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March 20, 2008
July 25, 2007
I, Donny George Youkhanna, confirm that I am a citizen of Iraq, I was born in Habania, Anbar province, in Iraq, on the day of twenty third of the month of October in the year of nineteen hundred and fifty, I am an Assyrian Christian, and all my ancestors had lived in Mesopotamia, now Iraq, from the ancient times of the Assyrians, more that five thousands years ago, I have dedicated all my life to work and serve my people and country with honor and loyalty, because this is my country.
I had all my education in Iraq, my higher education in the University of Baghdad, BA, MA, and PhD, and I am a specialist in Mesopotamian Archaeology.
During Saddam Hussein's time I have worked in the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage, from 1976 until I left the country in 2006. Before the war of 2003, we were unofficially considered second class citizens, simply because we were Christians and Assyrians, Saddam did big efforts to omit our identity as Christians and as Assyrians, he stared a campaign of re-righting the history of Iraq in the way he vision, and he started calling the ancient Assyrian as Arabs, no more Assyrians, he also set up orders that new born Christian babies should not be named Christian or Assyrian names but Arab Muslim names, and all of us had really big troubles about that, because our names are an important part of our identity. Although the Assyrian Christians had the highest percentage of educated people in Iraq, we had the lowest percentage of high positions in the government, and of course when for the first time in the late seventies of the last century, we had young Assyrians demanding for our political rights, they were captured, tortured, and then executed.
After the Americans toppled Saddams power in April 2003, every body started breathing the freedom and waiting for democracy to start and every one as an Iraqi should have his rights. But the infiltration of people coming from the countries surrounding Iraq made it impossible to start the real process of improving the situation in the country, besides fighting each other, the Sunnis and Shias, a large champagne started against the Christians, at home, my parents place in Dora, we started hearing that the Muslim extremists will do to the Christians exactly what they did to the Jewish in 1948, this meant complete cleansing of the people from the county, and because of that we received a letter in an envelope together with bullet of a Kalashnikov, the letter threatened my younger son, Martin, and accusing him of cursing Islam and teasing Muslim girls, and they mentioned that they suspect that his father, my self, works with the Americans, so he was ordered to write a letter of apologize for them, (the brigades of martyr Zarqawi), and a fine of one thousand US dollars, to be put in an envelope and dropped in a certain place in Dora, otherwise, the next day he will be kidnapped and beheaded immediately, when I heard that I asked my elder son to get them all, my mother, my two sisters and Martin and bring them to our flat in another part of Baghdad, and in the afternoon I arranged for the letter and the money to be dropped for them, so that they will not come after my son. In the coming few days, I heard that the same thing had happened to 12 Christian families in the same area of Dora, same kind of letter and the same kind of accusations, they all paid and left the area, leaving everything behind, houses, properties, now Dora is completely empty of any Christian Assyrians, and almost all the churches there had been bombed and burnt.
After I had my family all together in our flat, I arranged to send them to Damascus, Syria, to be safe of that deadly threat.
On the other hand, in November 2003, I became the director general of the Iraqi Museums, and in August 2005, I became the chairman of the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage in Iraq, after thirty years of service in all the fields of antiquities. But the problems started when the new ministry of tourism and antiquities was created to control the antiquities service, literary speaking when that ministry was controlled by the people coming from the religious party controlled by Al-Sader, when the ministry people started interfering in my job and specialty, whom they knew nothing, and then all my authorities as the chairman of the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage were withdrawn by the minister himself, this meant complete paralyze of my duties, and finally, I was told by some people in the same ministry that the order had come from their party that Donny should not stay in his position because he is a Christian, and such an important institution should not be headed by a Christian. When I learned all that I decided to quit my job and to apply for retirement, when I sent my request to the minister, in two hours I received the answer that he had signed my request and approved it, for me this meant clearly that he was waiting for that letter and never asked anything about it.
After one week, I managed to arrange everything and traveled to Damascus with my wife and my daughter, whom we were the last three of the family to leave. In Damascus we stayed for four months during which I was offered a chance of a visiting professor in the State University of New York at Stony Brook, but I still have my mother and my two sisters in Damascus.
What had happened to me and my family in Iraq is the story of every single Assyrian Christian family there, or some times even worst than that, they have been kidnapped, killed, persecuted, raped, it is an ongoing tragedy and genocide for the Assyrian Christian people in Iraq.
And now the only place these families can go, depending on their abilities, is either going up to the north in Nineveh plain, or, for those who have a better chance to move outside the country, to Syria or Jordan.
Now why going to the "Nineveh Plain" historically speaking, the Assyrians belong in to this Nineveh plain, we come originally from there, in the books of history and archaeology it is called "The Assyrian Triangle", our ancient major cities are there Nineveh, Nimrud, Khorsabad, and even the city of Ashur, our original towns and villages are there too, we've come down from these towns and villages in to the major cities of Iraq, Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Basrah, and it is just natural when we feel in danger, we would go back to our original area.
Another important historical fact is, that the Assyrians are the first people that converted to Christianity, in the beginning of the first century AD, by the hands of Saint Tomas, simply because they were civilized and educated people, so they understood Christianity immediately, and now, these people are rewarded for that by, persecuting, kidnapping, raping, and killing.
Again in the history, the Christians being the elite people during the Abbasid Khalifat period, around one thousand years ago, played a vital role in being the mediators by presenting the European culture to the Arabs and vise versa, and they have been doing the same role during the modern history of Iraq and again since 2003.
And now what is needed from the US Government, we need four essential steps to keep the remaining minority in Iraq and possible draw those who have left to return, they are:
- Push forward funds for internally Displaced Persons in the north (House of representative has passed a $10 million of funds, no action yet by the Senate).
- Press in a sustained and determined effort the Kurdish Regional Government to end all practices that marginalize and discriminate against Christians and non-Kurds.
- Provide, on an urgent basis, minimal infrastructure and amenities to Nineveh plain to allow the smallest minorities to support themselves in their ancestral areas.
- Convene the civic representatives of the Iraqi minority communities to forge a consensus regarding the political status of the Nineveh Plains territory, for example by forming an autonomous administration district as provided for in article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution.
March 20, 2008
July 25, 2007
You rightfully heard, I think, a very extensive presentation by my colleague. And I'd just like to associate myself with her. I've hit my stopwatch and I'll go no more than four minutes, because I can just basically say that I'm moved by what my colleague said, and agree with her.
I also want to say that as a member of Congress, I am extraordinarily proud to be able to say the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. I am proud that my country would establish you. I am proud that you would be so active. And I think that your work is highly important.
Iraq was on the watch list - or more than that - before we basically invaded Iraq. You took it for a while, and now it's on the watch list, and it deserves to be so. In my first trip - and I guess my value added is as a former Peace Corps volunteer and someone who has visited Iraq 17 times - I get a flow of what is going on there.
And the first time I was there, I met a man named Mohammed Abdul Hassan. It was April 2003. The fighting hadn't yet totally been completed. And he was telling me things about what we do and so on, and things that make him concerned.
Things that I learned immediately is that the Iraqi people are an extraordinarily proud people. They're a very tough people. He described his life in an Iranian prison, and he got married in his 50s now, and he was starting to have a family. And I said, boy, you've had a tough life. And he looked at me in amazement and said, my life is no different than any other Iraqi.
