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February 08, 2008
September 19, 2007
Thank you for asking me to appear. I have been asked today to discuss primarily the effects of sectarian violence on religious freedom and human rights, with particular attention to the Shiite perspective and Shiite-on-Shiite violence in Baghdad and in southern Iraq.
I note with interest that the September 2007 Defense Department report on Iraqi stability, which was published yesterday, says that "The security environment in southern Iraq took a notable turn for the worse in August." This assessment clearly tracks with much of the press reporting out of the Shiite areas of Iraq over the past few months. It is clear that intra-Shiite tensions are increasing, and that Shiite inhabitants of Iraq can no longer, as they have for the past several years, take security "for granted." High levels of violence in Iraq are no longer confined to Sunni areas or to areas where Sunnis and Shiites live closely together.
It is likely that the drawdown of multi-national forces in southern Iraq is a contributing factor to the increased violence we are seeing. Britain has now reduced its force from 7,100 to about 5,200 in the Basra area, with plans to reduce to 5,000 by the end of the year. In August 2007, Britain abandoned its last base in the city itself, Basra palace, and is now concentrated at the local airport.
The various Shiite factions appear to be engaging in, or at the very least preparing for, an all-out scramble for power. Broadly drawn, the fighting is between what I call the "insurgent" Shiites typified by the Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi, JAM) of Moqtada Al Sadr, and the "incumbent" Shiites of the dominant political parties in southern Iraq, particularly the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). The "incumbent" Shiites have professional party organizations and well developed political structures. ISCI was well positioned after the fall of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, and it participated in the provincial elections of January 2005. The less well organized Sadr faction did not compete aggressively in all the Shiite provinces of the south, and found itself in the minority on almost all the provincial councils of southern Iraq.
In general, Sadr's lower class Shiite constituents want the benefits of the Iraqi state to accrue to them in the form of generous social welfare payments, subsidies, and government jobs. ISCI and its national ally, the Da'wa Party of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, tend to represent more affluent Shiites who want economic growth and free trade rather than government involvement in the economy.
The "incumbent" Shiite parties are generally closer to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani than are the "insurgent" Shiite parties. This is because Sistani is generally mainstream and from the "quietist" school of Shiite Islam rather than the "vocal" school. Sistani is revered as the leading theologian by followers of both ISCI and the Sadr faction, but the Sadrists believe that Sistani's quietism does not necessarily serve their interests because he tends to support the status quo.
ISCI controls a militia of an estimated 20,000 called the Badr Brigades, now renamed the Badr Organization. The Badr forces, thanks to the 2005-2006 tenure of ISCI senior official Bayan Jabr as Interior Minister, have essentially, by all accounts, taken over the Ministry of Interior and much of the police administrative apparatus. Badr loyalists dominate the 26,000 member National Police, which the congressionally-mandated "Jones Commission" on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) said in September 2007 needs to be completely disbanded and reorganized because of its sectarianism.
This balance of forces explains some of the recent fighting seen in several southern cities. For example, there has been nearly continuous fighting between the JAM and the Badr-dominated Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the city of Diwaniyah (Qadisiyah Province) and Nassiriyah (Dhi Qar Province). In August 2007, the provincial governors of Qadisiyah and another Shiite southern province, Muthanna - both ISCI members - were assassinated within a week of each other. According to the Defense Department report cited previously, both governors had been "pushing back" against JAM "expansion and control."
An even starker example of the degree to which this infighting has spilled over into the public arena came on August 28, when fighting between the JAM and the ISF (purportedly mostly Badr fighters within the ISF) in the holy city of Karbala caused the death of more than 50 persons, mostly ISF and JAM fighters. However, the fighting interrupted a Shiite celebration (the birth of the 12th Imam) and many of the Shiite celebrants were ordered out of the city.
There are few Sunnis in southern Iraq and therefore Sunni - Shiite conflict is not a major feature in the south. However, Shiite militias in the south have retaliated for alleged Sunni atrocities elsewhere in Iraq. For example, in June 2007, militants blew up two Sunni mosques in Basra, apparently in retaliation for the June 13, 2007 destruction of two remaining minarets at the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, which is in a mostly Sunni province north of Baghdad. Such actions have, by many accounts, caused the few Sunnis that were in Basra to flee for central Iraq, including Baghdad, where more Sunnis are concentrated.
The city of Basra has complications even beyond those of Karbala, Diwaniyah, Nassiriyah, Amarah, and others. Basra is Iraq's main oil producing region and the point of export for about 80% of Iraq's total oil exports. In Basra, with power comes the ability to divert oil exports, smuggle them out, and pocket the proceeds. In Basra, there is yet another Shiite party that is competing for influence - the Fadilah, or Islamic Virtue, Party. Fadilah is led by Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, who was an aide to Moqtada Al Sadr's father but then was pushed out of the Sadrist movement when Moqtada moved to take it over after his father's death in 1999. At the national level, Fadilah and the Sadr trend are usually aligned against the "incumbent" Shiite parties because both Sadr and Fadilah represent lower class constituents. Both have recently pulled out of the broad "United Iraqi Alliance" that is dominated by the incumbent Shiite factions. However, in Basra, Sadr and Fadilah are competitors because of the vast assets up for grabs there. Fadilah has 12 of the 40 Basra province seats; ISCI controls 21 seats, leaving Sadr with very little representation on the provincial council. In April 2007, the Sadrists conducted protests in Basra to try to persuade the provincial governor, Mohammad Waili, who is a Fadilah member, to resign, a campaign that is continuing.
A Christian Science Monitor story of September 17 describes Basra as basically carved up among Shiite militias. The JAM is said to be very strong among the police force, and the Badr militia is said to have its loyalists heavily present in the Basra customs service that oversees trade between Iran and Iraq. Fadilah, which is very strong among the oil worker sector in Basra, controls the 15,000 person Facilities Protection Service (FPS) contingent that guards the oil infrastructure there. Another pro-Iranian militia is said to be operating in the city - Thar Allah, or God's Revenge, which grew out of a Shiite guerrilla group operating against Saddam Hussein from the marsh border areas.
The internecine fighting among Shiite factions does not appear to characterize the situation in Baghdad. According to the September 2007 DoD "Measuring Stability" report, the Sadr faction-dominated district of Baghdad called "Sadr City" is "the most stable in terms of ethno-sectarian attacks." "However, this area continues to provide support for JAM operatives who use the area for planning, logistics, and other support activities and as a base from which to launch attacks on the International Zone and neighboring areas."
