

# **UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM**

## **COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:**

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FELICE GAER: Welcome to today's hearing, during which the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom will examine the threat that religious extremism poses to security, human rights, and religious freedom in Pakistan. The domestic political crisis in Pakistan this past weekend, and the restriction of human rights and freedoms during it, underline the difficulties U.S. policymakers face in dealing with that strategic country. The Commission has been concerned about a rising threat of religious extremism that promotes violence in Pakistan and South Asia, one of the world's most troubled regions.

This is the third in the U.S. Commission's series of hearings exploring the nexus of religious extremism and security, and the impact of religious extremism on freedom of thought, conscience and religion and other human rights. The first was on Sudan, September 24, 2008; the second on Bangladesh, December 4.

Our five distinguished witnesses today and my fellow Commissioners will explore the dimensions and manifestations of religious extremism in Pakistan today and what the United States government can do to help Pakistan counter the ongoing threat of religious extremism and other severe violations of human rights.

For those of you unfamiliar with the Commission and its work, I encourage you to check out our Web site, [www.uscifr.gov](http://www.uscifr.gov). The Commission was created by Congress in 1998 to review violations of religious freedom and belief abroad. It is also tasked with giving specific policy recommendations to the President, Secretary of State, and Congress on how U.S. policy can most effectively advance freedom of religion and related human rights around the world.

Given the history of U.S.-Pakistani relations going back to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the geopolitical climate, and national security needs facing both nations today, it's not exaggeration to say that the U.S. relationship with Pakistan is among the most important facing U.S. policy-makers. Each year since 2002, this Commission has recommended to the State Department that Pakistan be designated a "country of particular concern" under the International Religious Freedom Act.

Despite the Commission's view that Pakistan has repeatedly, quote, "engaged in or tolerated systematic and egregious violations of the universal right of freedom of religion and belief," the State Department has not followed the Commission's recommendations. Now, we are concerned about the following issues in Pakistan: the inadequate response of the government of Pakistan to persistent sectarian and religiously motivated violence which mainly targets Shi'a Muslims, but also Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Baha'is, and other religious minorities. We're reminded also of Sikhs by one of our witnesses today.

Secondly, the highly abused blasphemy laws, which result in the detention – often prolonged detention – without charges of and sometimes violence against members of religious minority communities, as well as against some Muslims on account of their religious beliefs. Women have been particularly victimized by these laws. Official government policies are also of concern, such as the anti-Ahmadi laws, which prevent the Ahmadis from engaging in the full practice of their faith. The largely unchecked growth of Islamic extremist groups, whose members take part in violence targeting religious minorities in Pakistan and who are linked to

international terrorism in the region and beyond is also a concern, as is the reported relationship between religious extremists and elements in the Pakistani military, particularly Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, the ISI.

The Commission is also concerned about the alleged role of Pakistan's Islamic schools, or madrassas, in providing ideological training to religious extremists and in creating an atmosphere of intolerance in which abuses of religious freedom are more likely to occur. The impact of religiously based intolerance, extremism and violence is also of concern, including harsh restrictions on the equal rights of women to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The Pakistan government's apparent willingness to accommodate certain violent extremists, as we recently saw in the Swat Valley where they imposed – with government approval – their own particularly harsh interpretation of Sharia or Islamic law, is also an ongoing concern.

And finally, the Commission is concerned about the leadership role that Pakistan has been playing to promote the flawed concept of, quote, “defamation of religions,” unquote, in a United Nations resolution and in other UN bodies. This is an attempt to seriously limit freedoms of religion and expression, and the Commission has been quite concerned about this.

Now, given all of these factors that we're concerned about, what should the United States do? That's the subject of our briefing today. Should we pressure Pakistan to oppose the extremists directly? And if so, what foreign policy tools should be deployed – diplomacy, economic aid, multilateral bodies, et cetera? Can the International Religious Freedom Act assist in this effort? Given the political and civil turmoil in Pakistan, where does the United States turn for its allies? And finally, what recommendations can our invited experts make for improving the religious and human rights of Pakistan's most vulnerable – its women, its religious minorities, its poor.

As we hold this hearing, I should note that we are only a few weeks into a new administration which has announced it is in the process of renewing U.S. relations with – I'm sorry not renewing but reviewing – U.S. relations with Pakistan. In an interview published in the New York Times, March 6th, President Obama was clear that his administration sees Pakistan's problem with religious extremism as a national security issue. He said, and I quote, “as long as you've got safe havens in these border regions that the Pakistani government can't control or reach in effective ways, we're going to continue to see vulnerability on the Afghan side of the border. So it's very important for us to reach out to the Pakistani government and work with them more effectively.”

Our Commissioners are aware that this week the Obama Administration is expected to unveil its plans for addressing the situation in Afghanistan. And some claim that Pakistan will be enlisted to play a stepped-up role in curtailing religious extremism and dismantling the safe havens of the Taliban. All of these issues require our attention today.

Now, to speak to these complex and confounding challenges, we're pleased to have with us a distinguished panel of experts – actually two panels of experts. And before we hear from them, I'd like to say a word about the structure of the hearing. Each panelist will be asked to speak for 10 minutes, to leave plenty of time for follow-up questions and response. And they've

been invited to submit their longer statements. And they'll be posted on the Commission's Web site. We've got lights to show you when the time is up.

And before we begin with that, I'd like to introduce the Commissioners who are here today and then –

REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE (D-TX): Madame Chair?

MS. GAER: And ask Congresswoman Jackson Lee to –

REP. JACKSON LEE: My only problem is I have to leave to be on the floor leading the conference – the Congress to open. Might I just say my words now and – before your introduction?

MS. GAER: It's a pleasure, Congresswoman Jackson Lee. The floor is yours.

REP. JACKSON LEE: My deepest apologies. I'm supposed to be there right now, 10:15. Let me first of all express my appreciation for this Commission and the Chairwoman. And I'm going to take an opportunity.

I think this room must have been chosen for a reason. The backdrops behind you are words that are secular and Western, but I think have value. And so I'll just simply indicate the words of Hubert Humphrey, "the moral test of a government is how it treats those who are at the dawn of life, the children, those who are in the twilight of life, the aged, and those who are in the shadow of life, the sick and the needy and the handicapped." That speaks to what I would call religious values in the United States spoken secularly, that we care about those who cannot care for themselves. And so as we look to how religion is respected in other countries, we look to it in how the least who cannot speak for themselves, protect themselves, are protected.

My name is Sheila Jackson Lee. I represent the 18th Congressional District and I founded and I co-chair the Pakistan Caucus. We are members, both Democratic and Republican, who have been the fastest-growing caucus. And we believe that we strike a balance of reason on just what the Chairwoman has indicated about the value of the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. Having visited on many, many occasions, most recently in the beginning of February, meeting with the heads of government, having spoken to – during her lifetime and as she was coming back to Pakistan – Benazir Bhutto, working with the former president as well, and going to Pakistan for the first time with President Clinton – when I say for the first time meaning for the first time of trying to restore relationships – I realize that we walk somewhat of a difficult line.

But when you're friends, you should not hesitate to tell the truth. And frankly, it is important to recognize that the needs in Pakistan are far-ranging. It is a country that controls only a portion of its land. The frontier area is not controlled by the government of Pakistan. It is in fact a frontier area, bordered by Afghanistan and involved in the emerging and rising conflict of violence in Afghanistan and with the Taliban. The Taliban has now taken hold and roots in

the area, even more so than one might have hoped. And so, these issues of religious conflict now have become issues of war.

This is a time for voices of reason to be raised and to also provide the impetus and the promotion of NGOs, which are, I believe, fewer than those in other countries. There are issues dealing with the treatment of women. I have engaged in those and fought the government on how women have been treated. The issues of motivated or increased violence, the blasphemy laws, victimize women as the chairwoman has indicated. Unchecked Islamic extremists noted in the Swat area, the alleged role of the madrassas, all those raise their heads.

But yet, there is hope. There is a government that looks to be secular and to be respectful of other religions. Many would criticize Pakistani government over and over again for allegations of corruption. I think it is important to, at the same time, while making very strong statements against the infringement of religious freedom, that we also look the glimmer of hope.

And where are those glimmers of hope? One, in the Pakistani-American community that has been asking over and over to be more engaged, to be able to promote aspects of trade and enlightenment, to be able to protect – as I said – NGOs and international NGOs, to organize against those who would stand for religious intolerance. In addition, I think we should take hope in the fact that the chief justice is to be reinstated. And it was a peaceful coming together. What we have to be fearful of is that one side that managed the protests will believe that they have won and therefore that they should continue to disrupt the government.

We in the United States government are looking – and Congress – are looking to legislate legislation that will promote the good things that happen in Pakistan. The idea of greater empowerment in the Peshawar area to provide resources so that farmers can farm and women can have businesses and that we can have the kind of life, if you will, that focuses on civilian needs -- taking care of those who cannot take care of themselves. But I do think that we foil our responsibilities if we are silent on the atrocities that happened in Pakistan, even though they're our friend. In fact, we fail across the world if we do not stand against foe and friend alike when they fracture the human rights of those who live within their borders.

So this particular hearing is one that I look forward to reading the testimony, even though I'll be absent, and working with the Commission to find the right balance of legislation that speaks truthfully to this issue. And I do believe that we should have a situation where the State Department looks at the requests for citing this country as one where we have concerns. We can't fix what we don't pay attention to. We can't uplift what we don't know. And so I think this Commission and the testimony that we'll hear today and the statements that will be made will be a first step.