Finally, when we ended, he put his hands on my shoulder and said, you don't us and we don't know you. I think of Mithal al Alusi who was part of the de-Ba'athification commission. He goes to Jerusalem to participate in a Moslem-Christian - both a Muslim and a Christian forum and a Jewish forum. And when he returns, he is kicked off the de-Ba-athificatin commission. His guards are taken, two attempts on his life; and then the beginning of '06, his two children are killed trying to defend him. This is a place that doesn't have a lot of tolerance for people who have tolerance. And we're right to pay attention to it.
So as my colleague has rightfully pointed out, we have a lot of people whose lives are at risk who are looking to find some safe haven. And I'd like to point out to you legislation that Mr. Blumenauer has moved forward that would set up a program to allow 15,000 Iraqis and their families who are at risk, because they helped us in Iraq to enter the U.S., to come in for each of the next four years. Believe it or not, those who are religious minorities are viewed as having helped us. It would also, in addition, increase the number of Iraqis who can enter in addition to the 15,000, 20,000.
I think it's important for this commission to make it a very high priority to provide safety for these individuals, because the fact is, with all the mistakes we made - the allowing the looting, totally eliminating all security - I mean, no police, no border patrol, no army - and then asking 150,000 coalition forces to protect a nation of 26 million people, we just allowed unbelievable insecurity and we got rid of what people basically have a right to expect - that they would be able to live in a land where there would be security. And so, the governments are not capable of protecting the public in general, and they have no interest in protecting the minorities in particular.
So you have the government of Iraq that is aggressively seeking out people, and in many cases, if you're not one of them - and you are a small minority - you are going to be taken; you are going to be questioned; and your lives are going to be threatened. That's what the government is doing, and then in addition, as is rightfully pointed out, you have the Shia militia that have tended to be very unfriendly to these religious minorities.
So I think our first task is to recognize that problem exists, secondly to find ways to help some of these individuals find safety, and as my colleague has pointed out, you have between 2-4 million refugees, probably 2 million who have left, 2 million that are seeking some kind of status. We have burdened neighboring countries. So I would respectfully suggest that this commission be actively promoting this United States doing, at the minimum, what we should be doing, but even doing more than that.
I thank you.
March 20, 2008
July 25, 2007
Introduction
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and honorable members of the commission. It is an honor to have been invited by you to come and testify today to the commission about Iraq's religious and ethnic minorities. As the only Assyrian-American member of the entire Congress, I have a deeply personal interest in this issue.
Obviously, I'm proud to be a first-generation American of Assyrian and Armenian descent. My Assyrian grandparents fled their ancestral homelands in what was then the Ottoman Empire, now the northern border area between Iraq and Iran, in the early part of the 20 th century. In fact, my mother received her first holy communion in Baghdad in the midst of her family's escape from the chaos that has historically plagued this part of the world.
Today, as you might know, there are approximately 400,000 Assyrian-Americans in the United States, and they are all Christians. Some are Chaldeans; and this is the oldest rite under Rome, as well as Jacobites, Armenians, Greek Orthodox, Mandeans, and others. They have been subject to chronic and brutal persecution in their homeland, and by all accounts, their oppression has only worsened since the fall of Saddam Hussein. They represent the oldest surviving Christian population in the world, and one that, without help, is literally facing the brink of extinction.
Just parenthetically, I speak Assyrian. I do; I can speak it rather fluently - not as quickly as I would like to. And I do understand the language very well. Today, the numbers of Christians remaining in Iraq, mainly in the Nineveh plain in the north around Mosul, are rapidly diminishing. Those remaining live in villages that can trace their history back to over 2,000 years ago. They still celebrate their liturgies in Aramaic, which is the language that Jesus spoke. So these are the indigenous Christians in that part of the world.
I've met with several prominent Assyrian leaders in recent years, some of whom are here today. And without exception, they've communicated to me their genuine desire to embrace the opportunity before them to move away from the totalitarianism of the Hussein regime toward greater prosperity and stability by cooperating in the development of a democratic and pluralistic state. But religious and ethnic tensions, unchecked acts of discrimination, and unspeakable acts of violence continue to plague these communities. I think that you might recall the front page of the New York Times last year above the fold in color the church that had been bombed and burned out, and the members of that parish surrounding it.
Now, in my discussion with leaders in Congress and those representing Assyrian communities in Iraq, there are two factors, which I believe contribute significantly to the current crisis. My own observation is that Assyrians - and they are, I believe - the largest ethnic religious minority in Iraq - are in so many ways victims of geography. During my grandparents' time, they weren't even considered second-class citizens. And so, they were small communities that kept to themselves because they were Christian. They have, in these times, when I traveled to Baghdad, and more than once, and meeting with our military, they were very familiar with the Assyrians, and said, they have lived side-by-side with Sunnis, with Shi'a, and have really gotten along with everyone there. But they represent, obviously, a very, very small part of the overall population.
Getting back to what contributes significantly, I believe, to be what is a crisis, first the persistent indications that Iraq's religious minority populations do not receive by any means their fair share of development assistance. I wish I had a penny for every time someone asked my about my surname and what is it. It is very unfamiliar. There is a real unfamiliarity with people from that part of the world, certainly Assyrians.
Because they represent such a small community, their voice in national politics is relatively weak. There is some representation in the parliament; I have met with them. When I've traveled to Iraq, I've spoken to the head of the country and pointed this out, they listened. They really did not - subject matter didn't grab them, let's say. Funding for reconstruction, for housing, for education, are parceled out by central authorities to those who control the villages and the regions where they reside, without really sufficient transparency to ensure the proper parity between different ethnic and religious communities.
I attempted to address this issue two years ago by offering an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. My amendment called on the State Department and all relevant U.S. agencies to direct their attention to the needs of Iraq's indigenous religious minorities. I am pleased to say it received unanimous approval in the House of Representatives.
But since its passage, little evidence has been presented to indicate that progress is being made to assist these communities and the people that reside in them. Meanwhile, reports continue about Iraqi minorities being targets of kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, and acts of violence, due to their religious practices and beliefs. My appeals to the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Defense, and other federal entities have unfortunately received faint acknowledgement.
The visible result of this neglect has been the current crisis of Iraqi refugees, which the chairman spoke of in his opening statement. This brings me to the second area where I see a serious failure in our current policy. When I offered my amendment in 2005, I quoted estimates on the floor of the House indicating that as many as 80,000 Iraqi Christians out of a population previously estimated to be 1.2 million have fled Iraq. Today, two years later, I've seen reports indicating that as many as half of the entire Iraqi Christian population has left the country, fled the country, with thousands more internally displaced within Iraq.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Christians today make up approximately 3 percent of Iraq's population. But they represent nearly 40 percent of the total number of refugees fleeing Iraq. That's a stunning statistic. In fact, Iraqi refugees now comprise some 14 percent of the Jordanian population, another stunning figure. Here in the United States, we have had and will continue to have an emotionally charged debate about issues surrounding undocumented immigrants. Imagine for a moment what the tenor of the debate would be if we were facing an influx of the proportions that I just stated.
Often those who flee their homes and leave Iraq encounter governments not willing to grant legal status or assistance or the right to employment. This is a tragic situation that requires, I believe, a comprehensive and assertive response to resolve the many issues facing the displaced, and to adequately provide for the safety of those remaining in Iraq.
