was just a little news item. And just getting in information about the truth about Kim Jong Il and his regime is what we find undermines completely that hold that Kim Jong Il has. And I think if you had an election today, they would vote for Kim Jong Il because I don't think they know anything else. I think they're so psychologically damaged.MR. YOUNG: Mr. Hawk?MR. HAWK: No thanks.MR. YOUNG: On that note, I'm allowing no more of my fellow commissioners to prevail upon our friendship, and we are concluding these hearings. Let me conclude with just a couple of last words.First, I want to again extend our appreciation to the panelists. This has been enormously illuminating. We have benefited not only from your presence and your testimony tonight, and your patience, but also from the previous work that you've all done in this area. It has informed our work, and it will continue to inform our work enormously.Number two, I really do want to thank very much the audience that's here tonight. I think at least the tenor of the questions that we've received from the audience suggest exactly as we have anticipated that this is a shared enterprise. I think there were ideas certainly that will inform our work about recommendations we will continue to make to the president. We indeed have supported some of this legislation; we have supported expansion of broadcasts of Radio Free Asia. We have strongly supported the significant pressure on China with respect to the refugee issue, and so forth. But each of you also has an important and valued voice in the American political process, and we encourage you to use it as you see fit. You have representatives and senators, and urge you to use it as you feel appropriate in all the different ways to encourage the development of policies that you think advance the interest of North Korea after listening to this.Let me also say that we hope this is only to be the beginning of a dialogue with your community and many others about these issues. This is the second of our hearings on North Korea. We plan to hold more. And we hope that we can welcome again your participation, and that this is just the start of a process, an iterative process between all of the Korean-Americans and those interested in the issue of North Korea and our Commission as well as with other parts of the U.S. government.I would also add, for those of you who would like to communicate with the Commission, we would warmly welcome that. There is information out on the tables about how to get in touch with us at the Commission. If you have information and ideas and suggestions, we will take those with gratitude and urge you to contact us and to stay in touch with us about these issues. But we end tonight where we started, with our thanks to each of you for coming tonight, spending your time in considering this issue of enormous importance to a very large, very, very large number of people who deserve much, much better than they have, and who might benefit enormously from whatever help we can provide.Thank you very much. These hearings are concluded.(END)