Effects of Militia Influence and Control. Numerous accounts from visitors to Iraq show how Iraqi social and political life has been affected by the strength of militias in the south. Some examples of the growing Islamization of Basra and surrounding areas are contained in the State Department's human rights country report on Iraq for 2006, released on March 6, 2007, as well as the International Religious Freedom Report for 2007, released just a few days ago. Similar information was presented in a June 2007 study by the International Crisis Group.1 International Crisis Group. Where is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra. June 25, 2007. 1 According to the reports, professors at Basra University who were considered secular received written threats and demands to depart Basra. During 2006, a series of killings targeted professors in Basra (as well as Baghdad). The report also says there were "Serious reports of torture and killings leveled at [the Ministry of Interior's] Serious Crime Unit detention facility in Basra...." Basra's education director has required all females in the schools to cover their heads.
Although not limiting its discussion to Basra, the reports present trends in gender discrimination. In particular, according to the State Department human rights report:
in practice conservative societal standards impeded women's abilities to exercise their rights. Throughout the country, women reported increasing pressure to wear veils. Many reported the presence of flyers in their neighborhoods threatening women who refused. Women were targeted for undertaking normal activities, such as driving a car, talking on a cell phone, and wearing trousers, in an effort to force them to remain at home, wear veils, and adhere to a very conservative interpretation of Islam. In addition to societal pressures, there were several reports of women at government ministries being told to wear a veil or lose their job.
The International Crisis Group report asserts that the health care system has largely come under the control of Shiite Islamists, particularly the Sadrists, who controlled the national health ministry until the resignation of all Sadrists from the cabinet in April 2007. The Islamists have sought to segregate the health care system by gender, with doctors treating only patients of the same gender.
Although the State Department report does not specifically attribute such intimidation to Shiite parties or militias, press reports about Basra have consistently suggested that it is Shiite militiamen, particularly JAM members, that are conducting the intimidation discussed above. Other reports have said that Mahdi and Badr militiamen have beaten students publicly displaying affection and have attacked sellers of alcohol.
The Role of Iran. Most experts believe that Iran is backing many different Shiite factions, not knowing which might emerge on top and wanting influence with all. The one possible exception is Fadilah, which views itself as opposing Iranian influence in Iraq. U.S. military officials have asserted on a number of occasions that Iran is supplying the Shiite militias with sophisticated conventional weaponry, including Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs) that are capable of piercing U.S. armored vehicles. Iran's goal is to demonstrate U.S. weakness in Iraq and to ensure Shiite domination of post-Saddam Iraq. In Basra, according to the International Crisis Group report, Iranian intelligence has established a presence in Iran's consulate there, in humanitarian organizations, and in the pro-Iranian political party headquarters.
At the same time, Iran's influence might not be as strong or as organized as some assert. Basra governor Waili has not been forced out of office even though he belongs to Fadilah, which is the least sympathetic to Iran of the Shiite parties there. If Iran's influence were as determinative as some believe, it is reasonable to argue that Iran could, by now, have forced Waili out.
February 08, 2008
September 19, 2007
I'm Congressman Steve Israel. I represent Long Island, New York. In addition to that, I have been working on a bipartisan initiative with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle on areas where we can agree on Iraq. Our debate on the floor of the House has been a polarizing debate, but one of the areas where we can agree on, that we have agreed on, is addressing the refugee crisis in Iraq.
We have noted your extraordinary work and are interested in developing a partnership with the Commission so that we can incorporate some of your recommendations into legislative vehicles to make some progress on this crisis. I will commend to your attention a story in Roll Call this morning that talked about members on both sides of the aisle who feel, quite honestly, drowned out by the debate on the extremes, who recognize that Republicans and Democrats are going to disagree on about 75 percent of the issues with respect to Iraq and therefore, understand that we have a profound obligation to move the 25 percent that we agree on. We have been paralyzed on the 25 percent that we agree on because we're so busy fighting over the 75 percent that we will never agree on.
One of the issues that repeatedly comes up in our meetings, including one meeting this morning that was attended by about eight of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, and a long dinner meeting Monday night that was attended by about 15 members on both sides of the aisle, is what we must do with respect to the refugee crisis in Iraq. As you know, as your commission has stated, about two million Iraqi refugees seeking shelter around the world, two million internally displaced persons within Iraq.
We note with appreciation the reform that your commission has called for and has asked Congress to consider: expanding access to the U.S. refugee program for all Iraqis, extending P-2 categories to members of Iraq's religious minority communities. In addition, something that we're looking at, and we would appreciate your feedback as we go forward, is giving our ambassador, Ambassador Crocker, and his successors, more flexibility and more of a decision-making role in determining what refugees should be brought into the United States and expediting that process.
Tomorrow I'll be meeting with an Iraqi refugee who just arrived in Washington on a special immigrant visa. And the purpose of the meeting is first to thank him for his service to the United States government and to the coalition. Secondly to hear, from his perspective, why it took so long for him to get here - and it took an unreasonably long amount of time for him to arrive here, and third, to get his feedback on how we can accelerate and expedite this process.
I am told that this individual, who served courageously in the interests of the United States government and the coalition, is hoping that he can get a job as a cab driver in the United States. Now, I'm sure that he counts his blessings that he was finally able to get a special immigrant visa. But we can do better for him that put him in the job market as a cab driver.
I used to be on the Armed Services Committee. I'll close with this. I was on the Armed Services Committee for four years. I'm now on the Appropriations Committee. My heart is still with the Armed Services Committee, but my wallet is with the Appropriations Committee. And for four years, I heard that we had some very serious deficiencies within Iraq with respect to cultural awareness. I heard General Sanchez tell me, in Baghdad, we don't understand the cultures we're plunging into. I heard General Odierno, now the number two military official in Iraq, tell me in a Black Hawk helicopter, we need to do a better job working with the cultures that we find ourselves in. I heard consistently that we have glaring linguistic deficiencies in Iraq. To this day, we don't understand what people are saying about us.
A few days ago, I met with someone who was being deployed next week to Iraq. And he was telling me the thing he worries about most is going out on patrol and not being able to speak the language. And now we have an Iraq refugee that we're bringing into this country and he may go to work as a cab driver, instead of continuing his service to the United States government. I think there's something wrong with that. And so I want to suggest that we need to do two things.