But I close by simply saying this: It is important to see the cup as being half-full rather than half-empty. It is important that whatever we attempt to do that we try to build the infrastructure that is there to help make a difference. They are there. Visiting Pakistan, there are families there, there are religious leaders there who simply want to live in peace. Let us find them. Let us build them up. Let us make them work. But at the same time, show them that we will protect them and that we will stand against those who would undermine what is basically a

country that was founded on democratic principles by the founding Mr. Jinnah who understood that democracy meant something and the protection of religion would mean something as well.

Thank you. And I yield back. Thank you commissioners for your indulgence – not your intolerance, I hope – but your indulgence of my having to rush away and to tend to my duties. Thank you very much.

MS. GAER: Thank you, Congresswoman. And I can assure you that we have no indulgence for intolerance. But we have intolerance for abuse and for those problems. So thank you for joining us. And thank you for your expressions.

Please allow me now to introduce the Commissioners to you and then we'll turn to our speakers. Sitting on my left but your right, Michael Cromartie, our vice chair. Sitting on my right but your left is Elizabeth Prodromou, our other vice chair. Starting from this side over, Commissioner Talal Eid, Commissioner Leonard Leo – you've heard from the three of us – Commissioner Nina Shea, and our executive director James Standish.

Now, our first two speakers are Ambassador William Milam and Dr. Steve Coll. William Milam served as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan in 1998 to 2001. He is now a Senior Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center here in Washington, distinguished author and columnist. The Ambassador will discuss relations between the United States and Pakistan and particularly how to improve cooperation. Ambassador, the floor is yours.

WILLIAM MILAM: Well, thank you.

MICHAEL CROMARTIE: You pull the button there.

MR. MILAM: The button? Thank you. Technically challenged from the beginning. Thank you, Madame Chairman and your fellow Commissioners for inviting me. I'm very pleased to be here. I listened carefully to Representative Jackson and I thought that was a very good statement that she made.

I thought that I would basically give you kind of an overview of not just U.S.-Pakistani relations as I see them over the last few months but some other thoughts that come to mind, which are based upon the news of the day or the news of the week, if you will.

MR. CROMARTIE: Would you pull your mike closer to you?

MR. MILAM: I can, yes. I'm not going to repeat myself though. And then, I will, you know, after Steve is finished, I'll be glad to answer any questions you have, the kinds of things you brought up in your opening statement that you are looking for. But these are more, as I say, personal thoughts based upon what I think is happening and what has happened over the last few weeks.

And I hasten to add that though I had a long and very happy career in the Foreign Service of the United States, I do not speak for the State Department any longer. I do not pretend to

Speak for the State Department. I hardly speak to them sometimes. But so, and I will try and be very brief. And I don't know where the light comes on. I guess it's over here. But I will try and keep my eye on that too.

First of all, let me start with what we all assume is the good news from Pakistan. And good news is quite rare from Pakistan these days. And that is the recent diffusion of what I would call the political crisis that was starting to engender violence and could have gone very much out of control. I thought it was kind of a scary moment if you will.

I want to say that the good news is not unalloyed good news. There are some things that we need to think about that came out of this recent resolution of this confrontation. But I have to think that it's better than the alternative, which probably was a very violent period, which would have weakened the government quite substantially and opened it, probably, or made it more vulnerable actually to the encroachment of extremists, which threaten the existence of Pakistan in any case.

There are some good signs that came out of it. One is that – and these movements like the lawyers' movement, that was the sort of impetus, picked up a lot of baggage that it didn't start with, which is mostly good. It became, for example, a whole symbol of the desire for judicial independence. And attached to that was a lot of sort of unspoken desire for social and economic progress from, shall we say, the lower elements, the lower echelons of Pakistani society. It caught on. It had a lot of public support. It in fact was, in a sense, an idea – ideas really – whose time had come. But come again, because they've been here before. And it was also an example of how – when civil society in Pakistan actually coalesces around something, it can be quite effective. And that's fairly rare, actually.

Now, this lawyers' movement basically did in President Musharraf. He caused it and it caused his fall from power, ultimately. And it has – the outcome, I think, has weakened the present government, Zardari's government, without necessarily strengthening the overall governing process. We will have to see how things work out between him and – between the PPP and Zardari and Nawaz Sharif and his PMLN.

You know, a year or so ago, we all had dreams – even I frankly was thinking about this – dreams of a coalition between these two major parties, a coalition of government that would have maybe been able to address more effectively the real serious problems that are affecting Pakistan. But that fell apart within a few weeks after the election of February 18th. And whether or not this resolution of the process – of the problem – actually forecasts better cooperation between the two or not, I think, is still a very open question.

There is a history we have to be aware of here. And it seems as if whenever the province of Punjab, the biggest and majority province, is controlled by one party, that party is usually the – excuse me – PML and the other, the central government is controlled by another party – and that would be usually the PPP. There has been a history of serious political struggle between the two and very little being done – very little effective governance, if you will. Will that recur in the next few months? I don't know. But I think there are worrisome signs.

I'll return to this a little bit in a few minutes, but let me talk a little bit about U.S.-Pakistani relations. First of all, it's clear to me that the Obama administration is seeing and sees Pakistan through a slightly different lens than the previous administrations. And I use that in plural. Pakistan remains an ally and a very important ally of the United States. But I think our focus is changing from the kind of sort of more open kind of relationship we had to a much more -- to a relationship which is much more focused on changing the Pak mindset -- Pakistani mindset -- if that's possible, in terms of resisting the threat that really threatens their state and being able to meet that threat.

And, I will explain -- this has led, I think, to a different kind of view of our cooperation with Pakistan, particularly the mix of assistance we would be giving Pakistan. The military side, I think, is much more going to be much more focused on counterinsurgency operations and the equipment, as well as the training, that is needed by the Pakistani army to do that. And our assistance will be much more economic in nature, I think. I believe that the administration is going to triple economic assistance. And that would go, I think, both to shoring up the economy, which is in terrible shape, as well as, I hope, over the longer term, to providing some aid for social developments and particularly education, which the public education system as you know, is in a state of collapse.

There's one more thing and it's a very delicate thing that I think this administration will focus on. But it will be hard to determine this focus because it will be quite closely held and under wraps. And that is the India-centricity of Pakistan. Everything that Pakistan does, at least in foreign affairs and security issues, is viewed through the lens of India, which it views as its eternally hostile neighbor. There's no good way we can do this. We certainly cannot be seen to meddle or to even mediate on the issues, particularly the Kashmir issue. But we really have to work on putting this back together.

My colleague Steve has had an article recently in *The New Yorker* about how close they got to an agreement before Musharraf hit the skids domestically. And that is, I think -- that at least is a piece of paper that they've got that we need to sort of get them back to over time. It won't be easy and it's going to be a long time because neither government is strong enough right now to make such a move. But maybe in a few years, it will be. In the meantime, hopefully just our economic assistance will be the way we sort of contribute to a new mindset.

Now, this power struggle -- the red light is on; I have to stop -- the power struggle is -- I'll just finish. The power struggle is worrisome because there is no sign of real political, democratically arrived compromise. This came from intense pressure, partially from the United States, as you know. Secretary Clinton called the leaders. Our Ambassador, Anne Patterson, who is doing a terrific job in my view, was all over the place. I bet she lost count of the number of times she saw the different leaders.

But the real pressure -- I think the game-changer -- was when the army became involved. Now the army didn't get involved as it has in the past, very behind the curtain. It is kind of reminiscent of 1993 when the army dictated a compromise between, yes, Nawaz Sharif and the president, which turned out to be probably a compromise that nobody liked but everybody lived with. But this intense pressure has brought Zardari to the point of giving in.



Now, he should have given in. The problem with this – the other problem with this sort of crisis is that we saw it coming a year ago. And it could have been dealt with a year ago or six months ago. It has built up because political actors don't seem to have the ability to deal with these kinds of crises, only the army does. Now, the army again has a place at the table – at the political table. So you know, this is not the best sign we could have, I think. But as I said in the beginning, it's better than the alternative.

I will stop there if you don't mind, and await your questions.

MS. GAER: Thank you very much, Ambassador. We'll turn to many of these issues in the question period. It's now my pleasure to introduce Steve Coll, our next speaker. He is the president of the New America Foundation. He is also a Pulitzer Prize-winning foreign correspondent, former managing editor of the Washington Post, and the author of *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10th, 2001*. Mr. Coll will discuss the implications of the extremist threat to the security of Pakistan and beyond. Thank you for joining us. And you know the light system as well.

STEVE COLL: Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. I appreciate the opportunity to speak. I'll, like Bill, try to be brief. In listening to your introduction, I have a long formal statement, which you have, and I'll not overlap with that too much.

I thought I would just try to set a little bit of context for U.S. policy formation over the next couple of months, since that's an area that you're working on and review some of the challenges that U.S. policy-makers face in the midst of this fluid security situation in Pakistan. I think the goal of U.S. policy toward Pakistan is pretty easy to describe. It's in the interest of the United States to promote a stable, modernizing, democratic Pakistan that is at peace with itself and at peace with its neighbors, and, in pursuing that goal, to promote those leaders, institutions and forces within Pakistan that seek to revive and perfect the Pakistani constitution that defined the country's identity and political system from its founding.

There is still, as the lawyers' movement demonstrates, a residual national wish for a democratic constitutional order of the sort that many Pakistanis imagined when they created their country. The United States has failed in its own policy-making when it has isolated and stepped away from that vision and those leaders in pursuit of its narrow security interests. And I think there is an understanding in the Obama administration and broadly in the Congress and elsewhere that the time has come to rebalance U.S. policy to emphasize the pursuit of a stable, modernizing, democratic constitutional Pakistan, not because it's an American idea but because it's a Pakistani idea.

