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March 20, 2008
September 19, 2007
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission, it is an honor to appear before you to discuss issues related to Iraqi refugees. What I want to do today is lay out what we have done, are doing and plan to do to protect vulnerable Iraqi refugees.
First, I want to give a baseline, and give a thumbnail sketch of where the Iraqi refugee situation is today. It is hard to get precise numbers in any refugee crisis, but it is estimated that slightly over four million Iraqis have been displaced from their homes.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees believes that of this number, roughly half, or two million, have left Iraq for other countries in the region. Half of the 165,000 who have registered with UNHCR have arrived in the past year.
Suddenly, Syria, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon find themselves playing host to a huge influx of Iraqis. Many of these Iraqi refugees are in serious need of shelter, health care, and education for their children.
Among this population of refugees, of course - and of special interest to your commission - are many members of religious minority groups, including Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, Sabeans and Yazidis.
Many of the Iraqis who have registered with the UNHCR in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey identify themselves as Christian. It is remarkable, for example, that the percentage of Iraqi refugees who have arrived in the US for resettlement who are is Christian is 62%. The situation of these refugees is especially tragic because of their long history in Iraq; many of these communities have been living in what is now Iraq for millennia.
Still, there is a lot of deliberation about whether religious minorities in Iraq have been targeted specifically because they are Christian or whether they are victims of overall sectarian violence. I must emphasize that the majority of displaced Iraqis are Sunni and Shia Muslims.
Whatever the religious affiliation of the displaced Iraqis, we are determined to help them, and have backed up our promises with robust programs in protection and resettlement.
The State Department bureau I head, the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, is involved in helping refugees and conflict victims all over the world. We do so through the United Nations, through the Red Cross, and through a network of respected American and international non-governmental organizations. We provide substantial funding to these groups, and monitor and evaluate how their programs benefit refugees and other vulnerable groups.
Our funding is in line with the longtime American approach to refugee assistance: our primary goal is to protect the refugees in the places where they have sought safety and to promote a political solution that will allow them to return to their home country.
The large-scale displacement of Iraqis began in May, 2006, after the bombing of the Samara mosque in February of that year. As public disorder increased, so did the number of Iraqis fleeing their homes. We are fully engaged in an effort to support the Iraqi government's political reconciliation process. Our top priority is a peaceful Iraq, in which citizens of all religions and ethnicities can live together free of sectarian violence and terrorism.
Only this kind of agreement, which will lead to a peaceful and multi-ethnic state, will allow Iraqis to rebuild their country. Only this kind of agreement will lead to an Iraq to which refugees can return safely, and voluntarily, in confidence that they and their families will be secure in the long term.
For now, however, many Iraqis still believe it is unsafe to return to Iraq. For this population we have been working hard to provide help in the fields of education, health and emergency relief. In 2007 the U.S. government has made available nearly $200 million to international organizations and non-governmental organizations, and other governments to relieve the suffering of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons.
Let me give you some numbers that illustrate the scope and depth of our commitment. I will focus my remarks on assistance to refugees, but will mention some aspects of our work that also help internally displaced Iraqis.
This year, the United States has given $37 million to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Special Iraq Appeal. The money raised by this appeal has been used to register over 165,000 Iraqis as refugees and to provide food and other assistance to 100,000 of this group. This money also funded UNHCR's assistance to 300,000 internally displaced people as well as to 45,000 non-Iraqi refugees who remain inside Iraq. No other country gave more to this appeal.
On my March trip to Syria and Jordan I was alarmed to find so many Iraqi kids were not attending school. This was a looming disaster for the future of Iraq. The United States government urged UNHCR and UNICEF to launch a joint education appeal and helped to persuade the government of Jordan to admit Iraqi students to its public schools.
On my recent trip to Turkey and Jordan I announced the first part of our contribution to that appeal, at a girls' school that has recently opened its doors fully to Iraqi students. Twenty percent of the student body is Iraqi and for some of these students it was the first time they were at school in two years. Our contribution to the appeal is now at $39 million, and the money is enabling Jordanian and Syrian to expand, to hire extra teachers, and to set up specialized training programs.