In the last month, 73 of my House colleagues joined me in writing to President Bush urging him to take seriously the grave warnings which were personally expressed to him by his Holiness, Pope Benedict, for Iraq's endangered Christian population. As the pope laid out to the president in clear and unequivocable terms, we're witnessing the emergence of an Iraq that simply does not tolerate Christians and religious minorities. Clearly, the rights of minority groups are not being protected in Iraq. And I'm convinced that without really important and drastic improvement in the current situation, we may well witness the complete loss of the Iraqi indigenous Christian community. And I think that would be absolutely tragic.
I continue to work on this issue in Congress. Last month, we passed a provision in the fiscal year 2008 Department of State and Foreign Appropriations bill requiring that $10 million be provided directly to assist religious minorities in the Nineveh Plain region of northern Iraq. We have our work cut out for us to protect this provision - as my wonderful colleague Chris Shays would fully appreciate, to protect this provision as the bill goes to conference. But I believe that between this funding allocation and the very broad bipartisan support in the House, all of my colleagues that signed the letter to the president, I'm hopeful that our work to promote attention to the welfare of Iraq's religious minority populations will bear fruit.
Of course, all of this is under the umbrella of the ongoing war, and war is hell. But this particular group of minorities, Christians in Iraq, I think little known, little appreciated, is suffering enormously. So in closing, I'm very grateful to everyone here today that has come here today. There are people that are in the audience that have traveled from across the country to be here today, which underscores the importance of the issue and the depth of their passions about the issue as well as their knowledge of it.
And certainly, to you, all of the commissioners, it's a source of pride to me that the Congress established this Commission on International Religious Freedom. This is an important hearing and I am really honored to have been invited by you to be here today. This is obviously a critical issue that has yet to receive its proper recognition and a response to it. And because I am a person of great hope and the great faith that my family instilled in me - and it took great faith for them to have endured what they did, the stories that my grandparents related to me as a child on their knee - I think speaks to the people that I've testified on behalf of today. And I think this hearing can really help to strengthen the case to assist the beleaguered Christians in Iraq as well as those that still call it their homeland and hopefully can return there someday in peace and be able to practice the faith of their fathers.
Thank you very, very much.
March 20, 2008
July 25, 2007
Good morning. My name is Michael Cromartie, and I chair the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. I'd like to welcome you to a hearing to examine the serious threats faced by Iraq's communities of antiquity: the country's non-Muslim religious communities, including ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Yazidis, Sabean Mandaeans, and other minority religious groups. Today's hearing is the first of two. The second, scheduled for September, will focus on Sunni-Shi'a sectarian violence, including the Iraqi government's role, as well as the U.S. response to the refugee crisis. I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge my fellow Commissioner, Nina Shea, for all the work she has done to keep this issue in the public eye and to help with this hearing.
This year the Commission added Iraq to its Watch List of countries requiring close monitoring because of the nature and extent of violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by their governments. We made the decision because of the alarming and deteriorating religious freedom conditions for all Iraqis. Despite efforts to stabilize the country, successive Iraqi governments have not adequately curbed the growing scope and severity of human rights abuses. Although non-state actors, particularly the Sunni-dominated insurgency, are responsible for a substantial proportion of the sectarian violence and associated human rights violations, the Iraqi government also bears responsibility.
Also influencing our decision to place Iraq on our Watch List are the grave conditions affecting minority religious groups in Iraq, including the ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Yazidis, and Sabean Mandaeans. These groups appear to suffer a degree of attacks and other human rights abuses disproportionate to their numbers. As a result, thousands of members of Iraqi religious minorities have fled the country, seeking refuge in neighboring states and among growing Diaspora communities in the West.
Violence against members of Iraq's Christian community is of particular concern in Baghdad and the northern Kurdish regions. Reported abuses include the assassination of Christian religious leaders, the bombing and destruction of churches, and violent threats intended to force Christians from their homes. In some areas, ordinary Christians have reportedly stopped participating in public religious services for fear of inviting further violence.
Though smaller in number, Sabean Mandaeans and Yazidis have suffered abuses similar to Christians. Extremists view members of these groups as infidels or outsiders. What is more, religious minority communities often lack the tribal base or militia structures that might otherwise provide security and they are often targeted by both Sunni insurgents and Shi'a militias.
According to some reports, nearly half of Iraq's indigenous Christian population is now living outside the country. According to the Mandaean Society of America, approximately 85 percent of Iraqi Mandaeans have fled their country since 2003. This forced exodus may mean the end of the presence in Iraq of ancient Christian and other religious minority communities that have lived on those same lands for 2,000 years.
Together with the rising tide of sectarian violence, conditions for religious minorities and the associated Iraqi refugee crisis require heightened attention and more effective action by the U.S. government.
Let me ask that the witnesses on each panel keep to their allotted time of 10 minutes in order to allow adequate time for follow-up questions. All of the witnesses have been asked to submit longer statements, which will be posted on the Commission's Website. We have also asked the Embassy of Iraq and the Representative of Iraq's Kurdish Regional Government to submit written statements for the record.
June 16, 2004
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
June 16, 2004
Contact:
Anne Johnson, Director of Communications, (202) 523-3240, ext. 27
WASHINGTON - The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) today met with Secretary of State Colin Powell as part of its statutory mandate to advise the President, Secretary of State, and Congress on the promotion of religious freedom in U.S. foreign policy. The Commission reiterated its June 2003 recommendation that the United States appoint a high-level official to the new U.S. Embassy in Iraq, reporting directly to the Ambassador and supported by a unit of personnel within the Embassy, to monitor and report on human rights, including religious freedom, and to promote the protection of international human rights standards as a key U.S. policy objective. The Commission underscored that the new Embassy should have a vigorous program to engage Iraqis to promote the provisions in the Transitional Administrative Law's (TAL) guaranteeing the rights of every Iraqi to freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief and practice in the permanent Constitution.
"The provisions in the TAL are a milestone in the Arab world, constitutionally protecting not only religious minorities but also individual Muslims, and particularly women, to debate the role of Islam and to pursue reform. The deplorable Abu Ghraib prison incidents highlight the necessity for the United States to ensure that human rights are protected both in U.S. actions in Iraq and in the permanent Constitution," said USCIRF Chair Michael K. Young.
The Commission also urged Secretary Powell to designate Saudi Arabia a "country of particular concern" (CPC) for its systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, as outlined in the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). In a report released yesterday, an independent task force on terrorist financing of the Council on Foreign Relations specifically endorsed several USCIRF recommendations on Saudi Arabia, including that the U.S. government in its bilateral relations with the Saudi government should more frequently identify serious human rights violations and that Congress should initiate and make public a study on Saudi exportation of intolerance.
"In addition to Saudi Arabia, Commissioners also urged Secretary Powell to designate Turkmenistan and Vietnam, and Eritrea as CPCs. In Turkmenistan, recent moves by President Niyazov in response to U.S. pressure have not fundamentally changed the restrictive and abusive policies there. In Vietnam, the Vietnamese government has not taken positive steps despite constant specific high-level diplomatic discussions. In Eritrea, the government has not been forthcoming in response to U.S. efforts to discuss the worsening religious freedom situation there. The integrity and utility of IRFA is being undermined by the failure to name abusive countries as CPCs," said USCIRF Chair Michael K. Young.
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom was created by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 to monitor the status of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief abroad, as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international instruments, and to give independent policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State and the Congress.