Number one, we need to continue to find ways to solve this crisis and solve it quickly, and suggest to you that you have a willing, eager partner on both sides of the aisle to take your recommendations and pursue them as legislative vehicles. We want to work with you on that, particularly the Center Aisle Caucus, which I represent. And secondly, once the door is open to this flow of refugees, we need to find responsible ways of integrating them into our society and thanking them for the service that they provided and continue engaging them to provide additional services in the future.
So, thank you for your extraordinary work on religious persecution and this refugee crisis. I also want to recognize Joe Crapa. I'm a big fan of his. And I'm one of those members of the state and foreign operations subcommittee of Appropriations that has tried to put my money where my mouth is, not only supporting you with my rhetoric, but by seeking additional funds for this commission, and will continue to do so in admiration for your work. Thank you very much.
Hearing on Sectarian Violence in Iraq and the Refugee Crisis: Remarks by Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR)
February 08, 2008
September 19, 2007
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for inviting me to this meeting of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. I'm honored to testify before you today on the plight of refugees in Iraq.
Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, violence has grown to an appalling level. The looting of Baghdad immediately after its liberation was a harbinger of the lawlessness which today grips much of the country.
In spite of this chaos, our men and women in uniform have done a superb job in Iraq. They have suffered many casualties, and have born their burden with admirable courage.
But if Americans have suffered, Iraqis have also had their share of tragedy. Iraqi civilians have born the brunt of incredibly brutal violence. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has committed a pantheon of atrocities, from murdering children to the recent atrocity against the Yazidi community.
In addition to Al-Qaeda, faceless sectarian death squads hunt the country. Americans may have grown numb to the daily reports of bodies dumped by the side of the road, or in rivers, or in alleys, but Iraqis haven't. For them, the nightmare is reality.
To escape this violence, millions of Iraqis have left their homes. The UN estimates that more than two million Iraqis have fled the country, and 2.2 million are internally displaced. Over half of those two and a quarter million have recently left since the Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006.
These refugees come from all walks of life, but especially from Iraq's most vulnerable groups. Human-rights organizations estimate that Christians, who constitute less than 3 percent of Iraq's population, make up at least 20 percent of the refugees. Sabaeans, a tiny sect within Iraq, make up 5 percent of refugees. These minorities are often targeted by Islamic extremists for murder, rape, or forced conversion. Unsurprisingly, many choose to leave.
The refugees do not only come from minority populations. Estimates indicate about 45 percent are Sunni, and 25 percent are Shia. Iraqis of every stripe are fearful for their lives. Tragically, the UN states that two to two-and-a-half hundred thousand of these Iraqis are school-age children.
These children and their families have left home for different reasons, but their reasons have a common thread. In a survey by the United Nations, sixty-three percent of Iraqis said they had left their neighborhoods because of direct threats to their lives. Twenty-five percent left because they had been forcibly removed from their homes. These threats are often based on religion.
Sectarian violence is today the leading cause of refugee displacement. The effect has been to segregate Shia Iraqis and Sunni Iraqis, both nationally and locally. In Baghdad, some Sunni neighborhoods are walled off to protect them from the attacks of their countrymen. In the south of Iraq, threats from Shia militias have forced Sunnis to move to the north and west. The Shias from these areas have likewise fled Sunni death squads and Al-Qaeda.
In a front-page article this past Monday, The New York Times described how the sectarian violence and ever-present fear of death have fundamentally changed Iraqis and their society. Mixed marriages have become rare. Many Iraqis leave; and those who stay behind in a mixed neighborhood live constantly on the edge of a knife.
Hatreds lasting a thousand years are difficult to reconcile. Our country, which is a mere 231 years old, has difficulty enough with our old disagreements. We have solved some and continue to wrestle with others.
Nobody, however, has helped us reconcile these conflicts. Americans resolve American problems; and today, Iraqis need to resolve Iraqi problems. US soldiers cannot solve sectarian hatreds.
By some reports, our current strategy, the "troop surge," is making things worse. The Iraqi Red Crescent estimates that as many as 100,000 Iraqis have been leaving their homes since February, at the beginning of the "surge." This is not the fault of our soldiers, but rather a natural fear of more violence.
Nevertheless, it seems like folly to me to use American troops to police Sunni and Shia Iraqis who hate each other. The refugees we see today, in a large part, are due to the Iraqis' inability to resolve this hatred. The mission US troops are on today seems misguided. We certainly need to fight al-Qaeda and train the Iraqi army. We do not need to be trying to force a political compromise that isn't there.
One of the tasks the United States needs to embrace more fully is the responsibility for the suffering of ordinary Iraqis. While we cannot necessarily treat the disease, we can help treat the symptoms.
America owes a debt to those Iraqis who have been affected by the war. We also owe a special debt to those Iraqis who have worked with American forces. To this end, I cosponsored S.1104, a Senate bill to increase the number of Iraqis and Afghans who could be admitted to the United States. That is one step.
A bigger step would be moving to alleviate the overall refugee issue. I have been working with Senator Kennedy to pass S.1651, a bill which would enable Iraqi refugees of special attention (like religious minorities) to be admitted to the United States. It would increase the visas we make available to Iraqis, as well as allow refugees to be directly processed in Iraq.
In a diplomatic cable dated September 7th, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker complained to the State Department about bottlenecks in the refugee process. Among other problems, the ambassador noted that refugees often faced up to a two year delay to enter the US, an unnecessarily long wait. He urged action. I heartily agree.
I know better than many Americans how difficult it is for religious minorities to thrive in this world. It is difficult in the United States. It is far harder in the Middle East. The condition of these minorities in Iraq is thus of special interest to me. If we owe a debt to Iraqis, I hope that this legislation plays a small part in repaying that debt.
Though America may bear overall responsibility, these refugees are not only a concern of the United States. Other countries, willing or not, are involved as well. Iraq's neighbors have perhaps the most pressing concerns about the refugee issues, because these nations often wind paying the bill. Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt have so far borne the brunt of the refugee crisis.
Jordan, which has a population of 6.1 million, hosts up to 750,000 Iraqi refugees. Lebanon, with a population of 3.9 million, hosts between 40,000 and 200,000 Iraqis. Syria, with a population of 19.3 million, supports an estimated 1.2 million refugees. Egypt carries a lesser but still significant burden.