Over 370,000 Iraqis in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are being helped by the nearly $19 million we have contributed to ten non-governmental organizations that provide health care, education and emergency humanitarian assistance to displaced Iraqi refugees in those countries.
Most of these groups have worked in the region a very long time, and have the expertise to get help to the refugees quickly. For instance, in Syria and Lebanon, Catholic Relief Services provide emergency humanitarian assistance to those in need: refugee families receive mattresses, blankets, clothes and heaters. In Syria, CRS and the International Catholic Migration Commission enable Iraqi refugees to find and pay for medical treatment, and offer remedial education courses for Iraqi children.
Finally, the U.S. government has given over $10 million directly to the Government of Jordan so it can reinforce ongoing health and education programs in communities that have seen a large wave of arrivals from Iraq. In this way schools, clinics and housing offices in Jordan are getting extra funding from us to pay for the large increase in their client or student base.
At our urging, UNHCR, our embassy and some designated NGOs are referring refugees to our admissions program. Resettlement is our option of last resort, the course we take when it is unlikely a refugee will be able to return safely to his or her home country even if conditions for others improve, and for whom integrating into host communities is not a possibility.
Many of the Iraqis whom we have resettled, or who are in the midst of being considered for resettlement, belong to especially vulnerable populations, such as religious minorities or former employees of the US government.
Resettlement is a complex process. Many U.S. government agencies play significant roles: the bureau I head and the Bureau of Consular Affairs in the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Health and Human Services. Outside the government, we work with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to ensure that we are considering the most suitable cases for resettlement.
We contract with international and non-governmental organizations such as the International Organization for Migration, or the International Catholic Migration Conference, to establish what are called Overseas Processing Entities. Staff of these organizations interview refugee applicants and prepare the necessary paperwork which is reviewed and used during the refugee case adjudication by officials from the Department of Homeland Security.
When I was in Jordan I sat through refugee interviews conducted by the Overseas Processing Entity in Amman, and another interview by the Department of Homeland Security. New, post-9/11 security concerns mean that the process takes longer than it used to. For example, each DHS interview in Jordan lasted for approximately four hours.
We work, at a diplomatic level, with the foreign governments in countries that are hosting Iraqi refugees. Finally, in the U.S. we work with our resettlement agency partners who help refugees adjust to life in the United States, and with the Department of Health and Human Services, which provides further assistance.
For the Iraqi refugee situation, when we began expanding access to resettlement this spring, we had to create the infrastructure from scratch. We had no refugee processing presence in Syria or in Jordan, the primary destination countries for Iraqi refugees. Likewise, the registration and referrals capacity of the small UNHCR offices in these countries needed to be expanded to deal with the increased demand.
Despite the challenges of rapidly establishing and launching the process in various locations, the U.S. has, to date, admitted 990 refugees this fiscal year and this number will increase considerably by the end of the month. Iraqi admissions in FY 2008 will be substantially higher.
One lesson we learned after 9/11 is that any program that allows people to enter our country must guard against terrorist infiltration. That's why we have acted to ensure the integrity of our refugee program by establishing a rigorous security vetting protocol. Those procedures help screen out potential security risks while at the same time offering sanctuary to Iraqi refugees who deserve our country's protection.
We are also dealing with external obstacles, such as the fact that Syria has refused to provide visas to DHS officials, who are necessary to enter Syria to conduct the necessary interviews with candidates for refugee resettlement. In some countries, getting exit visas for Iraqis who have arrived as refugees has been time-consuming.
Despite the challenges, we have a moral obligation to protect Iraqi refugees, particularly those who belong to persecuted religious minorities, as well as those who have worked closely with the United States government since the fall of Saddam Hussein. It is inspiring for me to visit refugee families who have resettled here in the U.S., and see how quickly they have adapted to their new surroundings. I plan to visit resettled Iraqis next month to monitor this aspect of our resettlement program.
Among the U.S. agencies providing services to refugees arriving in their new home are six faith-based groups, representing various Catholic, Protestant and Jewish organizations.
In closing, I would like to say that we are committed to helping refugees get the protection they need. We will continue to give generously to UN and other international and NGO efforts to help displaced Iraqis. The Administration's top priority, of course, remains promoting a more stable, and peaceful Iraq. Most of the Iraqi refugees I talk to want, most of all, to return home. We owe it to them to do everything we can to make that possible.