Dean Michael K. Young,Chair
- Felice D. Gaer,Vice ChairNina Shea,Vice ChairPreeta D. BansalPatti ChangArchbishop Charles J. ChaputKhaled Abou El FadlRichard LandBishop Ricardo RamirezAmbassador John V. Hanford III,Ex-OfficioJoseph R. Crapa,Executive Director
December 17, 2008
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Commissioner Remarks for Delivery at Iraq Press Conference, Tuesday, Dec. 16, 2008
Commission Chair Felice Gaer:
Good morning. Thank you for making the time to come to our press conference on religious freedom conditions in Iraq. We are expecting Rep. Frank Wolf, a longtime champion of religious freedom, and we have received statements from Rep. Chris Van Hollen, and Sen. Ben Cardin and Rep. Alcee Hastings, the Co-Chairs of the Helsinki Commission.
Today, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom is recommending that Iraq be designated as a "country of particular concern" (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), in light of the ongoing, severe abuses of religious freedom and the Iraqi government's toleration of these abuses, particularly abuses against Iraq's smallest, most vulnerable religious minorities.
The lack of effective government action to protect these communities from abuses has established Iraq among the most dangerous places on earth for religious minorities. The point was driven home once again this past weekend, when seven members of a Yazidi family were gunned down in their home in northern Iraq.
Four Commissioners have dissented from the Commission's CPC recommendation, believing that government action, complicity, or willful indifference has not been sufficiently established to warrant designating Iraq a CPC. Their views are contained in the Executive Summary.
But all of us are in agreement on our policy recommendations to the U.S. government. They are voluminous and detailed, but they boil down to a pretty straightforward message: The United States must keep religious freedom and other fundamental human rights at the top of the agenda as it develops and implements policies to help Iraq and the entire Gulf region achieve stability and security. As we work with other governments, we must never lose sight of the people they must serve, including the most vulnerable.
I'd like to turn the floor over to my fellow Commissioners to briefly highlight a few of our recommendations. Afterward, we will be happy to answer your questions.
Commissioner Nina Shea:
The situation is especially dire for Iraq's smallest religious minorities, including ChaldoAssyrian and other Christians, Sabean Mandaeans, and Yazidis. These groups do not have militia or tribal structures to protect them and do not receive adequate official protection. Their members continue to experience targeted violence and to flee to other areas within Iraq or other countries, where the minorities represent a disproportionately high percentage among Iraqi refugees.
The Commission has a number of recommendations aimed at making the prevention of abuses against religious minorities a high priority. We are asking the U.S. government to urge the Iraqi government to
- replace the existing Prime Minister's minorities committee with one that is independent and includes representatives of all of Iraq's ethnic and religious minority communities who are selected by the communities themselves;
- work with minority communities and their representatives to develop measures to implement Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution, which guarantees "the administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights of the various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all the other constituents," in Nineveh and other areas where these groups are concentrated;
- direct the Ministry of Human Rights to investigate and issue a public report on abuses against and the marginalization of Iraq's minority communities and making recommendations to address such abuses;
- and enact constitutional amendments to strengthen human rights guarantees in the Iraqi Constitution, including by:
- ensure that Iraqi government revenues neither are directed to nor indirectly support any militia, para-state actor, or other organization credibly charged with involvement in severe human rights abuses;
- suspend immediately any government personnel charged with engagement in sectarian violence and other human rights abuses, undertake transparent and effective investigations of such charges, and bring the perpetrators to justice; and
- continue the process of ensuring a greater sectarian integration into the government and security forces so that they better reflect the diversity of the country.
- lead an international effort to protect voters and voting places and to monitor the elections;
- direct U.S. military and coalition forces, where feasible and appropriate, to provide heightened security for the elections, particularly in minority areas, such as in Nineveh governorate, where there were irregularities in previous elections; and
- urge the Iraqi government at the highest levels to ensure security and to permit and facilitate election monitoring by experts from local and international NGOs, the international community, and the United Nations, particularly in minority areas, such as in Nineveh governorate, where there were irregularities in previous elections.
- press the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Kurdish officials in neighboring governorates to cease alleged interference with the creation, training, and deployment of representative police forces for minority communities, and link progress on representative policing to U.S. financial assistance and other forms of interaction with the KRG;
- demand immediate investigations into and accounting for allegations of human rights abuses by Kurdish regional and local officials against minority communities, including reports of attacks on minorities and expropriation of minority property, and make clear that decisions on U.S. financial and other assistance will take into account whether perpetrators are being investigated and held accountable; and
- work with Iraqi and KRG officials to establish a mechanism to examine and resolve outstanding real property claims involving religious and ethnic minorities in the KRG region and neighboring governorates.
- fund a much larger proportion of all UN appeals for humanitarian assistance to Iraqi IDPs and refugees;
- urge the Iraqi government to fund a much larger proportion of all UN appeals for humanitarian assistance to Iraqis and to increase its own assistance to IDPs; and
- utilize diplomatic efforts to urge U.S. allies in Iraq to increase humanitarian assistance to, and resettlement opportunities for, vulnerable Iraqi refugees and IDPs; and
- amend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program's new P2 category to allow Iraq's smallest, most vulnerable religious minorities direct access to the program; in addition, family reunification should be expanded for these refugees with relatives in the United States to include not only immediate family members, but as has been done in prior refugee crisis situations, to also include extended family such as grandparents, aunts and uncles, cousins, etc.
February 08, 2008
September 19, 2007
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission, it is an honor to appear before you to discuss issues related to Iraqi refugees. What I want to do today is lay out what we have done, are doing and plan to do to protect vulnerable Iraqi refugees.
First, I want to give a baseline, and give a thumbnail sketch of where the Iraqi refugee situation is today. It is hard to get precise numbers in any refugee crisis, but it is estimated that slightly over four million Iraqis have been displaced from their homes.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees believes that of this number, roughly half, or two million, have left Iraq for other countries in the region. Half of the 165,000 who have registered with UNHCR have arrived in the past year.
Suddenly, Syria, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon find themselves playing host to a huge influx of Iraqis. Many of these Iraqi refugees are in serious need of shelter, health care, and education for their children.
Among this population of refugees, of course - and of special interest to your commission - are many members of religious minority groups, including Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, Sabeans and Yazidis.
Many of the Iraqis who have registered with the UNHCR in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey identify themselves as Christian. It is remarkable, for example, that the percentage of Iraqi refugees who have arrived in the US for resettlement who are is Christian is 62%. The situation of these refugees is especially tragic because of their long history in Iraq; many of these communities have been living in what is now Iraq for millennia.
Still, there is a lot of deliberation about whether religious minorities in Iraq have been targeted specifically because they are Christian or whether they are victims of overall sectarian violence. I must emphasize that the majority of displaced Iraqis are Sunni and Shia Muslims.
Whatever the religious affiliation of the displaced Iraqis, we are determined to help them, and have backed up our promises with robust programs in protection and resettlement.
The State Department bureau I head, the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, is involved in helping refugees and conflict victims all over the world. We do so through the United Nations, through the Red Cross, and through a network of respected American and international non-governmental organizations. We provide substantial funding to these groups, and monitor and evaluate how their programs benefit refugees and other vulnerable groups.
Our funding is in line with the longtime American approach to refugee assistance: our primary goal is to protect the refugees in the places where they have sought safety and to promote a political solution that will allow them to return to their home country.