Each of these countries faces significant structural pressures as a result of their decision to support these Iraqis. Jordan, for example, has an estimated 1.8 million Palestinian refugees in addition to the Iraqis. Jordan thus now has the largest refugee-per-capita ratio on earth.
Because of Amman's delicate political situation we must make every effort to ensure that the financial and social strain does not stress Jordanian society, and make similar efforts with the other states.
The final status of externally displaced Iraqis must also be resolved within a reasonable time frame. These refugees' suffering must not be prolonged as a political weapon by their host countries with which to attack enemies. America has a national moral commitment to resolving the Iraqi refugee issue as quickly as possible.
Unfortunately, unconscionable delays have often prevented Iraqis from reaching safety.
The current refugee process requires potential refugees to leave Iraq before registering with United Nations refugee authorities. This journey is long, and especially hazardous.
Once Iraqis reach these authorities in Jordan, Syria, and elsewhere, a fresh purgatory awaits them. They must wait up to 6-8 months to be registered as refugees, and another 6-8 months to be designated as ready for resettlement. They are afterwards referred to the US and other final destination nations. These countries then have their own refugee processing systems, with their own delays.
Meanwhile, Iraqis usually lack access to basic social services. Given the large amount of children, the lack takes on an extra urgency. The NGO Human Rights First noted that America's funding for grossly inadequate. The United States gave $10 million to Jordan in the War on Terror Supplemental for Fiscal Year 2008.
In comparison, the United States gave Jordan $700 million in 2003 to offset the cost of the Iraq war. The United States is also spending $9 billion per month overall on the Iraq war overall.
Surely there is some additional funding available for the men, women, and children who are most affected by the violence in Iraq. It is America's moral duty.
We still have many questions to answer about solutions to the refugee crisis. Should we give economic aid to all countries which harbor refugees, such as Syria, or condition that aid on the treatment Iraqis receive? How can we expedite the relocation of Iraqi refugees? How can we prevent so many Iraqis from having to travel to other countries before they reach sanctuary in the United States and elsewhere? Should we focus our effort within international organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and UNICEF, or should we repay our debt bilaterally?
America historically has an honorable record in alleviating the plight of refugees from its wars. After the collapse of South Vietnam, for example, the United States absorbed an estimated 135,000 South Vietnamese refugees. In comparison, between 2003 and mid-2007, fewer than 800 Iraqis were admitted to the United States. Whether our effort is by ourselves, with allies, or with international organizations, more clearly needs to be done.
The plight of religious minorities is nowhere easy. It is most difficult in a war zone, in a region where they are already persecuted. The situation in Iraqis thus a humanitarian hazard of the first concern, particularly for those who bear overall responsibility.
Thank you for your time today. It has been an honor to testify before you.
February 08, 2008
September 19, 2007
And I welcome you to an appropriations committee hearing room in the Senate. It's nice to have an appropriation committee hearing room for a proceeding like this, an important proceeding. It doesn't cost the government any money.
But after that glowing introduction, I don't have very much to say; you've taken all my lines, but on a serious note I'm very delighted to be here and I thank the commission for what you are doing. We're about to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the International Religious Freedom Act, which Congressman Wolf and I had produced coordinately in the House and Senate. And it is very, very important work that you are undertaking. And I want to thank my longstanding friend Commissioner Leonard Leo for alerting me to the fact that you were here today and would be willing to hear a few comments from me.
The subject, which you are addressing, the sectarian violence in Iraq is one of overwhelming importance. Great humanitarian tragedy in that country today with the factionalism and with the battles among the Shi'ites and the Sunnis and the Kurds and with religious persecution the nth degree; they're not only persecuting, but they are annihilating as a form of genocide that they are undertaking there to the present time. And it is something which really requires a lot more attention from the United States. And the United States Congress, in a sense, has delegated a good bit of the important work to this commission; so, I'm glad to see you in session and hearing a very distinguished array of witnesses today.
The Judiciary Committee had a hearing in January on the subject of focused public attention and we need to get the White House more involved. We need to get the president more involved. When he speaks on the problems in Iraq, it would be helpful, I think, to note the refugee problem. And when you talk about mass migration, I was in the area in December and talking about the Mideast peace process with Syrian President Bashir Assad and he complains very strongly about the immigration problem there. Our figures listed at 700,000 who have gone from Iraq to Syria. He claims it's more like a million. And the United States has not been as open or forthcoming as the United States should be. I checked the statistics and found that since 2003, only 466 of these immigrants have been admitted to the United States, and last year, only 202 out of a quota of some 70,000.
So, our country should be doing a great deal more. And one of the items that is very, very problemsome, there are Iraqis who are cooperating with the United States on our efforts and once their identities are determined, they're at risk and they're being murdered and it is not a matter solely of humanitarian concern for those individuals, it is a matter of what we owe them. When they help us, we ought not to leave them at the peril of assassins, which is what is happening at the present time. So this is a matter which requires a great deal more concerted attention.
One item that I would suggest is that this distinguished commission get behind immigration reform in the United States, which should have a provision to deal with immigration from Iraq. As you know, we passed a bill in the Senate last year, the bill was passed in the House, but they could not be reached to reconciled; a little thing called politics came into play in the rotunda before there could be a conference report. Now this year, the Senate bill was defeated because of the contention of amnesty. And I have circulated a study bill which makes two changes.
As much as I dislike to have done so, I have eliminated citizenship and have only sought to eliminate the fugitive status of the immigrants so that the employers could not threaten to blackmail them into substandard living conditions and wages and so they would come out of the shadows and that we could register them, get them to pay their taxes, identify those who are criminals - you can't deport 12 to 20 million but you could deport the criminals. But I tell you just a little bit about the bill because I've talked to the majority leader Senator Leahy who chairs Judiciary and Senator Kennedy who's on the subcommittee, and we really need to bring the bill back. And that bill could deal with this issue to some extent in Iraq; can't be a total problem solver but it would take up and perhaps provide some suggestions and some recommendations.
Now those were my thoughts, distinguished commissioners. I again thank you for the work you're doing. When I say what is happening is the result of a legislation which Congressman Wolf and I pursued, I'm very pleased to have been a part of it. I thank you for putting me on the dais though I would've been pleased to have been at the witness table and I would submit myself to your questions, running the risk that you might have some probing questions for me as I do, on rare occasion, for witnesses.