The problem now is that this constitutional order is undergoing a period of considerable instability. Some of the aspects of that instability are without precedent in recent Pakistani history, particularly the role of an Islamist insurgency that has captured significant swathes of territory in the country as a couple people pointed out in earlier statements.

Now, the United States, in confronting this problem of instability and the pursuit of this constitutional order in these difficult circumstances has to also confront the role of the Pakistani security services historically in promoting, funding, arming, and equipping, sometimes with American cooperation, the very Islamist groups that now threaten that order. And one of the real problems in American policy in the past has been trying to find an effective, consistent policy to engage with the Pakistani army and to encourage and at times if necessary coerce it to change its conduct in relation to these band Islamist groups.

The principle new framework for U.S. policy, of course, as the commissioners know, is embedded in the earlier bill known as Biden-Lugar, now Kerry-Lugar. And I'm sure there's a House version of that. And it's an important reframing of U.S. policy to emphasize civil society, the economy, and constitutional politics and institutions over security aid, which dominated U.S. investments in Pakistan after 9/11. To some extent though, that bill is necessary but insufficient. It was a policy framework developed to address an era that has, to some extent, passed in Pakistan. It was meant to address the problem of Musharraf's authoritarian rule and to address the recognition that too much U.S. aid had gone into the Pakistani security services without proper accounting, without proper shared understanding of what that aid was intended to accomplish.

The reframing and rebalancing of U.S. aid to emphasize civil society and constitutional processes remains important. But we do have a constitutional government that needs other kinds of help as well. Pakistan is going to be in the teeth of the global economic crisis now unfolding. The scale of international financial assistance that it may require, for example, is probably greater than most people are interested in acknowledging at this point because, as with other cases in Eastern Europe, it's a pretty daunting number.

As the United States refashions or evolves the principles of Biden-Lugar, just to use the shorthand, into these new circumstances, I think it would be advised to guard against the pattern in past policy-making that has overemphasized the importance of particular personalities in the Pakistani system, and particularly personalities in the army leadership. In my own engagement with some of these discussions, it's possible once again to hear the sort of romanticization of particular generals, particular leaders, which is an observation not intended to suggest that these are not potentially good leaders or better leaders than their predecessor but to warn against the overinvestment of U.S. policy-making in a kind of top-down approach that relies on the putative – you know, the sort of supposed enlightenment of particular leaders. Instead, the United States ought to be investing in institutions and processes and in this goal of a successful or more successful Pakistani constitution.

The United States has also struggled in the past with identifying the policies that can encourage and persuade the Pakistani security services to break once and for all with the jihadi groups that have been an instrument of Pakistani foreign and regional policy for decades. Here, I think the debate about where U.S. policy should go is less well developed. There is a conceptual recognition that the conduct of the Pakistani army will be central to the success of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan and central as well to the potential for democratic constitutional revival in Pakistan itself. But there is less confidence and understanding about exactly what the United States can do to encourage the Pakistan army to actually undertake these

risky changes, which are very controversial within the Pakistani military and about which the evidence suggests there is no clear consensus within the Pakistani security institutions.

I can come back to that in questions as to what mechanisms the United States might actually have to pursue or to support along with allies including Europe, NATO, China, and Saudi Arabia, to encourage and incent these changes without attempting to impose its will, which is a prescription in Pakistan for failure.

I do think that I'll offer two thoughts in closing about this problem of the conduct of the Pakistani security services and their connections to the jihadi groups. One is that where the United States has failed in the past, and particularly since 9/11, it has failed often because it has not enunciated clear standards of expectation that can be used to measure the attitudes and conduct of the Pakistani security services. It's been observed by many people that the United States wrote, essentially, a blank check to the Pakistani security services after 9/11. But what would it mean to write a different kind of check – in other words to have a more constructive engagement?

Well, there are specific measures of strategic intent by the Pakistani army that, whether in private or in public, the United States could have firmly in mind during this engagement. For example, the Pakistan army has largely honored a cease-fire along the line of control with India since approximately 2004, 2005. Until 2008, its adherence to that cease-fire was virtually complete. The rate of infiltration by jihadi groups across the border from Pakistan into India also declined precipitously. Now, anyone who has traveled on the Pakistani side of the line of control knows that this is an area where the Pakistani state is fully in charge. It's an exclusion zone. You can't go there unless you have the army's permission. So that's one measure of the army's intent – its behavior along the line of control.

There are many others. Its attitude towards groups that operate openly, like Jamaat-ud-Dawa in Lashkar – I see the light is blinking and so I'll wrap up. Its conduct in relation to groups like the Haqqani network and other militant groups on the western frontier – these are metrics that I think are important to the health of the Pakistani political system. They're also important to the United States.

I'll end with one large thought. In the end, the pursuit of a stable, normalizing, democratic Pakistan is not going to be successful if it is vested in incremental changes in the conduct of the Pakistani security services alone. The only way to achieve stability in South Asia in the end is through normalization between India and Pakistan and the integration of their two economies and societies. That's why the Kashmir negotiations matter, not in and of themselves but as a pathway to normalization.

MS. GAER: Thank you both very much. We're now going to have a round of questions and look forward to your responses. We're going to try to keep our questions to a minute and hope you'll keep your responses to about three. That will allow a full round. And then, perhaps we'll have time for more.

I wanted to ask Mr. Coll, you have both described in your *New Yorker* article and also in your testimony to us the way the Pakistani army thinks about dealing with extremism and also you say that the Pakistani army actually – well, some officers – see themselves as guardians of a constitutional inheritance that aspires to democracy, pluralism, and modernization. But you’ve documented on the Kashmir deal in the *New Yorker* article how the ISI and the Pakistani military are actually using religious extremists, each for their own purposes.

Now, I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit for us on what you think the United States could actually do other than a deal on Kashmir to weaken and end the support and protection that ISI and the Pakistani military give to these religious extremists directly?

MR. COLL: Yeah, I think that’s the single most important question facing American policy-makers over the next one to two years: How to be effective? Even if you conceptualize the problem, it took a while to conceptualize the problem correctly for us as a country. Now you face this daunting engineering problem. So I think about that some and look back in history. And maybe Ambassador Milam can add some other examples.

If you ask the question, when has the Pakistan army taken – changed its conduct? And what were the reasons that it took risks or sort of acted in this direction that you’re describing? I think the most important factor is its own strategic perception of Pakistan’s national and corporate interests. So where the United States and its allies and other partners of Pakistan can help to highlight the self-interest that the Pakistan army, and therefore ISI, has in normalization, you know, that’s one obvious place to begin.

But on the sort of less aspirational side, it is the case that the Pakistan army has indirectly been coerced into changing its conduct from time to time where it believes its own legitimacy is at stake. There was a period in the early and mid-1990s when the United States threatened to place Pakistan on the list of countries that sponsor international terrorism. There have been – there was, after 9/11, obviously, a very famous interaction between the United States and Pakistan about which side it was on. And you can argue that the Pakistan army, in some of those cases, did the minimum necessary to preserve its legitimacy rather than making a full turn, but it did pay attention where its international legitimacy was at stake.

So this kind of coercive track and aspirational track interact with one another. By the time that the army – and I’ll just conclude with this observation – by the time the army took the extraordinary steps that it did to enter into these negotiations over Kashmir, essentially threatening to reverse decades of policy in this negotiation with India, it was not coercion that brought them to the table; it was aspiration. They wanted – Musharraf in particular – wanted the international legitimacy, the credibility. He wanted to be celebrated at international events as a peacemaker. He wanted Oslo to pay attention to him. So you do have – it’s not one thing or the other, but there is an interaction between aspiration and deterrence, I guess, rather than coercion, would be the best way to put it.

MS. GAER: Thank you very much. Commissioner Prodromou?

ELIZABETH PRODROMOU: Yeah, thank you to both of you for your overview. Both of you sort of set out this analysis that, on the one hand, looks at economic factors and economic assistance and then, on the other hand, looks at military and intelligence situation. And I wonder if I could ask you if there's any overlap here, because on the face of it, it appears that, you know, this is all about a battle of ideas from, you know, the most extreme to the most democratic in an oversimplified way, and yet, we know in other societies where the military is entrenched, it's oftentimes about who makes money.

And I wonder if you could map on – or if there is a map and if you could sort of lay it out for us in terms of what are the economic interests that drive the behavior of the Pakistani military and intelligence services? And in the Af-Pak hyphenate that's now become sort of the language in U.S. policy, who stands to win and who stands to lose in economic terms, with regard to the extremist elements in the military and the security services?

MR. COLL: Do you want to take a pass at that? I think it's a very good question. I think that if you look at the sort of, imperfect-but-interesting examples of other dominant militaries that have supported the evolution of constitutional systems, whether in Turkey – being the most complete example – in Indonesia, the Philippines – other places that look good in comparison – this question of corporate interests and economic interest has been critical to the decision that the militaries have taken.

In Pakistan's case, the army needs to be able to fund a modernization drive if it's going to continue to support the doctrine that it operates on – a defensive doctrine in relation to India. I think there's a recognition in the army that they're not going to be able to support that modernization drive unless the economy is growing substantially. The best prospect for economic growth that Pakistan has is integration with India. That's obvious to many in the army leadership. So they're torn.

You know, during the Musharraf period, there was a less corporate aspect to this issue, which was the integration of particular army officers into national economic boards, into the Karachi business community. You had generals – retired and serving – sitting on various kinds of economic institutions. That had a salient effect, it seemed, to build a kind of economic literacy in the top of the army core.