The large-scale displacement of Iraqis began in May, 2006, after the bombing of the Samara mosque in February of that year. As public disorder increased, so did the number of Iraqis fleeing their homes. We are fully engaged in an effort to support the Iraqi government's political reconciliation process. Our top priority is a peaceful Iraq, in which citizens of all religions and ethnicities can live together free of sectarian violence and terrorism.
Only this kind of agreement, which will lead to a peaceful and multi-ethnic state, will allow Iraqis to rebuild their country. Only this kind of agreement will lead to an Iraq to which refugees can return safely, and voluntarily, in confidence that they and their families will be secure in the long term.
For now, however, many Iraqis still believe it is unsafe to return to Iraq. For this population we have been working hard to provide help in the fields of education, health and emergency relief. In 2007 the U.S. government has made available nearly $200 million to international organizations and non-governmental organizations, and other governments to relieve the suffering of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons.
Let me give you some numbers that illustrate the scope and depth of our commitment. I will focus my remarks on assistance to refugees, but will mention some aspects of our work that also help internally displaced Iraqis.
This year, the United States has given $37 million to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Special Iraq Appeal. The money raised by this appeal has been used to register over 165,000 Iraqis as refugees and to provide food and other assistance to 100,000 of this group. This money also funded UNHCR's assistance to 300,000 internally displaced people as well as to 45,000 non-Iraqi refugees who remain inside Iraq. No other country gave more to this appeal.
On my March trip to Syria and Jordan I was alarmed to find so many Iraqi kids were not attending school. This was a looming disaster for the future of Iraq. The United States government urged UNHCR and UNICEF to launch a joint education appeal and helped to persuade the government of Jordan to admit Iraqi students to its public schools.
On my recent trip to Turkey and Jordan I announced the first part of our contribution to that appeal, at a girls' school that has recently opened its doors fully to Iraqi students. Twenty percent of the student body is Iraqi and for some of these students it was the first time they were at school in two years. Our contribution to the appeal is now at $39 million, and the money is enabling Jordanian and Syrian to expand, to hire extra teachers, and to set up specialized training programs.
Over 370,000 Iraqis in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are being helped by the nearly $19 million we have contributed to ten non-governmental organizations that provide health care, education and emergency humanitarian assistance to displaced Iraqi refugees in those countries.
Most of these groups have worked in the region a very long time, and have the expertise to get help to the refugees quickly. For instance, in Syria and Lebanon, Catholic Relief Services provide emergency humanitarian assistance to those in need: refugee families receive mattresses, blankets, clothes and heaters. In Syria, CRS and the International Catholic Migration Commission enable Iraqi refugees to find and pay for medical treatment, and offer remedial education courses for Iraqi children.
Finally, the U.S. government has given over $10 million directly to the Government of Jordan so it can reinforce ongoing health and education programs in communities that have seen a large wave of arrivals from Iraq. In this way schools, clinics and housing offices in Jordan are getting extra funding from us to pay for the large increase in their client or student base.
At our urging, UNHCR, our embassy and some designated NGOs are referring refugees to our admissions program. Resettlement is our option of last resort, the course we take when it is unlikely a refugee will be able to return safely to his or her home country even if conditions for others improve, and for whom integrating into host communities is not a possibility.
Many of the Iraqis whom we have resettled, or who are in the midst of being considered for resettlement, belong to especially vulnerable populations, such as religious minorities or former employees of the US government.
Resettlement is a complex process. Many U.S. government agencies play significant roles: the bureau I head and the Bureau of Consular Affairs in the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Health and Human Services. Outside the government, we work with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to ensure that we are considering the most suitable cases for resettlement.
We contract with international and non-governmental organizations such as the International Organization for Migration, or the International Catholic Migration Conference, to establish what are called Overseas Processing Entities. Staff of these organizations interview refugee applicants and prepare the necessary paperwork which is reviewed and used during the refugee case adjudication by officials from the Department of Homeland Security.
When I was in Jordan I sat through refugee interviews conducted by the Overseas Processing Entity in Amman, and another interview by the Department of Homeland Security. New, post-9/11 security concerns mean that the process takes longer than it used to. For example, each DHS interview in Jordan lasted for approximately four hours.
We work, at a diplomatic level, with the foreign governments in countries that are hosting Iraqi refugees. Finally, in the U.S. we work with our resettlement agency partners who help refugees adjust to life in the United States, and with the Department of Health and Human Services, which provides further assistance.
For the Iraqi refugee situation, when we began expanding access to resettlement this spring, we had to create the infrastructure from scratch. We had no refugee processing presence in Syria or in Jordan, the primary destination countries for Iraqi refugees. Likewise, the registration and referrals capacity of the small UNHCR offices in these countries needed to be expanded to deal with the increased demand.
Despite the challenges of rapidly establishing and launching the process in various locations, the U.S. has, to date, admitted 990 refugees this fiscal year and this number will increase considerably by the end of the month. Iraqi admissions in FY 2008 will be substantially higher.
One lesson we learned after 9/11 is that any program that allows people to enter our country must guard against terrorist infiltration. That's why we have acted to ensure the integrity of our refugee program by establishing a rigorous security vetting protocol. Those procedures help screen out potential security risks while at the same time offering sanctuary to Iraqi refugees who deserve our country's protection.
We are also dealing with external obstacles, such as the fact that Syria has refused to provide visas to DHS officials, who are necessary to enter Syria to conduct the necessary interviews with candidates for refugee resettlement. In some countries, getting exit visas for Iraqis who have arrived as refugees has been time-consuming.
Despite the challenges, we have a moral obligation to protect Iraqi refugees, particularly those who belong to persecuted religious minorities, as well as those who have worked closely with the United States government since the fall of Saddam Hussein. It is inspiring for me to visit refugee families who have resettled here in the U.S., and see how quickly they have adapted to their new surroundings. I plan to visit resettled Iraqis next month to monitor this aspect of our resettlement program.
Among the U.S. agencies providing services to refugees arriving in their new home are six faith-based groups, representing various Catholic, Protestant and Jewish organizations.
In closing, I would like to say that we are committed to helping refugees get the protection they need. We will continue to give generously to UN and other international and NGO efforts to help displaced Iraqis. The Administration's top priority, of course, remains promoting a more stable, and peaceful Iraq. Most of the Iraqi refugees I talk to want, most of all, to return home. We owe it to them to do everything we can to make that possible.
February 08, 2008
September 19, 2007
The Displacement Crisis
Iraq is experiencing the worst human displacement of its history, with over 2.2 million persons displaced within its borders and an additional two million who have fled the country to the surrounding region. This mass displacement is fast becoming a regional and ultimately international crisis.
Although there are many internally displaced persons (IDP) in Iraq displaced over the past several decades, since the 22 February 2006 bombing of the Samarra Al-Askari Mosque the primary driver of displacement has been sectarian violence. IOM assessments, which cover nearly 700,000 of an estimated 1,058,424 people displaced since February 2006, find that 88% of IDPs say they were targeted due to their religious/sectarian identity. General crime, lawlessness, and military operations are also factors producing displacement.
Although sectarian violence emphasizes religious identity, it is as much a political as it is a religious type of persecution. Religious identity is important because it is associated with power blocs that are competing for political and resource control.