March 20, 2008
September 19, 2007
Research Memo
Can the U.S. Influence Political Progress in Iraq?
*Judith S. Yaphe
Summary:
Regardless of the debate over the success or failure of the military surge in Iraq, Americans and Iraqis agree on one key point: military operations alone are insufficient to quell the insurgencies and keep Iraq intact. A political surge is essential, and it can only be delivered by Iraqis. Yet, as the military surge reaches its peak and despite U.S. pressure to enact benchmark legislation, the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continues to fail to show progress toward a political solution. If the political stalemate in Baghdad were not enough, Iraq in the months ahead will face three other potentially explosive political events: provincial elections, a controversial census, and a referendum to determine who will govern Kirkuk.
What can the U.S. do to restore confidence in its ability to end the violence and regain a level of cooperation? More to the point, what can the U.S. do to bolster confidence in the central government in Baghdad, shore up its sagging influence, and enhance its ability to establish and maintain a stable, secure, and inclusive Iraq, despite sagging U.S. influence? The U.S. can:
• Continue to support the elected government in Baghdad and help it act decisively to establish its authority through a consensual exercise of power. Reward progress made on key issues of inclusivity (rolling back De-Ba'thification measures), expanding military capabilities, and progress in repairing and exploiting Iraq's energy resources. Criticism from Washington will not strengthen Maliki's hand or enhance the ability of his government to act. Efforts to destabilize the elected government, even if it is unpopular with Iraqis and Americans, or to encourage regime change by unconstitutional means will drive a further wedge between the U.S. and Iraq. Miscalculation of America's ability to influence Baghdad could push the Maliki government-or its successor-into the arms of Tehran. Similarly, over-confidence on Iran's part of its influence in Iraq could tilt public and official opinion to favor U.S. support.
• Encourage political reform and not regime change. Iraq needs a more inclusive political system and national reconciliation, but demanding that the government create these by fiat will not work. Encouraging electoral reform could achieve this goal. The current electoral process of national lists and a nation-wide election only strengthens sectarian and ethnic factionalism. Provincial elections and electoral districts based on geography should produce candidates from local communities and responsible to them.
• Use the uncertain outcome of U.S. elections in 2008 and prospect of a precipitous drawdown of forces to underscore the need for political progress. Make clear to Iraqis that we are serious about long-term withdrawal and that our policy is not dependent of the status of the insurgencies in Iraq; it is based on protecting our national interests.
• Engage Iraq's neighbors in supporting the government in Baghdad. This includes talks with Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia on the mutual need for a secure and united Iraq and the need to limit foreign intervention.
Background
With the collapse of the Ba'thist government in 2003, the United States appeared to be in a position to shape the country's political direction and establish a civil society. Iraq had no history of sectarian warfare but it had a long tradition of political violence. At first, communal unease was masked by the need of Kurd and Arab, Sunni and Shi'a to establish bases of power and lines of authority in the nascent political process. Despite efforts by Sunni extremists and renegade Ba'thists to provoke violence and civil war, Iraq was able to avoid religiously motivated communal warfare. At that moment, America's ability to influence nation-building and create a more equitable and secure country was at its greatest.
The moment was brief. As American leverage over Iraq's political future waned, Iraqi factions that had been long isolated and excluded from power assumed dominant roles in the succeeding provisional governments and proceeded to deconstruct Iraqi politics, society, and security. Iraq today is a country divided by competing identities and loyalties. Some Iraqis find their primary identity in their ethnic origins-Kurds seeking to right historic wrongs through maximalist demands for territory and wealth, Arabs and Turkmen trying in response to defend their own rights to land and resources. Others identify themselves primarily according to religious sect-Sunnis trying to re-establish their historical political dominance, Shi'a determined to enjoy their new-found status as the majority group in a newly democratic country.