It may have had less attractive aspects in terms of opportunities for patronage and self-enrichment but that, too, doesn't bother me too much if the progress towards a democratic, constitutional system is unbroken. The problem in the Musharraf era was that this was an authoritarian system set up to reward the army corporately and individually, so that in that sense, it was not anything like the Turkish or Indonesian models.

MR. MILAM: Actually, I just wanted to – Steve is absolutely on the mark on this. I think I would stress the aspirational side of the thing, although the coercive side has to be part of our total calculus. But I wanted to point out that the self-interest – actually, the Pakistani army, to my way of thinking, is pretty interested in the economic future of the country and the economic growth of the country.

And I'm convinced – I was there in '99, when the Musharraf coup took place – that underneath all the other things they talked about – sham democracy and all that – was a real fear that the elected governments were running the economy into the ground – and some justification to that fear, by the way. And I think that they always have been – they're always influenced by whether or not their economic self-interests – their corporate interests – are going to be affected. I think he's right on the mark – and I think a lot of us have thought this – that somehow, as they see – and as Musharraf saw – that the economics of it were – of getting along better, or normalizing with India – were so important, that would be dominant and I think it will dominate.

MS. GAER: Thank you very much. Commissioner Eid?

TALAL EID: Thanks for both of you. I have one question for each one of you. For Ambassador William, as the United States re-evaluates and reorganizes its diplomatic and military relationship with Pakistan, what are the new leverage points we possess to advocate for human rights and religious freedom, and what influence have we lost?

Now, for Mr. Coll, and you can answer after that, do you think aid, including military assistance to Pakistan, should be conditioned, in some way, on improvement in human rights or religious freedom conditions, for example? And can we reasonably put conditions on U.S. aid to Pakistan, given the importance of Pakistan to U.S. military and other strategic concerns?

MR. MILAM: Shall I go first?

MS. GAER: Please, yes.

MR. MILAM: His first question was addressed to me, about leverage points, as I understand it, as we review this relationship and look for ways to make it, shall we say, more effective in terms of Pakistani behavior and Pakistani policy. Well, I don't know if I have any new leverage points in mine; I have the same old leverage points, but bigger ones, in a sense. First of all, just the kind of aid that I was talking about, both on the military side – if the Pakistanis are going to take action against – military action – against the extremists – this isn't the only solution to the extremist issue, by the way – but if they are, they're going to need a lot more counterinsurgency equipment, counterinsurgency training.

But I'm more interested in the economic side. I think that if our economic aid – assistance – is focused correctly and aimed correctly, it will, over time, provide a leverage point. Also, as a matter of fact, I might point out, whether it was right or wrong, that according to the Financial Times this morning, President Clinton stressed the economic aid that was planned for Pakistan as a reason why President Zardari might want to think again about his confrontational policies with the lawyers and with Nawaz Sharif.

Beyond that, as Steve pointed out, in the next few years, Pakistan's economy is going to need enormous amounts of, shall we say, shoring up, not just from us because we can't do it all, but from the international financial institutions – the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and all those. And we play – we have a large voice in all of those. And we

can help direct more of that kind of flow towards Pakistan, and they will need a lot of it. So that's sort of my not-very-innovative thinking.

MR. COLL: Yeah just quickly, I mean, I think that informal conditioning of the sort that Ambassador Milam suggested, through the ordinary course of interactions with the government of Pakistan about economic packages is likely to be much more effective than some formal conditioning. What the United States, I think, would want to avoid would be the abrupt transition from a period of no-strings attached, no-questions-asked, to one of kind of public drama over the sort of worthiness of the Pakistani government to receive American largesse, which will only be counterproductive because it will reinforce the considerable unpopularity of the United States in Pakistan as a sort of perceived coercive power.

I think that you can accomplish many of the goals of sort of formal conditioning through these informal processes for now. I also think that, at the same time, it's important to sequence in our engagement with the Pakistan government at all levels, whether it's the security services or the civilian government, to make clear and consistent what U.S. goals are over time so that if, in a period of reasonable time, the Pakistani – sections of the Pakistani state continue to operate in direct contravention of U.S. interests – for example, directly aiding militias that are attacking and killing U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan, just to choose one example – that there is a clear sequence of what the consequences of what that kind of conduct would be over time. And that might lead you to more formal conditioning, but I don't think that's where you would start. That's my sense of it.

MS. GAER: Thank you very much. Dr. Prodromou had another question.

MS. PRODROMOU: Yeah, I suppose this is more for Dr. Coll. You mentioned a kind of grand, strategic point, that at the end of the day, regardless of what the U.S. might do in Pakistani domestic politics, without a normalization in Indo-Pakistani relations, stability in the region is pretty short-lived. And so I want to ask you a little bit about the media and things like a commission like ours might do in terms of suggesting targeted assistance and sectoral support.

A casual reader and listener to the Pakistani media sees all sorts of conspiracy theories everywhere about U.S. intentions in Pakistan with regard to religious extremism – and also with India, you see the same thing in India as well. So how is it that – how do you see the media as a kind of actor in shaping public opinion about religious extremism and human rights in Pakistan, and also in terms of what the United States might do to work with those actors in the media who might tell a different kind of story and re-present domestic politics and Indo-Pakistani relations?

MR. COLL: It's another good question and I have two quick thoughts about it. One, I was speaking with somebody who'd been involved in this strategic equation in the region – not on the American side – for the last six, seven years, and this person was making the point that, when they started to think about normalization, one of the objections was, oh, the people won't follow us. And so there was a thought – well, let's do people-to-people contacts as a way to get started. And there were people who thought, well, that's kind of a milquetoast idea – people-to-people exchanges, visa issuing, border crossing.

And this person was saying, to his astonishment, six, seven years later, it is the undergirding of the potential for normalization. So there is a parallel in the media. The Indian and the Pakistani media consume each other quite a lot. There's a lot of access to media through satellite broadcasts and other things. But opening up each country to the other is just as critical as it is in academia and the military and so forth. The more contact these two societies – especially the democratic sectors and media sectors – have with each other, the better their reporting will get.

In Pakistan itself, there is obviously a very robust media that includes some incredibly brave and independent journalists. And without discrediting them through U.S. government funding, the United States certainly ought to pay attention to those sectors of the Pakistani media that, for their own reasons, are taking on the role that you would wish the media to play in a constitutional democracy responsibly and figure out, through broader coalitions and international partners, how to protect and strengthen that sector through advocacy and other means.

MS. GAER: Well, it's my pleasure to thank the panelists. This has been fascinating. Thank you for your submissions and thank you for your remarks today in questions. We hope we can stay in touch with you on these issues, which are not going to go away. And we very much appreciate your presence and your insights. We'll now take a one-minute break to allow the second panel to take their seats. And we'll begin again at that point.

(Pause.)

Okay, so we'll begin. We were just waiting for Mr. Hussain to get back, but in the moment, I'll begin with the introductions of the three panelists. First, we'll thank you. Welcome. We're delighted that you could join us. And our plan is to have, first, Ali Dayan Hasan speak and then Azhar Hussain if he gets back and then Ayesha Jalal, in that order.

Ali Dayan Hasan is Senior South Asia Researcher with Human Rights Watch, which is the largest U.S.-based human rights advocacy organization. Mr. Hasan, who is based in Lahore, will provide up-to-date information on human rights conditions there, particularly as related to freedom of religion or belief, and the role of Pakistan, either in fostering or in restricting universal human rights. So thank you very much, Mr. Hasan. The floor is yours.

MR. HASAN: Thank you, Chairperson. Let me begin by talking about, actually, religious freedoms in Pakistan. As we are aware, there are two aspects to discrimination on grounds of religion in Pakistan. One is legal discrimination and the other is political. Now, in terms of the legal structures, effectively, Pakistan is a Sunni sectarian state. It has – in fact, it is – I could be even more specific, perhaps – a Wahhabi sectarian state.

This was put into place during the military regime of General Zia ul-Haq, with U.S. backing, I might add, and there is a whole legal structure, right up to the federal Sharia court, which actually buttresses this situation. There is, as we are aware, the blasphemy laws, all introduced in the late '70s and early '80s, and all of this is used to discriminate against minorities. That is legal discrimination.



Now, of course, the most high-profile example of this is the discrimination faced by the Ahmadi community. This is a remarkable situation because these are individuals who profess to be Muslims and have been declared non-Muslim by an act of parliament, which, as far as I'm aware, is the only instance anywhere in the world of something like that being the case. But if you view the Ahmadis actually as Muslims, the situation of how this discrimination works changes. What we then see is a situation where, actually, the Muslim non-Sunni minorities in Pakistan – Muslims – are actually treated much worse than the discrimination faced by non-Muslims, i.e. Christians and Hindus.

We see very high levels of discrimination faced by the Ahmadis. Just recently, five Ahmadis, including children, were charged under the blasphemy law. So this is something that is very much happening now. More importantly, there is also the issue of the Shi'a minority in Pakistan with growing Talibanization in the northern areas and the NWFP. What we are witnessing is a great sense of siege that the Shi'a minority lives in.

We have gathered some statistics, which are quite interesting, which I would like to share with you. In Dera Ismail Khan, which is the frontier town bordering the tribal areas and the Northwest Frontier Province proper, since 2006, 551 people have died in violence that can be construed to be religious or sectarian or, sometimes, is often reported as al Qaeda and terrorism-related. Now, if you break down these figures, of these 551 people, there has been one Christian, one Hindu, nine Sunni and 540 individuals from the Shi'a minority who have been killed.

That should give some idea of who is being targeted and how often. We see this through the prism of a fight between al Qaeda or the Taliban and the Pakistani state or Taliban violence, whereas often, it is sectarian violence masquerading as the Taliban or the Taliban following sectarian agendas, however you'd like to see it. There is – I would also like to talk about Parachinar and the Kurram Agency – these are agencies of the tribal areas. Now, for the last 18 months, the Kohat-Parachinar Road has been closed.