Population Movement Patterns
The bulk of Iraqi displacement occurs from or within Baghdad: 69% of IDPs surveyed by IOM reported Baghdad as their place of origin. IOM assessments find that overall, Iraqi IDPs tend to move from mixed communities to religiously and ethnically homogenous communities: Shias tend to move southward, and Sunnis northward towards the central or upper-central governorates. Within large cities like Baghdad or Baquba, IDPs tend to move within the city to homogenous neighborhoods. Despite this larger trend, there are exceptions: in recent weeks, a large group of Sunni IDPs found refuge in a predominantly Shia neighborhood in Baghdad.
The religious profile of the displaced population reflects that of the country at large: 65% of those surveyed are Shia, 31% are Sunni, 4.4% are Christian, and other minority groups (Sabean Mandean and Yazidi) less than 1%. The vast majority (93%) of assessed IDPs are Arab, with 4% Assyrian, 2% Kurd, 1% Turkmen, and Chaldeans and Armenians less than 1%.
Many Iraqis who have the ability to leave the country are doing so, with the majority of them becoming refugees in neighboring Jordan and Syria. Both of these countries are planning to introduce visa plans that heavily restrict refugee entry. This, along with this year's increase in Iraqi local authorities' restrictions on inter-governorate movement within the country, is likely to force population flows into new areas as displacement continues.
The Humanitarian Assessment
The prolonged nature and increased scale of displacement has produced a serious humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Displacement deprives families of their income and resources, rendering them unable to provide for themselves in their new locations. Displacement also strains the host communities who share their services and resources with the displaced
SHELTER is a top priority need reported by IDPs. Of those IDPs assessed by IOM, 58% rent, 18% stay with a host family or relatives, and up to 25% live in camp or group settlements. As rent prices rise, savings run out, and the burden increases on host households, many IDPs are seeking more sustainable living arrangements. An increasing number of IDPs are living in settlements or camps, posing serious challenges for the short-term delivery of aid and longer-term implementation of durable solutions.
FOOD is also a top priority need reported by IDPs. Much of the Iraqi population depends upon the government's PDS rations, but there is a widespread lack of access to these distributions due to political manipulations, limited resources, logistical difficulties, and insecurity. IOM assessments find that the situation is especially dire among the displaced, with 81% of those assessed reporting no or intermittent access to PDS rations.
EMPLOYMENT is a key sector requiring long-term durable solutions. Much of the immediate IDP humanitarian need is due to loss of income during displacement, and the crisis may worsen as prolonged displacement exhausts the finances of those IDPs who so far have been able to support themselves. IOM assessments find that IDPs consider employment an extremely important priority need, since it will allow them to provide for themselves and begin to rebuild their lives.
HEALTH CARE has deteriorated greatly in Iraq due to the exodus of qualified professionals, a severe shortage of medication and equipment, and damage to medical facilities. Many of the displaced live in substandard conditions and lack basic services, increasing their risk of disease. IOM assessments find that 34% of IDPs cannot access required medications, and 12.4% have no access to health care.
WATER & SANITATION is a growing concern among many of the most vulnerable IDP and host community groups, particularly those in camps or neighborhoods where basic services are either non-existent or overwhelmed. Many IDPs rely on water trucking or host community generosity for water, while others have no potable water and drink from rivers or drainage ditches. Of those IDPs assessed by IOM, 16% reported that they do not have regular access to water.
EDUCATION is an important issue for IDPs, half of whom are under the age of 18. Host community schools are severely overcrowded due to the influx of IDP children, exacerbating social tensions. In IOM assessments, IDPs frequently manifest their education concerns by requesting both school rehabilitation/expansion projects and income generation schemes that will allow families to support themselves without keeping children home from school to work.
Meeting the Humanitarian Need
IOM is a lead organization in the delivery of emergency assistance and Community Assistance Projects (CAPs) within Iraq . In Iraq, IOM projects have reached 5 million beneficiaries since 2003; emergency distributions have reached 52,000 families since 22 February 2006. Despite security limitations, IOM has been able to deliver aid and implement projects throughout Iraq by coordinating closely with partners on the ground. The IOM IDP Monitoring & Needs Assessment Programme provides in-depth assessment data and analysis on Iraqi displacement, regularly disseminating reports that inform the humanitarian community and other stakeholders. The IOM Ministry of Migration and Displacement Capacity Building Programme works closely with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) to build its capacity and formulate Iraqi government policy toward migration issues
Although international awareness of the Iraqi displacement crisis has grown considerably in the past year, donors have been slow to respond and funding remains insufficient. IOM has received barely 20% of its $85 million funding appeal for 2007-2008. IOM has received $6 million from the U.S. government for 2007. Lack of funding remains the primary constraint on IOM's ability to reach beneficiaries.
The Way Forward
IOM assessments find that 55% of IDPs intend to return to their place of origin, 23% intend to integrate in their place of displacement, and 19% intend to resettle in a third location. As insecurity continues and communal divisions harden, increasing numbers of IDPs may settle permanently; however, the fact remains that the majority of the displaced intend to move again.
In this environment of continuing insecurity, humanitarian agencies must be able to meet the short-term emergency needs of extremely vulnerable Iraqis, while implementing durable solutions projects that assist IDPs in rebuilding their lives. Failure to do so will exacerbate the humanitarian dimension of a massive displacement crisis that is already guaranteed to have economic, social, and political reverberations in Iraq and the region for years to come.
February 08, 2008
September 19, 2007
Introduction
I would like to thank the Commission for the opportunity to appear before you on behalf of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR is charged by the international community to ensure refugee protection and to identify durable solutions to refugee situations.
Without doubt, the protection of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is one of the most critical challenges with which UNHCR is grappling today. An estimated 2.2 million persons are currently displaced inside Iraq while another 2 million have fled the country to become refugees in the surrounding region or elsewhere. Unfortunately, this flow does not seem to be dissipating; we estimate that some 2,000 refugees are forced from their homes each day by the violence that continues to plague their homeland.
Simply put, the international community has not faced this magnitude of displacement in the Middle East since 1948. In UNHCR's view, the international community should move in a robust way to provide support to the countries hosting Iraqi refugees and preserve the fragile protection space. In the absence of a concerted effort by regional governments, donor governments (including the United States), UNHCR and its implementing partners, the situation will likely erode even further, bringing new levels of displacement and deepening protection problems.
Number of Iraqis Affected and Impact
Numbers of Iraqi refugees and IDPs
The majority of Iraqi refugees who have sought protection outside of Iraq have fled to Syria and Jordan. Iraqis now represent almost 10 percent of the populations in Syria and Jordan, and in Damascus, one out every four people is an Iraqi refugee.
Impact
This influx of Iraqi refugees has resulted in a surge in demand, and consequently, a significant increase in the price of basic commodities. Power supplies in certain parts of Damascus have been unable to cope with demand, schools are overcrowded, and medical and health care facilities are exhausted. Prostitution among women and girls has increased; health problems have been exacerbated by lack of access to adequate care; trauma, anxiety, and other mental health problems are widespread; and women-headed households are common.
Iraqis are not permitted to work legally in their host countries, resulting in diminished assets and making survival more difficult. A recently completed survey in Damascus revealed that the overwhelming majority depend on some form of charity, and that 34 percent of Iraqis predict that they will run out of funds in the next month.