February 08, 2008
September 19, 2007
Good afternoon. My name is Michael Cromartie, and I serve as chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. I'd like to welcome you today to our second of two hearings on the situation in Iraq. The first hearing, held in July, examined the serious threats faced by Iraq's non-Muslim religious communities, including ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Yazidis, Sabean Mandaeans, and Jews.
At today's hearing we will first examine the nature of the intra-Muslim conflict and the extent to which individual Muslims are being targeted for killings and other violence solely on account of their religious identity. Our second topic will be the refugee flows within and from Iraq, and the U.S. government's response to the refugee crisis.
This year, the Commission added Iraq to its Watch List of countries requiring close monitoring due to the nature and extent of violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by the government. We made the decision to place Iraq on our Watch List because of the alarming and deteriorating religious freedom conditions for all Iraqis. Despite ongoing efforts to stabilize the country, successive Iraqi governments have not curbed the scope and severity of human rights abuses. Instead, sectarian violence between Arab Sunni and Shi'a factions has become an increasing problem.
Although the Sunni-dominated insurgency and foreign jihadi groups are responsible for a substantial proportion of the sectarian violence and associated human rights abuses, the Iraqi government also bears responsibility for actions it engages in and for tolerating abuses committed by Shi'a militias with ties to political factions in the governing coalition. One of the issues we hope to address at our hearing today is the steps the U.S. government should consider to address the security and religious freedom challenges posed by the intra-Muslim violence.
The confluence of sectarian violence, religious discrimination, and other serious human rights violations has driven millions of Iraqis from their homes to seek refuge in the Nineveh plains in Northern Iraq, and in predominantly Kurdish regions, as well as in countries outside of Iraq. For the past few years, the Commission has drawn attention to the growing refugee crisis and continues to emphasize the plight of those fleeing religious violence in Iraq.
According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 4.2 million Iraqis have been displaced since the war began. Of that total, 2.2. million have fled to neighboring countries, the majority to Syria, which until earlier this month maintained an open border policy for Iraqis. Among the most vulnerable are members of religious minorities, the ChaldoAssyrians, Sabean Mandaeans, and Yazidis, who make up a disproportionately large number of refugees from Iraq. As many as 2 million people have been displaced within Iraq. In March 2007, UNHCR announced that Iraqis top the list of asylum seekers in western industrialized countries and that the number of Iraqi asylum claims increased by 77 percent in 2006. UNHCR has registered 170,000 Iraqi refugees and is on schedule to refer 20,000 for third country resettlement this year. It has referred more than 10,000 to the United States, though since the beginning of this year, only 700-900 Iraqi refugees have been resettled here.
Clearly, the rising sectarian violence and the associated Iraqi refugee crisis require heightened attention and more effective action by the U.S. government. I would like to point out here that the Commission added Iraq to its Watch List with the understanding that it may designate Iraq as a country of particular concern, or CPC, for severe religious freedom violations next year if improvements are not made by the Iraqi government.
Before we hear from our witnesses, let me just say a word about the structure of the hearing. There will be several panels that will address two broad subjects. We will begin our discussion about sectarian and religion-based violence with two distinguished witnesses. When that panel has concluded, we will turn to the situation for refugees in and outside Iraq, beginning first with Assistant Secretary of State Ellen Sauerbray from the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. After her panel, we will hear from a final panel of refugee experts, including the Assistant High Commissioner for Operations from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, to gain further insight into the growing refugee problem. At some point during our hearing, we will also hear from Senators Gordon Smith, Arlen Specter, and Representative Steve Israel.
You all have the witnesses' biographies in front of you so I will not repeat them to you here. Given the number of panels we hope to hear from today, we ask that the witnesses on each panel keep to their allotted time of seven minutes in order to allow adequate time for follow-up questions. All of the witnesses have been asked submit longer statements, which, together with transcripts of the hearing, will be posted on the Commission's Website.
February 08, 2008
Wednesday, September 19, 1:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 138
OBJECTIVES
Although observers have watched Iraq's cycle of sectarian violence with growing alarm, neither governments nor the media have considered the threat this violence poses to Freedom of Religion, Conscience and Belief. Scholars and policy makers have been similarly slow to investigate connections between religious identity, religiously-motivated atrocities and Iraq's burgeoning refugee crisis. This hearing will investigate both policy challenges, as well as trelationship between them.
Like the Commission's July hearing on Iraq's minority religious communities, this forum is the first of its kind. More significantly, the hearing provides Commissioners with an opportunity to highlight the importance of their recent refugee policy recommendations, many of which now appear in refugee reform legislation currently before Congress.
1:00 OPENING REMARKS
Mr. Michael Cromartie
Chair, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
1:05 PANEL I: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE
Dr. Kenneth Katzman
Senior Specialist in Middle East Affairs
Congressional Research Service
Dr. Judith Yaphe
Distinguished Research Fellow
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
1:45 PANEL II: U.S. REFUGEE POLICY
Hon. Ellen Sauerbrey
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State
Hon. Anne Convery
Acting Deputy Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development
2:30 PANEL III: IRAQ'S BURGEONING REFUGEE CRISIS
Ms. Judy Cheng-Hopkins
Assistant High Commissioner for Operations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Ms. Dana Graber Ladek
Iraq Displacement Specialist, International Organization for Migration (IOM)
3:30 CLOSE
February 08, 2008
Wednesday, September 19, 1:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 138
SUMMARY
The United States is taking measures to step up processing of Iraqi refugees, a senior State Department official told a hearing of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, but Members of Congress and a prominent international refugee organization said the U.S. government should be doing much more to respond to the refugee crisis and to address the sectarian violence that is one of its main engines.
The hearing on Sept. 19 was the second of two the Commission has held on Iraq. The first focused on the particular plight of Iraq's smallest religious minorities, while the second examined the nature and role of sectarian violence in Iraq and the much-criticized U.S. response to the greatest refugee crisis the world has seen in decades.
"The confluence of sectarian violence, religious discrimination, and other serious human rights violations has driven millions of Iraqis from their homes to seek refuge in the Nineveh plains in Northern Iraq, and in predominantly Kurdish regions, as well as in countries outside of Iraq," Commission Chair Michael Cromartie said. "For the past few years, the Commission has drawn attention to the growing refugee crisis and continues to emphasize the plight of those fleeing religious violence in Iraq."