During this period, 548 Shi'as have been killed by the Taliban, 1250 severely injured or maimed for life and 750 have received minor injuries. Now, this is an area we're talking about where the population is less than half a million. And Parachinar is a Shi'a pocket surrounded by Sunnis, of course. In the province of Baluchistan, you have – in Quetta, you have the Hazara tribe. Now, the Hazara tribe are ethnically identifiable and are Shi'a. They live in ghettos, though they are better educated, and consequently, they become focuses of – they are targeted for discrimination and violence.

And this is just part of the greater, bigger picture, which is of ongoing discrimination against the Shi'a minority and the lack of responsiveness by the state in the situation. I described the situation of the Ahmadis earlier. Other minorities in Pakistan – the Christian minority and the Hindu minority, which are a very small percentage of the population – also suffer from varying levels of discrimination, particularly the use of the blasphemy law, which is actually hardly ever used for religious purposes. There is hardly ever any real religious sentiment underpinning even the application of the law; it is essentially used to settle all manner of other disputes – power relations, property disputes – and is a convenient tool to be used, sometimes even against Muslims, by accusing them of blasphemy.

So now the question is, what can the U.S. do in the situation? And I think that we have, actually, a very fine opportunity coming up. Post the restoration of the deposed chief justice, it is now clear that the Pakistani government and the opposition is going to embark upon a major constitutional reform package. This is something that both the opposition leader, Nawaz Sharif's party and President Zardari's party, the PPP, are committed to. And in fact, it is the demand of both parties that the 1973 constitution be restored to its original form. Now, they both mean different things by this restoration. Nawaz Sharif wants it restored to where it stood on the 12<sup>th</sup> of October, 1999, where all the legal discrimination that I have mentioned had been legislated into the constitution.

One solution to this is for the constitution to be restored as it stood on the 5<sup>th</sup> of July, 1977, before General Zia ul-Haq's coup and before these discriminatory measures were introduced into the constitution. Now, the PPP would actually have no problem with this; the party that would have a problem with this is Nawaz Sharif's PLMN, but this would be an opportunity to urge Nawaz Sharif to actually show that he is willing to dispense with the politics – with his politics, which has been a politics of, and remains one to a greater or lesser extent, of close association and involvement with Sunni extremist elements within Pakistani society, and certainly, very highly socially conservative elements within Pakistani society.

I think that there is actually a possibility; if there is a cross-party consensus on this, this will happen. In 30 years, this is the first time where there is actually a real possibility that legal discrimination against minorities can be ended, and the sectarian nature of the Pakistani state can be – the legal dispensation – can be rolled back. So I think that that is one very straightforward thing that can be achieved.

Now, in terms of Talibanization and what its effect has been on religious freedoms, our understanding from the Valley of Swat, for example, is that it is – the most vulnerable sections of society, of course, are targeted in this kind of situation. And that is women, children and religious minorities. And when I say – again, I emphasize the reason why I mentioned the Shi'a in the beginning is that the problem in Swat, or the problem in many parts of the Northwest Frontier Province, doesn't just concern even Shi'as; it concerns any Sunni that does not subscribe to the Taliban worldview in particular.

Given that that worldview and that religious framework is actually not indigenous to many of these populations – it is not something that has organic roots within local populations across much of Pakistan – what is happening is a process of coercive transformation, if you will, of religious practice and religious discourse. This ought to be resisted and it ought to be – there ought to be little tolerance for this kind of activity. Of course, when you discuss this with the Pakistani government, their response often is that they are powerless to do anything about it, and that's where the military comes in, but I notice that I have run out of time, so I will end here.

MS. GAER: Thank you very much. We hope we'll come back to some of those questions. Our next panelist is Azhar Hussain, who is Vice President for Preventive Diplomacy at the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy. As head of its Pakistan Madrasa Project, he will speak to the role played by Pakistan's thousands of Islamic schools and the relationship

between Islamic education and the growth of Pakistan – the growth in Pakistan of religious extremism and intolerance – and I hope he will discuss the role of the United States government and what it can do to promote more tolerance and more diverse views. Thank you.

AZHAR HUSSAIN: Thank you. I would like to thank Chairwoman Gaer, the Vice Chair and distinguished Commissioners for the privilege of sharing my experiences and insights before this commission. I have a lot here and I think it will take me some time to read through it, so I'll just talk through it, if you don't mind.

MS. GAER: Yeah, if you could, keep your comments to about 10 minutes, thank you.

MR. HUSSAIN: I will do that, absolutely. And I'm a field worker, so I go and conduct workshops of tolerance and diversity, pluralism, within madrassas and with religious leaders in Pakistan. And so I'll speak from that perspective a lot. You have a really good and distinguished panel of speakers here talking about policy and changing the world, and I will talk about much more granular details, if you will, about madrassas.

Pakistani madrassas are vital to Pakistanis, partly because public school system is so poorly managed, most people have no option but to send their kids to madrassas. In 1947, when Pakistan was founded, there was less than 200 madrassas; right now, there are somewhere between 20 to 25,000 madrassas. And there is a reason for that. Obviously, poverty, economic conditions, and also, the conservative Islamic sect that is growing in Pakistan. There is an incredible need that's coming from people themselves to go to madrassas or to send their kids to madrassas. So some families will send two of their kids to private school and at least one of their sons to madrassa.

There is much debate about how extremist madrassas are. And some figures are from 50,000 to 60,000 – that is extremely exaggerated. I think in 2007, our Ministry of Education did a census. They started to register madrassas, and there are 16,000 madrassas registered right now. We believe at ICRD there are about 20 to 25,000 madrassas. Though there is a lot of discussion about madrassas and their role in terrorism as one of the major concerns for the United States, we have not spent funds to really find out, how many madrassas are there, and/or how many students attend those, how many teachers teach these courses and what are the motivations for these students, teachers or the families to send them to madrassas?

Some very basic information is missing, partly because we shy away from funding these institutions or anybody who works in these institutions. But yet, we talk quite a bit about it. Policy circles in Washington, D.C. constantly recommend to rein in madrassas and take punitive steps, but there is very little on the ground that I see happening to manage madrassas or develop them in the first place. One minute lesson in history of madrassas: Madrassas give us the concept of university, the chair of the department, the dean and faculty, the mortarboard and scholarship. Madrassas also gave us the modern rational, thinking concepts of algebra and zero. So when we talk about madrassas, we have to be careful, and we also have to pay some respect to their historical value to Muslim communities and to the Western communities as well.

Of course, there is a lot of resentment in madrassas. There is a lot of conspiracy theories about the United States and its role that it played in the '80s, fighting the Afghan war. In fact, at that time, madrassas were teaching 12-to-16-year courses; it was expedited to be two-and-a-half-years' course because we needed a lot more fighters coming out of madrassas faster. And because of that, most of the ulamahs that graduated from madrassas got an Islamic degree – a master's degree in Islamic studies after two-and-a-half, three-and-a-half years, but of course, they were sent to Afghanistan or their kids were sent to Afghanistan and they became teachers.

This, of course, created an insatiable desire for power, because they could see after Taliban took over Afghanistan that there are ways that you can take over power – maybe coercively, maybe just taking two years of courses. And when Taliban were overthrown, coming back to Pakistan, they feel that there are ways that they can still consolidate that power. Madrassas have given rise to the groups like Sipah-e-Sahab, Lashkar-e-Janghavi, and most violent sectarian groups, mostly targeting Shi'as or anybody who disagrees with their form of Islam.

Most Taliban leadership graduated from Darul Uloom Haqqania – some Binori Town in Karachi. Mullah Omar actually graduated from Peshawar Darul Uloom Haqqania in Pakistan. Groups who are educated in universities, like Lashkar-e-Taiba, also have hundreds of madrassas. They are now called Jamaat-ud-Dawa. And intolerance is part of – I wouldn't say a part of the curriculum – but part of an integrated fabric of a madrassa. It is an identity-based conflict, which is exacerbated by a sectarian divide.

It is a Deobandi madrassa, so therefore, they are only teaching the ideology of Deobandi, which is very strict Hanafi ideology. Barelwi, which is also a Hanafi school of thought, but is very different from Deobandi – Deobandis tend to be Taliban. Ahle Hadiths, which is a Wahhabi sect, also runs Lashkar-e-Taiba and other terrorist groups. There is quite a bit of support and sympathy within madrassas for these groups. These groups tend to – these groups meaning extremist groups – tend to ask for justice quite a bit – law and order, justice – and find ways to come up with examples of injustices and saying, then, therefore, we have to take law into our own hands and equalize the justice. Most of the time, these revenge killings happen in the name of justice or law and order. Shi'as or Ahmadis or Christians are the targets of it.

I think there is an incredible opportunity for the United States and Pakistan to engage madrassas, since we have been – I'll go into our project in Pakistan – ICRD – International Center for Religion and Diplomacy – has engaged madrassa leaders since 2004. In five years, we have trained over 2,500 madrassa leaders from all over the country. Once they have gone through our workshop, there was outright excitement. We have more than – I can't keep any count at this point, but literally, thousands of madrassas calling us to do more workshops with them.

Our workshops deal with human rights, tolerance and women's rights, and all from a very – concept of Quran and hadiths – Islamic tenets. It's very popular. We are inundated with requests, so that tells you that, once engaged, a madrassa tends to like it – they like engagement, they like respect, they like more education, they like more educational opportunities. We have engaged madrassa leaders in the Northwest Frontier. Some of the madrassa leaders that were

trained in Taliban madrassas have asked us to come and do more workshops. They want us to take them to the secure location to give them training, because in their region, they would be bombed. And that is, in fact, the case at this point, where most of the willing madrassas are so scared to speak about modernization because they fear there will be an attack on them.