The strain caused by hosting large numbers of new arrivals has unfortunately led to border restrictions. Syria, which has been notably generous to Iraqis seeking protection, announced last week that Iraqis must obtain a visa before crossing the border. Jordan has also severely restricted access to those attempting to enter. Once the visa requirement for Syria is implemented (currently set for October 15), it will effectively mean that there is no longer a safe place, and no escape route, for Iraqis fleeing their country.
Internally displaced Iraqis are facing perhaps even more complex protection problems. Of those displaced since February 2006, approximately 70 percent are women and children. Many IDPs are denied registration, and therefore lack access to basic services, including subsidized food assistance, fuel, and basic protection.
Authorities in 11 governorates have imposed restrictions on IDP entry and residence, even for people of the same ethnic group, due to concerns about security, political considerations, or because social services are saturated and support from the central government is thin.
Increased restrictions on IDP movement and growing social and economic vulnerability have led to the establishment of makeshift IDP camps and spontaneous clusters of improvised shelters. It is estimated that about 20 percent of IDPs are now in such collective settlements, where conditions are in some cases slum-like. Major needs of camp residents include water and sanitation, adequate shelter, medical care, and security.
UNHCR Operations
Turning now to what UNHCR and its partners are doing to address the protection challenges Iraqis are confronting. At the start of 2007, UNHCR began a concerted effort to enhance its presence in the region in order to offer protection and assistance to Iraqi refugees. This effort has included implementation of a registration system in order to provide Iraqis in host countries with documentation, to identify those who are most vulnerable and to better address their needs.
Those identified as vulnerable may then be referred for resettlement to a third country such as the United States. To date, UNHCR has referred more than 14,000 individuals for resettlement, with more than 10,000 of these referred to the United States. UNHCR is responsible for the front end of the resettlement process, which is referrals to resettlement countries. Countries, like the US, then vet these cases under their own resettlement laws and procedures.
Operations Inside Iraq
The security situation inside of Iraq, particularly in the center and in the south, poses serious challenges to humanitarian work. UNHCR, like many other agencies, has been forced to adopt remote management and partnership arrangements to ensure the delivery of basic protection and assistance. We are attempting to support Iraqi authorities and local institutions at the provincial level and to establish humanitarian warehouses to support the delivery of emergency assistance. Assistance to Iraqi IDPs includes distribution of non-food items such as tents, blankets, mattresses, fuel, and cooking equipment.
Operations Outside Iraq
UNHCR has largely worked to support the existing infrastructures of host countries with an emphasis on education and health. This work has resulted in an agreement by the Jordanian government to allow Iraqi children to enroll in public schools, regardless of the residence status of their parents. This is considered a major breakthrough given Jordan's previous policy. Our objective now is to enroll 100,000 children in Syrian schools and 50,000 in Jordanian schools by the end of this academic year, in addition to the 60,000 already enrolled.
UNHCR has also established community centers in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon that provide emergency assistance, domestic violence counseling, services to address sexual violence, referrals for health and education assistance, and vocational and computer training.
Funding Appeals
A $123.7 million for assistance to refugees in Syria and Jordan and Iraqi IDPs, which includes a large health component.
A $129 million joint appeal with UNICEF to address education needs in host countries
The international community has contributed about 80 percent of the funding for the overall appeal. The education appeal, on the other hand, is funded at only 30 percent, funding which has been provided almost exclusively by the US.
Much more needs to be done as we expect that protection and assistance needs will continue to escalate. We appreciate the US government's generous contributions and look forward to working with our US counterparts in a concerted effort to ensure the safety and well-being of Iraqis affected by this crisis.
February 08, 2008
September 19, 2007
Research Memo
Can the U.S. Influence Political Progress in Iraq?
*Judith S. Yaphe
Summary:
Regardless of the debate over the success or failure of the military surge in Iraq, Americans and Iraqis agree on one key point: military operations alone are insufficient to quell the insurgencies and keep Iraq intact. A political surge is essential, and it can only be delivered by Iraqis. Yet, as the military surge reaches its peak and despite U.S. pressure to enact benchmark legislation, the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continues to fail to show progress toward a political solution. If the political stalemate in Baghdad were not enough, Iraq in the months ahead will face three other potentially explosive political events: provincial elections, a controversial census, and a referendum to determine who will govern Kirkuk.
What can the U.S. do to restore confidence in its ability to end the violence and regain a level of cooperation? More to the point, what can the U.S. do to bolster confidence in the central government in Baghdad, shore up its sagging influence, and enhance its ability to establish and maintain a stable, secure, and inclusive Iraq, despite sagging U.S. influence? The U.S. can:
- Continue to support the elected government in Baghdad and help it act decisively to establish its authority through a consensual exercise of power. Reward progress made on key issues of inclusivity (rolling back De-Ba'thification measures), expanding military capabilities, and progress in repairing and exploiting Iraq's energy resources. Criticism from Washington will not strengthen Maliki's hand or enhance the ability of his government to act. Efforts to destabilize the elected government, even if it is unpopular with Iraqis and Americans, or to encourage regime change by unconstitutional means will drive a further wedge between the U.S. and Iraq. Miscalculation of America's ability to influence Baghdad could push the Maliki government-or its successor-into the arms of Tehran. Similarly, over-confidence on Iran's part of its influence in Iraq could tilt public and official opinion to favor U.S. support.
- Encourage political reform and not regime change. Iraq needs a more inclusive political system and national reconciliation, but demanding that the government create these by fiat will not work. Encouraging electoral reform could achieve this goal. The current electoral process of national lists and a nation-wide election only strengthens sectarian and ethnic factionalism. Provincial elections and electoral districts based on geography should produce candidates from local communities and responsible to them.
- Use the uncertain outcome of U.S. elections in 2008 and prospect of a precipitous drawdown of forces to underscore the need for political progress. Make clear to Iraqis that we are serious about long-term withdrawal and that our policy is not dependent of the status of the insurgencies in Iraq; it is based on protecting our national interests.
- Engage Iraq's neighbors in supporting the government in Baghdad. This includes talks with Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia on the mutual need for a secure and united Iraq and the need to limit foreign intervention.
- Success of local tribal and community leaders against al-Qaida. The trend of tribal and other leaders within the Sunni Arab community turning against the terrorist elements with which they had previously been allied began in predominantly Sunni Anbar with the support of U.S. forces and is apparently spreading towards Baghdad. The United States should not take this tribal cooperation with American forces for granted; it does not signify Sunni Arab acceptance of the legitimacy of the government in Baghdad, nor should it be interpreted as new-found loyalty to the U.S. It does, however, demonstrate how readily self-interest can alter what may appear at first glance to be alliances of principle.
- Coming leadership changes. The leader of the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI), Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, is gravely ill with lung cancer. His organization is officially being guided by one of his sons, but the real power is likely to be a technocrat highly regarded in the West, Adil Abd al-Mahdi. Adil is not a cleric and is reportedly unpopular with the rank-and-file of the ISCI, but he is apparently an effective organizer and may be able to put together a more coherent and less combative organization. Similarly, Jalal Talabani, President of Iraq and leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, has been hospitalized in Jordan and the U.S. this year with unspecified ailments. Talabani is in his 70s and showing his age after long years of combating both Saddam Husayn and his primary rival for leadership of the Kurdish community, Kurdistan Regional Government President and Kurdish Democratic Party head Masoud Barzani. The two Kurdish factions are still negotiating the unification of their organizations and militias, and the rising generation of Kurdish leaders may be willing to challenge the autocratic control wielded by these powerful warlords over the Kurdish economy, politics, and civil society. It is possible that an opening up of the political system within Iraqi Kurdistan could lead to a reexamination of long-unchallenged assumptions about how the Kurds' relate to the rest of Iraq-for better or worse.