Assistant Secretary of State Ellen R. Sauerbrey told the hearing that the United States had provided nearly $200 million this year to international organizations and non-governmental organizations to help Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Of about 10,000 Iraqis the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has referred to the United States, Washington has so far admitted 990 refugees during Fiscal Year 2007, Sauerbrey said. She predicted that the admission of Iraqis in the next fiscal year "will be substantially higher," with resettlement figures nearing 1,000 per month. Sauerbrey also said that at the same time as the hearing, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was announcing the appointment of a high-level advisor on Iraqi refugees. (Secretary Rice said that Ambassador James Foley would serve as the Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee Issues.)
Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA) called the issue of sectarian violence in Iraq "one of overwhelming importance," and said that it required far more attention from the U.S. government. He suggested that the United States do "a great deal more" to open up to Iraqi refugees, and that President George W. Bush should become more involved in addressing what he described as a "great humanitarian tragedy." "When he speaks on the problems in Iraq, it would be helpful, I think, to note the refugee problem," Specter told the Commissioners. Specter noted the magnitude of the refugee problem, saying that Iraq's neighbors were shouldering a great burden while the United States "has not been as open or forthcoming as the United States should be."
Sen. Gordon Smith (R-OR) also called for more action. "One of the tasks the United States needs to embrace more fully is the responsibility for the suffering of ordinary Iraqis," Smith said. "While we cannot necessarily treat the disease, we can help treat the symptoms." He highlighted S.1651, a bill he is co-sponsoring with Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), which would allow especially vulnerable Iraqi refugees, such as members of religious minority communities, to be admitted to the United States and to be processed inside Iraq. "America historically has an honorable record in alleviating the plight of refugees from its wars," Smith noted. "Whether our effort is by ourselves, with allies, with the international organizations, more clearly needs to be done."
Rep. Steve Israel (D-NY) said there was bipartisan support in Congress for addressing the plight of Iraqi refugees. "Our debate on the floor of the House has been a polarizing debate, but one of the areas where we can agree on, that we have agreed on, is addressing the refugee crisis in Iraq," Israel said. He voiced appreciation for the Commission's recommendation to expand access to the U.S. Refugee Program for all Iraqis and to extend the P-2 category-which allows certain groups of refugees direct access to the U.S. processing program without the need for referral by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)-to members of Iraq's religious minority communities, and said he and his colleagues were eager to work legislatively to implement the Commission's recommendations.
With some 2,000 refugees being displaced every day, the international community has not faced such a magnitude of displacement in the Middle East since 1948, said Judy Cheng-Hopkins, the UNHCR's Assistant High Commissioner for Operations. About 2.2 million people are displaced within Iraq, and another 2 million have taken refuge in neighboring countries or elsewhere outside Iraq; some 165,000 of these have registered requests with UNHCR for third-country resettlement. Cheng-Hopkins noted that Iraqi refugees now comprise about 10 percent of the populations of Jordan and Syria, and that one in four residents of the Syrian capital, Damascus, is an Iraqi who has fled his or her homeland. Joining Jordan and other countries in the region, beginning on October 15, Syria will implement entry visa requirements that will virtually shut off the escape routes for Iraqi refugees, she said. Inside Iraq, 11 of 18 governorates have already closed their borders to IDPs. In spite of the desperate needs, UNHCR has received funding pledges for only 33 percent of its current $129 million appeal supporting refugee education programs.
Dana Graber Ladek, the Iraq Displacement Specialist with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), discussed the IOM's assessment of the situation of more than 100,000 families that have been displaced within Iraq. As many as 88 percent of them have been forced to flee their homes because they were targeted due to their religious identity. In spite of the refugees' and IDPs' pressing need for basic food, shelter, and social services, IOM has so far received only 20 percent of the funds appealed for this year.
Dr. Kenneth Katzman, a specialist in Middle East affairs for the Congressional Research Service, drew the Commissioners' attention to increasing tension and conflict among Shi'as, with political factions and their associated militias openly competing for power in Baghdad and Southern Iraq. In Basra, Iraq's main oil-producing region, three Shi'a parties are now competing for control of the oil production and distribution infrastructure. Shi'a militias are enforcing growing Islamization in the South, including violent threats against non-conforming Muslims, and University professors deemed to be too secular. Speaking on intra-Muslim sectarian violence, Dr. Katzman acknowledged that the Iraqi Interior Ministry was thoroughly penetrated by members of the Badr Organization, and had been involved in targeted operations against Sunni civilians. Despite those past violations, however, the new Interior Minister has been working to reduce the influence of Shi'a militias within the Iraqi national police force, thanks largely to pressure from the U.S. government.
Dr. Judith Yaphe, a specialist in Middle Eastern political analysis at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), said that the disfunctionality of Iraq's government-stemming in part from a constitution intentionally written to ensure a weak central government-made it unable to achieve meaningful political reconciliation. "Until you have coherence in government and functioning systems, things won't improve," she said. Dr. Yaphe also acknowledged the penetration of Iraqi ministries by Shi'a militias, noting that this phenomenon was consistent with the Iraqi government's fractured structure and Prime Minister al-Malaki's weakness relative to the other Shi'a political factions within his coalition government. Yaphe concluded by describing the current cycle of sectarian violence as "a complicated set of civil wars and power struggles" implicating both ethnic and religious identity. "Iraqis are under constant siege from poverty, unemployment, a dysfunctional government, corrupt political leaders, and vicious militias determined to enforce their peculiar combination of sectarian purity and material aggrandizement," she observed.
After the first hearing, the Commission wrote a letter to Secretary Rice recommending heightened U.S. attention to the severe threat facing the smallest religious minorities in Iraq. The Commission's other recommendations on Iraq can be found in the 2007 Annual Report .
March 20, 2008
Wednesday, September 19, 1:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 138
OBJECTIVES
Although observers have watched Iraq's cycle of sectarian violence with growing alarm, neither governments nor the media have considered the threat this violence poses to Freedom of Religion, Conscience and Belief. Scholars and policy makers have been similarly slow to investigate connections between religious identity, religiously-motivated atrocities and Iraq's burgeoning refugee crisis. This hearing will investigate both policy challenges, as well as trelationship between them.