I'll give you a very quick last example from our most recent workshop. We also do interfaith workshops where we bring madrassa leaders and Christian leaders together. And this is a commander of the Northwest Frontier Province from Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has now renamed itself to Dawa. He said that, "I have learned Quran all my life. I read it every day and I teach it to hundreds of kids. Before this workshop and this engagement, I never knew many of the suras actually meant to create peace and harmony with minority groups. I was taught in madrassa a fear of other, and there was no mention of coexistence, which the Quran is all about, from what I can see from this workshop."

We went back three weeks later and talked to him again, because I was kind of amazed that he said that. He's actually teaching those lessons and actively was able to interview, on camera, saying that I really need to fix all of these different things that I've done all my life and start to turn away these kids from violence and go towards peace. Islam can only be spread through a peaceful environment. He got it, and about 2,300 of our graduates have gotten that message as well.

I have lots of those examples; we just did a Deobandi women's madrassa workshop from Baluchistan. Many of these women send their sons to fight in Afghanistan, and one of the women at the end of the workshop said, "you can talk all day to the male madrassas, but the people who will stop their sons and their husbands from going to war and waging jihad is us. They listen to us. And right now, you have not engaged us; you have only pointed fingers at us." So I think the red light is on. I have lots of recommendations, but I will end it here and we'll talk more. Thanks.

MS. GAER: Thank you very much. Our final speaker today is Ayesha Jalal, who is Professor of History at Tufts University and a recipient of the prestigious MacArthur so-called "genius" grant. And she's the author of *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia*. She's been a leading scholar of Pakistan's cultural and political history. We look forward to her placing some of these issues in, not only their historical context, but explaining the interplay of religion and politics in Pakistan and the understanding of the concept of jihad and what the militants in Pakistan are actually seeking. Thank you.

AYESHA JALAL: Thank you, Madame Chairman. It's a great privilege to be here. For a country that was created to safeguard the religious freedoms of Muslims in the subcontinent, Pakistan today is in the paradoxical situation of trying to muster the will to protect its predominantly Muslim citizens from militants that are brandishing a very noxious ideology that is attributed by them to Islam.

I think it's important to realize that by no discernible principle of the Quran, Islamic law or, for that matter, Muslim history, can the current war that's being waged by these militants in the northwestern tribal areas of Pakistan and also Swat be ascribed to religion or religious

motivation, far less to a jihad in the name of god. I think that's an extremely important point to underline – the battle that's being waged against the Pakistani state by the militants, who are aligned with al Qaeda is for state power and not, as is mistakenly assumed, for the establishment of an Islamic order where justice and peace can reign supreme.

The root cause of the current upheaval in Pakistan, which has been unraveling for a long time, really lies in the denial of elementary justice to the vast majority of the people of Pakistan under extended periods of military authoritarian rule, often supported by this country, the United States of America. But it's important to realize that religious extremism in Pakistan – it's been mentioned that the Deobandis have been emphasizing their particular ideology – Pakistan was predominantly Barelwi until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in a complete transformation of the landscape.

And Pakistan, by then, was a largely moderate country, even though it had made this grave error, which Ali has mentioned, of declaring the Ahmadi heterodox minority non-Muslims and thereby undermining a principle, really, of modern nation-states in terms of inclusionary citizenship rights. By doing that, they basically opened up the opportunity for other sects to claim that the other sects should be declared a non-Muslim minority as well. So this is where the problem really lies.

Now, when General Zia ul-Haq transformed Pakistan into a Deobandi state, largely in support of the American and Saudi-backed jihad against the Soviet Union, Pakistan itself became a nerve center for religious extremism. That's really where it begins. And it's important to realize that, while institutions were undermined before that, Pakistan remained largely moderate. And it's extremely important – these are really, relatively new things that have happened over the last few decades.

Once the military-dominated state began actively promoting militant and orthodox variants of Islam in certain madrassas – not all madrassas are doing this, but certain madrassas – especially in the Northwest Frontier – were geared toward providing recruitment grounds for the so-called freedom fighters, or jihadis that were fighting in Afghanistan. Pakistan became a battleground, not only between the Shi'as and Sunnis, but also within the Sunni majority between the Deobandi minority who were being favored by the Pakistani state, the Barelwis, who were very angry, not to mention other schools of thought – Ahle Hadiths have been mentioned here.

Now, while the incidence of intra-Muslim enmity has been appreciably greater – a point Ali has made – and this, too, mainly for local political reasons and not for some religious reasons, there have been sporadic acts of violence and outright discrimination, which I think it important to realize, against religious minorities like the Christians, as well as the Hindus and Sikhs, who are miniscule communities in Pakistan. The relatively well-off Ismaili community of the Aga Khan, for instance, which was always privileged and had escaped discrimination, has also – is no longer safe in parts of the country's northern areas, again for political reasons, for the targeting of what's called identity politics, which need to be distinguished from faith-based politics – issues of faith.

Now, the deepening polarization in Pakistan is not just along lines of religion, but also class, region and gender. But I think – it's been said before, but I'll say it again – not all is lost. Remarkably enough, Pakistan has a vibrant and resilient civil society as well as a small, but determined, human rights movement. An independent human rights commission has courageously stood up for the rights of religious minorities and especially women. A free media has refused to be cowed into submission by authoritarian regimes. And these are all important plus points for Pakistan over its rather checkered history. What can the U.S. do in support of religious freedoms in Pakistan?

I think, first, it can hold the state it supports with liberal doses of economic aid accountable and compliant with international standards of religious freedoms and human rights. This cannot, however, be achieved through coercion or condescension. I think the U.S. also, secondly, must engage Pakistanis and be on the side of Pakistan's dynamic civil society as it struggles to redirect the country towards the path of moderation and the goals of social justice. Here, I'd like to take up a very important theme that came up in both – in the early panel – which is about changing the Pakistani mindset and changing the conduct of the Pakistan army. How do you do this?

Well, I think this has been the fundamental fallacy – the inability to comprehend what ails the Pakistani military mindset. It's been mentioned here that the issue is Pakistan's India-centricity. India is a status-quo power, whereas Pakistan is unhappy with the situation in Kashmir. Even though I think it's important to realize that Pakistan has come a long way, and this was hinted at by the early panel, in terms of its policy towards Kashmir. It recognizes the importance of normalizing relations; the Pakistan army realizes that.

But the Pakistan army has fostered this brand of extremism largely as a kind of a paramilitary force that can play a role in Kashmir. If you look at history, in 1947 when Pakistan appeared on the map of the world and India was partitioned, it was the tribals from FATA – the Federally Administered Tribal Areas – that were sent into Kashmir, not the Pakistan army, because the Pakistan army did not have the means to actually carry out that military operation, even though they assisted that operation.

So I do think it's important to realize that the question of Kashmir is vital. I understand that the United States feels unable to come out into the open, but that is precisely what, then, fosters this belief in the Pakistan army that the United States is not sincere. You've mentioned a very important point about the conspiracy theories. Well, Pakistanis generally believe these conspiracy theories, that what is happening in Pakistan today is by American design. And I think this is extremely important; I mean, even pop songs are being made which show that what's happening today in Pakistan – the religious extremism – is exactly what the United States wants.

And how do we begin to change that? Well, the first thing that you need to do is to begin to focus on what the Pakistan army thinks. I think that it's been mentioned that aspiration is important, but I think that it's important to realize that the Pakistan army is a very pragmatic institution. It will – its ethos is of extreme importance, and it's not Islam or anything, it's its own strategic perceptions. Now, Kashmir is seen as a land dispute – real estate dispute – between

India and Pakistan, ignoring the people of Pakistan, when in fact, it's about strategic issues. It's about water resources.

Now, if water resources that Pakistan is afraid that Pakistan is going to be – basically be sort of reduced to a wasteland in a decade or so, then you begin to understand what fuels the Pakistan army's passion and why the distrust of the United States that is there is important and why it's been a difficult ally for the United States. I just want to mention that in a recent, heated debate at Peshawar University, you know, it ended in pandemonium when the former ISI chief, General Durrani said well, let's stop – it was about how to handle the insurgency in the Northwest – and he said, let's stop all this talk and just tell me – raise your hands – who wants the United States to win or the Taliban?

Just raise your hands, he said, and I mean, the meeting ended in pandemonium. Now, it's important to realize where this is coming from. It's coming from – partly because of Kashmir – the United States's unwillingness or inability to do anything vis-à-vis India and Pakistan's intelligence forces being driven to desperation, as they were. The second issue is Afghanistan. Everybody knows that Pakistan is going to be vital for the war in Afghanistan to be won by the United States of America, but what is not accepted is that both India and Pakistan have continued to see Afghanistan as a zero-sum game. So long as they see this as a zero-sum game, there is going to be no real, genuine collaboration between the United States and the Pakistan army.

There is this fear, which explains Musharraf's duplicitous stance during his period, which was that the Americans will once again abandon Afghanistan, thereby winning the war but losing the peace, which is why it's so important for Pakistan to keep its assets secure, i.e. the Taliban – the Afghan Taliban. Now, I think these are pretty clear issues – what the problem is – so I think what needs to be done is to realize that if America is to isolate terrorists, it must avoid the temptation and pressures of completely isolating the Pakistani people. And I think it's by foregrounding what is being thought – and some of it is not very pleasant. It must also be recognized that religious freedoms, which Americans value so much, are also universal values that Pakistanis aspire towards as much as anyone else. And I think I'll just stop there, thank you.