- Shifting political alliances. In recent months several prominent Iraqi leaders have attempted to create political alliances that cross sectarian lines. For example, Iyad Allawi, a secular Shi'a and ex-Ba'thist who headed the second provisional government and now controls 25 seats in the National Assembly, has been trying to rebuild his organization by appealing to both secular Iraqis and religious Iraqis who prefer a secular government. Allawi is a well-known quantity admired for his decisiveness and courage, but he is also seen as corrupt and criticized for being too close to the U.S. More significantly, Muqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shi'a cleric who heads the Sadr Movement and the Mahdi militia, has begun trying to broaden his appeal, inviting religious Sunnis and Christians under the protective umbrella of his movement. Sadr's attraction has two sources: first, the effective social and humanitarian programs that he runs, which benefit a large number of poor Shi'a, especially in Baghdad, and second, the ability of his Mahdi army to retaliate against Sunni extremists and protect Shi'a neighborhoods. Some Iraqis believe Sadr's goal is to be the Spiritual Guide of Iraq seated in the shrine city of Najaf, a position paralleling that of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, a political ayatollah who (like Muqtada) lacks authentic religious credentials.
- Kurdish maneuvering. Iraq's Kurdish factions have been ominously quiet while Sunni and Shi'a extremists-both Arab-fight each other for power in the name of Islam. The Kurds are determined to gain Kirkuk by the end of this year by de-Arabizing the city and then holding a referendum that will approve Kurdish control. Turkey would like the referendum postponed while it considers the potential impact that an expanded Kurdish regional authority virtually independent of Iraq might have on its own Kurdish population. Iraq's Kurds, however, may be crafting another dramatic political shift. Representatives of some Kurdish factions claim their leaders are considering changing loyalties and allegiances from Baghdad to Ankara. It is unclear what arrangements Kurdish leaders may be considering, and it is equally unclear what benefit Ankara would perceive in allying with Iraq's Kurds. Such a move might arguably provide short-term solutions to Kurdish-Arab power struggles in Iraq and to Turkey's problems with anti-Turkish Kurdish terrorists (the PKK) operating from safe havens in northern Iraq, but Turkish leaders would seem far more likely to see it as increasing separatist tendencies among Turkish Kurds rather than easing them.
- Continue to support the elected government in Baghdad and help it act decisively to establish its authority through a consensual exercise of power. We need to reward positive behavior-passage of de-Ba'thification which can lead to greater political and security inclusiveness, success in military training and expanded Iraqi operations, and oil legislation. U.S. talks with Iran may help strengthen the ability of the Maliki government or its successor, to move forward on decision making in critical areas, but the U.S. must be careful not to present such any agreement as collusion by external actors to dictate Iraq's future. Even the appearance of acceding to demands from Washington or Tehran could undermine whatever base of support Maliki has now. The Iraqi government must walk a fine line between its dependence on support from the U.S. and Iran to deliver services or security to the Iraqi people and its vulnerability to charges from all sides of being too acquiescent to either American or Iranian influence. U.S. efforts to manipulate the government or realign political factions will weaken the elected government without either enhancing American credibility or introducing a more effective replacement regime.
- Encourage political reform. Demanding transparent governance, strict accountability, and the passage of specific kinds of legislation without reforming the electoral system will only increase resentment of the U.S. and undermine the legitimacy of the elected government. Iraqis talk about needing the rule of law, which the U.S. represents in theory, but they first need the kind of security and protection that creates an environment able to sustain the rule of law in practice and the experience of government change through democratic, legitimate means. The U.S. should encourage holding provincial elections as called for in Iraq's constitution and shifting from the current list-based, nation-wide system, which reinforces sectarian and ethnic-based lists, to geographically defined districts. This way, candidates known to the electorate, directly elected by them, and responsible to them may encourage the emergence of local-based leaders representing Iraq's diverse groups. The result could be the rise of new political players who enjoy bona fide popular legitimacy, have the local political bases to govern more effectively, and who ultimately can present a constructive challenge to the factions currently holding national politics hostage to personal pique.
- Carefully prioritize demands on a fragile government in Baghdad-is it in American or Iraqi interests to hold Baghdad hostage to demands that it pass legislation on oil or de-Ba'thification, for example, if doing so ensures the total collapse of the current government?
- Emphasize political affiliation over ethnic or sectarian identity. Deal with Iraqi political players in terms of parties and factions, and not as ethnic or sectarian blocs. Emphasizing sectarian or ethnic identity reinforces separateness rather than encouraging inclusion.
- Urge an end to bickering over which party or faction ‘owns' which post or ministry and to awarding positions to family, friends and clients rather than to technocrats and experts. In particular, urge the removal of the most offensive and extreme appointees in the Defense, Interior and Intelligence Ministries. Finding replacements for them and the militias embedded in these ministries will be difficult but is necessary before Iraqis can look to their own rather than to the U.S. for protection and justice.
- Avoid picking sides in Iraq's internal political battles or personalizing confrontations with tribal, sectarian, or ethnic leaders. A strategy that tilts towards seemingly compliant Sunni Arab tribes and leaders today could produce unintended consequences tomorrow, such as the creation of a new, well-armed militia focused on attacking Americans rather than al-Qaida terrorists or Iranian elements. On the other hand, today's rogue may be tomorrow's key to resolving a security or political dilemma.
- Continue efforts to create a national military force. Emphasize recruitment from all sectors of the population, provide training in military tactics and civil-military relations, and provide the means for the Iraqis to defend themselves against well-armed insurgents. Iraq's neighbors can have no role in this critical task-all are seen as having more interest in a militarily and politically weak Iraq than in an Iraq able to defend itself. And all are probably planning their actions once the U.S. withdraws.
- Use the uncertain outcome of U.S. elections in 2008 and prospect of a precipitous drawdown of forces to underscore the need for progress in Iraqi governance, national reconciliation, and security operations. The withdrawal card may be our strongest lever. This might pressure a recalcitrant central government and self-absorbed allies, such as the Kurds, to cooperate. None of the key players wants immediate U.S. withdrawal. Fear and mistrust of "the other" (Kurd of Arab, Shi'a of Sunni, Sunni Arab of everyone) outweigh opposition to the U.S. presence, although few Iraqis would admit this openly. Make clear to Iraqis that we are serious about long-term withdrawal and that our policy is not dependent of the status of the insurgencies in Iraq; it is based on protecting our national interests.
- Try to engage Iraq's neighbors to take positive measures to assist the Iraqis in securing their borders and blocking the transit of terrorist recruits and money to stoke the insurgencies in Iraq. The neighbors, for now, are part of the problem. Gulf Arabs claim former Iraqi Ba'thists and Sunni Arab extremists living in the Gulf are given safe haven and in some cases citizenship, serve in local police and security services, and facilitate the transfer of assistance from individuals in those countries to Sunni extremists in Iraq. Their recruitment of young men for Sunni insurgent operations in Iraq and collection of money allegedly has the tacit support of the ruling Sunni families in several Gulf countries. None of the Gulf governments appears to have much interest in an Iraq led by non-Sunnis or non-Arabs, although all would deny it.