Like the Commission's July hearing on Iraq's minority religious communities, this forum is the first of its kind. More significantly, the hearing provides Commissioners with an opportunity to highlight the importance of their recent refugee policy recommendations, many of which now appear in refugee reform legislation currently before Congress.
1:00 OPENING REMARKS
Mr. Michael Cromartie
Chair, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
1:05 PANEL I: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE
Dr. Kenneth Katzman
Senior Specialist in Middle East Affairs
Congressional Research Service
Dr. Judith Yaphe
Distinguished Research Fellow
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
1:45 PANEL II: U.S. REFUGEE POLICY
Hon. Ellen Sauerbrey
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State
Hon. Anne Convery
Acting Deputy Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development
2:30 PANEL III: IRAQ'S BURGEONING REFUGEE CRISIS
Ms. Judy Cheng-Hopkins
Assistant High Commissioner for Operations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Ms. Dana Graber Ladek
Iraq Displacement Specialist, International Organization for Migration (IOM)
3:30 CLOSE
March 20, 2008
September 19, 2007
The Displacement Crisis
Iraq is experiencing the worst human displacement of its history, with over 2.2 million persons displaced within its borders and an additional two million who have fled the country to the surrounding region. This mass displacement is fast becoming a regional and ultimately international crisis.
Although there are many internally displaced persons (IDP) in Iraq displaced over the past several decades, since the 22 February 2006 bombing of the Samarra Al-Askari Mosque the primary driver of displacement has been sectarian violence. IOM assessments, which cover nearly 700,000 of an estimated 1,058,424 people displaced since February 2006, find that 88% of IDPs say they were targeted due to their religious/sectarian identity. General crime, lawlessness, and military operations are also factors producing displacement.
Although sectarian violence emphasizes religious identity, it is as much a political as it is a religious type of persecution. Religious identity is important because it is associated with power blocs that are competing for political and resource control.
Population Movement Patterns
The bulk of Iraqi displacement occurs from or within Baghdad: 69% of IDPs surveyed by IOM reported Baghdad as their place of origin. IOM assessments find that overall, Iraqi IDPs tend to move from mixed communities to religiously and ethnically homogenous communities: Shias tend to move southward, and Sunnis northward towards the central or upper-central governorates. Within large cities like Baghdad or Baquba, IDPs tend to move within the city to homogenous neighborhoods. Despite this larger trend, there are exceptions: in recent weeks, a large group of Sunni IDPs found refuge in a predominantly Shia neighborhood in Baghdad.
The religious profile of the displaced population reflects that of the country at large: 65% of those surveyed are Shia, 31% are Sunni, 4.4% are Christian, and other minority groups (Sabean Mandean and Yazidi) less than 1%. The vast majority (93%) of assessed IDPs are Arab, with 4% Assyrian, 2% Kurd, 1% Turkmen, and Chaldeans and Armenians less than 1%.
Many Iraqis who have the ability to leave the country are doing so, with the majority of them becoming refugees in neighboring Jordan and Syria. Both of these countries are planning to introduce visa plans that heavily restrict refugee entry. This, along with this year's increase in Iraqi local authorities' restrictions on inter-governorate movement within the country, is likely to force population flows into new areas as displacement continues.
The Humanitarian Assessment
The prolonged nature and increased scale of displacement has produced a serious humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Displacement deprives families of their income and resources, rendering them unable to provide for themselves in their new locations. Displacement also strains the host communities who share their services and resources with the displaced
SHELTER is a top priority need reported by IDPs. Of those IDPs assessed by IOM, 58% rent, 18% stay with a host family or relatives, and up to 25% live in camp or group settlements. As rent prices rise, savings run out, and the burden increases on host households, many IDPs are seeking more sustainable living arrangements. An increasing number of IDPs are living in settlements or camps, posing serious challenges for the short-term delivery of aid and longer-term implementation of durable solutions.
FOOD is also a top priority need reported by IDPs. Much of the Iraqi population depends upon the government's PDS rations, but there is a widespread lack of access to these distributions due to political manipulations, limited resources, logistical difficulties, and insecurity. IOM assessments find that the situation is especially dire among the displaced, with 81% of those assessed reporting no or intermittent access to PDS rations.
EMPLOYMENT is a key sector requiring long-term durable solutions. Much of the immediate IDP humanitarian need is due to loss of income during displacement, and the crisis may worsen as prolonged displacement exhausts the finances of those IDPs who so far have been able to support themselves. IOM assessments find that IDPs consider employment an extremely important priority need, since it will allow them to provide for themselves and begin to rebuild their lives.
HEALTH CARE has deteriorated greatly in Iraq due to the exodus of qualified professionals, a severe shortage of medication and equipment, and damage to medical facilities. Many of the displaced live in substandard conditions and lack basic services, increasing their risk of disease. IOM assessments find that 34% of IDPs cannot access required medications, and 12.4% have no access to health care.
WATER & SANITATION is a growing concern among many of the most vulnerable IDP and host community groups, particularly those in camps or neighborhoods where basic services are either non-existent or overwhelmed. Many IDPs rely on water trucking or host community generosity for water, while others have no potable water and drink from rivers or drainage ditches. Of those IDPs assessed by IOM, 16% reported that they do not have regular access to water.
EDUCATION is an important issue for IDPs, half of whom are under the age of 18. Host community schools are severely overcrowded due to the influx of IDP children, exacerbating social tensions. In IOM assessments, IDPs frequently manifest their education concerns by requesting both school rehabilitation/expansion projects and income generation schemes that will allow families to support themselves without keeping children home from school to work.
Meeting the Humanitarian Need
IOM is a lead organization in the delivery of emergency assistance and Community Assistance Projects (CAPs) within Iraq . In Iraq, IOM projects have reached 5 million beneficiaries since 2003; emergency distributions have reached 52,000 families since 22 February 2006. Despite security limitations, IOM has been able to deliver aid and implement projects throughout Iraq by coordinating closely with partners on the ground. The IOM IDP Monitoring & Needs Assessment Programme provides in-depth assessment data and analysis on Iraqi displacement, regularly disseminating reports that inform the humanitarian community and other stakeholders. The IOM Ministry of Migration and Displacement Capacity Building Programme works closely with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) to build its capacity and formulate Iraqi government policy toward migration issues
Although international awareness of the Iraqi displacement crisis has grown considerably in the past year, donors have been slow to respond and funding remains insufficient. IOM has received barely 20% of its $85 million funding appeal for 2007-2008. IOM has received $6 million from the U.S. government for 2007. Lack of funding remains the primary constraint on IOM's ability to reach beneficiaries.