MS. GAER: Thank you very much. We'll now proceed to a round of questioning and we'll continue that as long as we can. I wanted to actually start where we ended and ask Professor Jalal about this idea of how one holds a state accountable for its human rights performance and adherence to universal standards – but how one does that without, as you said, coercion or condescension.

And specifically, I wanted to ask you if you thought that increased U.S. criticism of religious freedom conditions in Pakistan, along the lines that Mr. Hasan has outlined, would in fact serve to bolster extremist forces and what you think are the potential risks in being more explicitly critical? And in that context, we have the tool, as members of the U.S. Commission, of recommending this “country of particular concern” status. And I wondered if you could comment on whether such a designation would be productive or counterproductive.

MS. JALAL: No, I think it's an excellent question, and I really do want to say, I mean at the expense of being completely blunt, that whatever the United States tends to say, at least in a



certain segment of Pakistani society, can be a kiss of death. And so I really – I shudder at what – I think what the U.S. can do is to try and help Pakistan – and this is really following up on what Ali was saying – is to really go through a judicial reform, through and through – it is to support its civil society elements. These things have to come through Pakistan's own civil society. Where the U.S. can help is not so much in providing doses of human rights rhetoric, but to empower elements in Pakistan that have been fighting this long battle with great courage and have really suffered a great deal.

So I think judicial reform and strengthening of civil society is really where the U.S. should go and not try to give Pakistanis doses on where they are undermining human rights, because there's a very big danger that now, when we are talking about the rule of law finally coming into place in Pakistan, that we may forget what kind of rule of law we want. And I think it's extremely important to be aware of that.

So I would urge the Commission on International Religious Freedom to focus much more on getting Pakistan for judicial reform at the lower levels. There's a lot of focus on the top levels, but the real issue is that the people of Pakistan have been deprived of elementary justice, which is why they have been prone to accept this rhetoric, which is not even religious; it's simply an ideological distortion, in my humble opinion, of Islam and what Pakistan stands for.

MS. GAER: Thank you very much. I see Mr. Hasan nodding, and I'm sure when you get a question, you might also address this. We have a question from Commissioner Shea.

NINA SHEA: Thank you. I found this panel fascinating and I think that what is downstream from the military manifestations is so crucial to the resolution or the solution. And I am curious, one, about after Mumbai, there was an attempt to rein in Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Mr. Sayeed was apprehended. And I'd like to know what the status of that is. How extensive was that? And also, Mr. Hussain, I'd like to know what your recommendations are. You hinted at them. Because I just think what you described in these workshops was absolutely fascinating.

MR. HASAN: Thank you. After Mumbai, there was a crackdown, of sorts, on the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, but it has – the government has stopped short, in my view, of declaring the Jamaat-ud-Dawa an active enemy, as opposed to a non-friend. That's the crucial distinction, and I think that there are sound reasons for that. It is the government's view, I think as I understand it, that a head-on confrontation with the Lashkar, at this point, effectively placing the Lashkar in the same position as the Taliban and what goes under the umbrella of al Qaeda will bring into question the ability of the state to enforce its writ anywhere, and they really can't afford to engage in that kind of confrontation.

The kind of confrontation that is occurring in the Northwest Frontier Province cannot occur in the Punjab, which is the majority of the population, and there still be a semblance of a viable state. Now, there is – therefore, there has to be a long-term solution to this. I would emphasize what Professor Jalal has said again, which is that it is, certainly in my view, Kashmir remains the fountainhead of the jihadi enterprise. It's very simple. Which is not to be confused with levels of infiltration going up or down; it has to do with the use of jihad as a national security tool by the Pakistani security establishment.

That will not end short of some kind of closure on Kashmir. And consequently, the key to peace and pacification in Afghanistan lies in a resolution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, because that will lead to a whole reimagining of relations within the region and also, of the Pakistani national security state, as it exists today. So all of these things are related – the issue of Mumbai, what happens to Hafiz Sayeed, the state's ability to actually confront these individuals and the military's desire to confront these individuals. These are all things that remain open to question.

It is one thing – we saw with Musharraf, he tried to distinguish between al Qaeda and the Taliban, between the Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban, and between Pakistani jihadis operating in the Kashmir theater of operations and other jihadis. These are all manifestations of a highly developed policy of jihad as a national security instrument. And I'm afraid I don't see whatever the Pakistani military's aspirations towards acceptability may be, they also view themselves as indispensable to American strategic interests in the region and are of the view that there is so much leverage the U.S. has with them and no more. And certainly, they are not going to tolerate what they see as a serious compromising of their institutional interests in order to pander to U.S. strategic imperatives of the day.

MR. HUSSAIN: Okay. I have three pages of recommendations; I will do maybe two or three of them. (Chuckles.) But U.S. policy should pursue a multi-track approach with the emphasis on long-term stability and the human development of Pakistani people. I think everything that we talked about deals with issues of tolerance – the lack of tolerance within the religious community, within secular communities. We target the Islamist religious community being intolerant, and I find a lot of intolerance in secular communities and academic communities and elite communities in Pakistan. And probably, that is why, maybe, there is more of a visceral reaction in religious communities, because they feel that much prejudice.

The short-term objectives are needed to counter security concerns, but not at the cost of a longer-term vision of sustained engagement of the Pakistani people. We have slept too long with the Pakistani government and ignored the Pakistani people. Our financial aid to Pakistan should not be tied to any one political leader or party. We must use soft power – engagement, engagement, engagement. It works in Pakistan. Pakistan enjoys respect. They give you respect. When you go there, you'll see what I mean. And they expect that back. When we point fingers, whether we are right, they tend to become very defensive.

It is hard for them to grow. It is hard for them to take that feedback. It is only through constructive engagement and dialogue that we can get anywhere, especially with Pakistan's conservatives. U.S. funds should support – integrate our funds into what is healthy constitutional rights of Pakistani, and it's in Pakistan's constitution, which is that each Pakistani has a right to perform his religious duties and his ethnic duties.

And that means our funds should really match that goal, and that would, because it would be in the context of Pakistan, it will empower Pakistani government and the institutions because they are living up to their dream of that constitution. And that could be easily done through kind of a required teacher's workshop. There are a lot of teachers – institutes – in Pakistan. There

should be a robust scholarship to develop that kind of infrastructure within Pakistan. Tolerance training is a need of today. And it is working in Pakistan.

MS. GAER: Dr. Prodromou has a question.

MS. PRODROMOU: Yeah, I echo my fellow Commissioners' sentiments; this was really tremendous. I have these sectors now that you've all mentioned in terms of civil society – the judiciary, the educational sphere – madrassas and public schools, I would imagine – and also, the media. But Professor Jalal, you talked about this kind of sustained denial of elementary justice, so I would imagine that the place where, you know, the Pakistani citizen meets the state in that respect is in policing. And I wondered if you could say a little bit to us about whether the kind of tolerance workshops and tolerance training that you have discussed would also be useful in terms of the police force.

And then, one small, but big, question: You've all emphasized the issue of Kashmir as the lynchpin of any sustainable, you know, bilateral peace between India and Pakistan. So what is the solution to Kashmir? I mean, you keep saying the U.S. needs to help broker a solution; what does a solution mean and does the average Pakistani citizen see Kashmir as a water resource – a natural resource – issue, or does the average Pakistani citizen really see it as irredenta and a territory issue?

MS. JALAL: Well, yes clearly, the police is extremely important. And the police, like most institutions of the post-colonial Pakistani state is a colonial construct. And the police that was established by the colonial state was designed to do one thing, which was to make sure that nothing ever happened. And so that's what the police in Pakistan tries to do – make sure that nothing ever happens. Now, that doesn't always work with a burgeoning civil society, so there is a serious problem with the police. The morale of the police is low and that needs to be addressed quickly.

At the same time, Pakistan does need elementary judicial reforms at the base, which simply does not exist. And I think that's extremely important. On the issue of Kashmir, because I can talk about that quite a lot, there are actually several solutions that have been doing the rounds. But there has been a distinctive lack of political will, especially on the Indian side, and which has driven Pakistani security forces, the army in particular, to desperation, I think. And I think that's one of major reasons for it.

So clearly, the solution lies, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put it well, one solution would be to – they're not prepared to accept changes in borders, but we could make the borders irrelevant. So soft borders, leading to greater trade and social interaction. Families are divided. Kashmiris in Pakistan – there are large numbers of Kashmiris. I myself am one. We have Kashmiri families. So there is an issue here that the border is the problem, not the solution. That's one thing to be acknowledged.

As for the people of Pakistan, I do think it's extremely important to distinguish between the attitude towards Kashmir in the late '40s and '50s and today. In the late '40s and '50s, yes, it was a question of, hand us over Kashmir. It came well into the '80s. But there is a change.

Now, the attitude is that – as far as the people of Pakistan are concerned – that it's the right of the Kashmiri people. It's not India and Pakistan's game, but what the people of Kashmir want, and we just want to help them get that right.

So I think this is extremely important to seize on, but the Pakistani state's official position is that unless India gives way, it's not going to move away from its official stance, which is to say let's follow the U.N. resolutions, which have been dead for a long time. So I think that there is a change in the air; there's a real debate in Pakistan and a willingness to – so long as the Kashmiri people are happy and relatively free.

But water is a very, very big issue for the people of Pakistan, particularly the Punjab. Water is a divisive issue between the provinces and makes the federal equation that much more difficult. And everybody knows that India is the higher riparian power and therefore, Kashmir is vital in that sense as well, but there is an emotional relationship with Kashmir that needs to be accepted, too.

MR. HASAN: If I may respond to your query about the police, the problem in Pakistan is this: All law enforcement agencies are, as Professor Jalal said, they're there to ensure that nothing happens, and I would like to expand on that by saying that they're also there to extract confessions. Now, the way they do this is by hanging people upside down and whipping them. Torture is endemic in Pakistan. It is widespread and it is – and because there is no training in interrogative practices, the police and other institutions have very limited forensic training, or training in the normal tools of law enforcement, they tend to use extracted confessions – extracted through violence – as the basis of the legal system. These confessions then go into the legal system and lead to ongoing problems.

Secondly, in terms of the rule of law, while I'm a great proponent of the current movement that has restored the chief justice and view it with much admiration, the rule of law is not established in the Supreme Court of Pakistan; it is established at the lower level, at the local-level judiciary. It's shocking, because Pakistan, on the one hand, produces a bureaucracy that goes through a two-year training of civil service – what they call the civil service – which produces world-class diplomats that then go and work for the World Bank, the UN and other IFIs. A magistrate or a sessions judge, which is a local-level judge, gets two weeks of training.

On the other hand, the police's forensic capacity is limited to being able to tell the difference between human and animal blood. It's all very basic and very limited, really. And these are the issues that confront Pakistani people. For most people, there is no access to a court of law. That presupposes literacy, which is missing. If you're an uneducated person or a person who cannot read or write, you're unable to access the legal system altogether. Hence, the existence of parallel, informal forums of justice, such as jirgas and tribal forums that create their own brand of summary justice.

So there is a very, very serious issue of the establishment of the rule of law, but the question, of course, is – and this is the fundamental question – what kind of rule of law will Pakistan establish? Saudi Arabia has rule of law; it is not a rule of law any rights-respecting person aspires to. The issue is, will Pakistan start implementing its set of discriminatory laws, or

will it actually create a legal system that promotes justice rather than discrimination? And that is what lies ahead.

And to go back to what I was saying about the constitution reverting to what it was, it is very important, and here is a situation – an opportunity – where actually, the person who needs to be pressured behind the scenes, informally, is the opposition party. If it wishes to actually, truly divorce itself from the political agenda of the religious right wing in Pakistan and engender the rule of law, as former prime minister Nawaz Sharif has argued to great effect for the last one year, this is their opportunity, and the U.S. can actually make it happen.

MS. GAER: We have a question from Commissioner Eid and then we're probably going to have to bring things to a close. So, please.

MR. EID: Thanks to all of you. A question for Mr. Ali, if you can speak a little bit about the Pakistani blasphemy law. As I know, these laws are regularly used against religious minorities and other Muslims. Pakistan is also playing a leading role at the United Nations in exporting blasphemy laws under the concept of defamation of religions. What would it take to encourage Pakistan to remove its blasphemy laws?

And after that, I have a question for Mr. Hussain: You addressed very well the issue of madrassas, and to my knowledge, there are reports that these madrassas are teaching intolerance toward religious minorities, at least against Shi'as and Ahmadis. My question is if you can help us with that, are there written guidelines issued by the government official or religious officials to regulate these teachings to make it tolerant more than any other thing? And are you aware of currently-used textbooks that contain language promoting intolerance, hatred or violence?

And to Professor Jalal, if we have time for that, what will it take to decrease anti-Ahmadi sentiment in Pakistan, and can the United States play a role in any such efforts? And I wonder if you can tell us about the changes that religious extremism and intolerance have had on Pakistani women and their different responses? Thank you.

MR. HASAN: First, about the blasphemy law, it's a law generally used against the Ahmadi community and sometimes against other religious minorities, i.e. Christians and Hindus. There were periods where Christians have faced an upsurge of persecution with the use of the blasphemy law, but actually, in a sense, what happens is that often, from what we have seen, when the blasphemy law is used against Christians, there is often a non-religious reason for it, i.e. there is a property dispute or a commercial dispute and it becomes an easy instrument of coercion -- which is essentially what it amounts to.

With the Ahmadi movement, it seeks to actually stop them from propagating their faith. Basically, Ahmadis can be charged under the blasphemy law for simply professing their faith. It is so blanket, and Pakistan's legal system has issued several remarkable judgments, really, that will tell you about how they perceive the Ahmadis. Muslims, by way of greeting, as we are aware, say "*assalamu alaykum*." The Pakistani Supreme Court, in the '80s, came up with this thing called the "Coca-Cola judgment," and it went like this: It was that just as Coke has its trademark, so does Islam. And these greetings – *Assalamu Alaykum*, *Bismillah ir-Rahman ir-*

*Rahim* – are the trademarks of Islam and therefore, non-Muslims, i.e. Ahmadis, may not use them. So if an Ahmadi invites someone to a social event and that written invitation begins with the name of God, that is a criminal offense to be tried under the blasphemy law.

Now, this sounds outlandish, but variations of this happen all the time. So that is how the blasphemy law is used in Pakistan. The question of what to do with it – I have proposed one thing here of what the U.S. can do. In terms of your second question, about the Human Rights Council and Pakistan's conduct there, we at Human Rights Watch have condemned it repeatedly, have often advocated with the Pakistani government that it should change its behavior – certainly recently. I think that there is something very fundamental going on and we have to acknowledge it if we are to make progress with this, which is that this whole business of defamation of religion has become one of the great rhetorical divides of the age, really. And it is as much a function of political events over the last few years, in the post-9/11 world, as it is of anything else.

Now, what Pakistan does at the Human Rights Council, it assumes leadership of OIC countries and seeks to collectively speak for them. This feeds into Pakistan's ideas of being a leader amongst Muslim nations and it gives them more diplomatic clout than would be otherwise forthcoming. There are two elements to this: one is that the consensus within OIC countries has to end on this issue of defamation of religion. That requires the U.S. advocating not just with Pakistan, but with other countries, perhaps with countries that may espouse more reasonable stances on this situation.

And secondly, there is a government in Pakistan that is seeking international acceptance. And the U.S. government could advocate to the Pakistani government that it would be advisable for it to behave otherwise. Of course, the problem here has been – things hopefully are going to change – the problem in all of this has been U.S. contempt, really, under the previous administration, for the United Nations and the Human Rights Council and the whole structure of international diplomacy. So the U.S. has been remiss in actually advocating for different behavior from Pakistan, urging Pakistan to behave differently, because it has historically not viewed the Human Rights Council as of any consequence. But as we see in this debate, it is very, very important.

To return to the blasphemy law, I think that any direct intervention from the U.S. on the blasphemy law – an overt intervention – will be misconstrued and seen as, perhaps, an evangelical exercise, which would be counterproductive. This is particularly important given that in the last year-and-a-half, since General Musharraf imposed an Emergency on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of November, really, the U.S. has done very many things to alienate Pakistani civil society and the sector of society that actually would support this kind of thing. I think the way in is through the rule of law and the debate about the rule of law – about constitutional and judicial reform – and that is what is going to deal with the blasphemy law as well.

MR. HUSSAIN: I'm going to be very, very quick. Thank you for all of that. I know Ms. Nina Shea asked me to elaborate a little bit more on specifics on how to go about doing more tolerance – again, I think the constitution of Pakistan allows for that and I think if you can make it systemic, any funding that goes in – I have a red light. I don't know why. I need my

time. (Laughter.) Okay. It could be systemic, just as we did in olden days, where if you have more than 10 employees, all teachers – every law enforcement person goes through a minimum awareness workshop – minimum awareness training on prejudice reduction, anti bias, tolerance. That gives, at least, people some idea of what kind of ethnic groups are in Pakistan, what kind of religious groups are in Pakistan, and you can't call somebody – (inaudible) – just because you are a Shi'a or Ahmadi.

That could be done through earmark funding to Pakistani government saying do it because your constitution says it. So let's make it work. There's a lot of theoretical constitutional language, but none of it is being implemented. Again, other piece – especially about justice, and the United States can gain quite a bit on that. If there are district-wide – there's only 120 districts in Pakistan – where there could be public defender offices that can defend people without fee, they could be set up with very little fees. The movement is going right now – there is the environment for it. And justice for all is also provided in the constitution of Pakistan. This could take the rug from right underneath the insurgency that says there is no law, there is not justice, and so that's why we have to do this. Those are the kind of things that could really work in the short term and could sustain this.

MS. JALAL: Is there any time for me to respond?

MS. GAER: If you could make it extremely brief.

MS. JALAL: Yes, I'll make it very short. How can the sort of reaction to the Ahmadiis be changed? I think very simply, by first, the Pakistani state focusing on elementary governance and straightening things out in that area, rather than trying to define who is a Muslim and who's not a Muslim. That is where the problem is. It's no business of the state to decide who is a Muslim; that's where the problem stems from.

Number two, I think in return the Ahmadiis will have to integrate more. I think one of the great sort of reactions against them is that they proselytize and that they do not want to – that they see themselves as the true Muslims and the others as non-Muslims. So I think that attitude has to change in the Ahmadi community. And finally, your last question about how this extremism has impacted women – clearly, on women and minorities, the Pakistani state itself, for strategic reasons, created the space for this kind of Islam, and that is where the problem is. And at the moment, Pakistan is witnessing the peripheries closing in on the center, but it has clearly affected women and religious minorities the most.

MS. GAER: Thank you very much. I want to thank all of our panelists today. We could go on all day, but we do have to leave the room. And I also want to thank the staff of the Commission – Steve Snow, Bridget Kustin, Kody Kness, Judy Golub, Knox Thames, Tom Carter, Dave Dettoni, and James Standish, and anyone I left out – for all the work that's gone into putting this on today. Thank you very much. We look forward to continuing this.

(END)