The Way Forward
IOM assessments find that 55% of IDPs intend to return to their place of origin, 23% intend to integrate in their place of displacement, and 19% intend to resettle in a third location. As insecurity continues and communal divisions harden, increasing numbers of IDPs may settle permanently; however, the fact remains that the majority of the displaced intend to move again.
In this environment of continuing insecurity, humanitarian agencies must be able to meet the short-term emergency needs of extremely vulnerable Iraqis, while implementing durable solutions projects that assist IDPs in rebuilding their lives. Failure to do so will exacerbate the humanitarian dimension of a massive displacement crisis that is already guaranteed to have economic, social, and political reverberations in Iraq and the region for years to come.
March 20, 2008
September 19, 2007
Introduction
I would like to thank the Commission for the opportunity to appear before you on behalf of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR is charged by the international community to ensure refugee protection and to identify durable solutions to refugee situations.
Without doubt, the protection of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is one of the most critical challenges with which UNHCR is grappling today. An estimated 2.2 million persons are currently displaced inside Iraq while another 2 million have fled the country to become refugees in the surrounding region or elsewhere. Unfortunately, this flow does not seem to be dissipating; we estimate that some 2,000 refugees are forced from their homes each day by the violence that continues to plague their homeland.
Simply put, the international community has not faced this magnitude of displacement in the Middle East since 1948. In UNHCR's view, the international community should move in a robust way to provide support to the countries hosting Iraqi refugees and preserve the fragile protection space. In the absence of a concerted effort by regional governments, donor governments (including the United States), UNHCR and its implementing partners, the situation will likely erode even further, bringing new levels of displacement and deepening protection problems.
Number of Iraqis Affected and Impact
Numbers of Iraqi refugees and IDPs
The majority of Iraqi refugees who have sought protection outside of Iraq have fled to Syria and Jordan. Iraqis now represent almost 10 percent of the populations in Syria and Jordan, and in Damascus, one out every four people is an Iraqi refugee.
Impact
This influx of Iraqi refugees has resulted in a surge in demand, and consequently, a significant increase in the price of basic commodities. Power supplies in certain parts of Damascus have been unable to cope with demand, schools are overcrowded, and medical and health care facilities are exhausted. Prostitution among women and girls has increased; health problems have been exacerbated by lack of access to adequate care; trauma, anxiety, and other mental health problems are widespread; and women-headed households are common.
Iraqis are not permitted to work legally in their host countries, resulting in diminished assets and making survival more difficult. A recently completed survey in Damascus revealed that the overwhelming majority depend on some form of charity, and that 34 percent of Iraqis predict that they will run out of funds in the next month.
The strain caused by hosting large numbers of new arrivals has unfortunately led to border restrictions. Syria, which has been notably generous to Iraqis seeking protection, announced last week that Iraqis must obtain a visa before crossing the border. Jordan has also severely restricted access to those attempting to enter. Once the visa requirement for Syria is implemented (currently set for October 15), it will effectively mean that there is no longer a safe place, and no escape route, for Iraqis fleeing their country.
Internally displaced Iraqis are facing perhaps even more complex protection problems. Of those displaced since February 2006, approximately 70 percent are women and children. Many IDPs are denied registration, and therefore lack access to basic services, including subsidized food assistance, fuel, and basic protection.
Authorities in 11 governorates have imposed restrictions on IDP entry and residence, even for people of the same ethnic group, due to concerns about security, political considerations, or because social services are saturated and support from the central government is thin.
Increased restrictions on IDP movement and growing social and economic vulnerability have led to the establishment of makeshift IDP camps and spontaneous clusters of improvised shelters. It is estimated that about 20 percent of IDPs are now in such collective settlements, where conditions are in some cases slum-like. Major needs of camp residents include water and sanitation, adequate shelter, medical care, and security.
UNHCR Operations
Turning now to what UNHCR and its partners are doing to address the protection challenges Iraqis are confronting. At the start of 2007, UNHCR began a concerted effort to enhance its presence in the region in order to offer protection and assistance to Iraqi refugees. This effort has included implementation of a registration system in order to provide Iraqis in host countries with documentation, to identify those who are most vulnerable and to better address their needs.
Those identified as vulnerable may then be referred for resettlement to a third country such as the United States. To date, UNHCR has referred more than 14,000 individuals for resettlement, with more than 10,000 of these referred to the United States. UNHCR is responsible for the front end of the resettlement process, which is referrals to resettlement countries. Countries, like the US, then vet these cases under their own resettlement laws and procedures.
Operations Inside Iraq
The security situation inside of Iraq, particularly in the center and in the south, poses serious challenges to humanitarian work. UNHCR, like many other agencies, has been forced to adopt remote management and partnership arrangements to ensure the delivery of basic protection and assistance. We are attempting to support Iraqi authorities and local institutions at the provincial level and to establish humanitarian warehouses to support the delivery of emergency assistance. Assistance to Iraqi IDPs includes distribution of non-food items such as tents, blankets, mattresses, fuel, and cooking equipment.
Operations Outside Iraq
UNHCR has largely worked to support the existing infrastructures of host countries with an emphasis on education and health. This work has resulted in an agreement by the Jordanian government to allow Iraqi children to enroll in public schools, regardless of the residence status of their parents. This is considered a major breakthrough given Jordan's previous policy. Our objective now is to enroll 100,000 children in Syrian schools and 50,000 in Jordanian schools by the end of this academic year, in addition to the 60,000 already enrolled.
UNHCR has also established community centers in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon that provide emergency assistance, domestic violence counseling, services to address sexual violence, referrals for health and education assistance, and vocational and computer training.
Funding Appeals
A $123.7 million for assistance to refugees in Syria and Jordan and Iraqi IDPs, which includes a large health component.
A $129 million joint appeal with UNICEF to address education needs in host countries
The international community has contributed about 80 percent of the funding for the overall appeal. The education appeal, on the other hand, is funded at only 30 percent, funding which has been provided almost exclusively by the US.
Much more needs to be done as we expect that protection and assistance needs will continue to escalate. We appreciate the US government's generous contributions and look forward to working with our US counterparts in a concerted effort to ensure the safety and well-being of Iraqis affected by this crisis.