Iraq is not in the midst of a single insurgency focused simply on ending American occupation, nor is it enmeshed in a sectarian civil war in which one clearly defined religious faction makes war on another over doctrinal differences. Instead, struggles over national identity and political power lie at the heart of the issue. Iraq is experiencing a complicated set of civil wars and power struggles over conflicting visions of identity and reality. Much of the political conflict and social violence is waged in sectarian terms, but under the façade of religion Shi'a are fighting Shi'a, Sunnis are battling Sunnis, Sunni Turkmen are fighting Shi'a Turkmen, and criminals and opportunists are using the instability to enrich themselves and empower warlords. The parties to the struggle are tribal leaders, militia chiefs, politicized clerics, former government and military officials, Mafia-style warlords, criminals, and individuals who spent long years in exile.
In the midst of this multi-faceted conflict, Iraqis are under constant siege from poverty, unemployment, a dysfunctional government, corrupt political leaders, and vicious militias determined to enforce their peculiar combination of sectarian purity and material self-aggrandizement. At the same time, the Maliki government is under pressure from the U.S. government and politicians to show progress on U.S.-established political benchmarks, including revision of the Constitution and enactment of laws on control of the country's oil resources, de-Ba'thification, and national reconciliation. The problem is that the political system upon which all these demands are being levied has not yet completed the painful process upon which the country embarked in April 2003: the establishment of a new modus operandi for the governance of Iraq based on a lowest common denominator vision of what kind of country Iraq is going to be. Instead, more than four years after the collapse of Saddam Husayn's regime, all the key contenders are still battling for power in much the same way that Saddam did.
As a result, the Shi'a factions that dominate the government in Baghdad and their Kurdish allies continue to balk at making political concessions that could undermine their new-found positions of power. This includes refusal to adopt inclusive political practices or end the broad application of de-Ba'thification laws. Rather than creating accountable ministries staffed by apolitical technocrats and experts, they find it necessary to ensure control by embedding family, friends, and clients in powerful (and lucrative) posts. While they have promised cooperation with American and coalition forces in the war on al-Qaida and other terrorist elements, in reality they define "terrorists" as their political or tribal opponents and the militias those opponents control.
Why has the Political Surge Failed?
Iraq's political leaders' have welcomed the military surge. However, they resent what they view to be unwarranted intrusion into sovereign political issues. For these Iraqis, the U.S. debate over when-not if-the U.S. should withdraw and benchmarks Iraq's National Assembly must pass, are intrusive, interventionist, and relevant only for American political consumption, not to the life-or-death struggle for power in Iraq. The resentment is fueling tensions between Iraqis and Americans and further undermining U.S. influence in Iraq and the region. No amount of U.S. pressure seems capable of influencing Iraqi political leaders, who are more absorbed with struggling for political power and local control than with pleasing the United States.
The lack of progress has other sources. Part lies in the newly invented political system and its constitution, which was crafted in haste in 2005. Political authority was decentralized, national power was limited, and provincial, sectarian, and ethnic interests consolidated. Identity shaped by a strong sense of ethnicity, religious sect, and victimization define loyalty for many in Iraq. Part of the problem lies in the politicians and factions trying to assert control over territory, people, and wealth. Their self-absorption has left the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki unable to curb sectarian strife, establish a modicum of security, win political consensus on any issue, or deliver the goods and services desperately needed by the Iraqi people.
And, part of the problem lies in the engrained resentment in Baghdad over U.S. efforts to direct political decisions and security operations. Occupied by Turks, British, and Americans, Iraqis resent foreign intervention in their politics. Moreover, U.S. failure to meet Iraqi expectations that it would deliver everything from democratic institutions to jobs, foreign investment, electricity, and peace caused many Iraqis to lose confidence in American intentions and capabilities.
What Could Change This Picture?
Iraq may be at risk of failing as a state, but it is not there yet. Nor do Iraq's new political elites have any interest in committing national suicide. What could restore their willingness to cooperate and a modicum of confidence in the United States, and boost its influence.
• Success of local tribal and community leaders against al-Qaida. The trend of tribal and other leaders within the Sunni Arab community turning against the terrorist elements with which they had previously been allied began in predominantly Sunni Anbar with the support of U.S. forces and is apparently spreading towards Baghdad. The United States should not take this tribal cooperation with American forces for granted; it does not signify Sunni Arab acceptance of the legitimacy of the government in Baghdad, nor should it be interpreted as new-found loyalty to the U.S. It does, however, demonstrate how readily self-interest can alter what may appear at first glance to be alliances of principle.
• Coming leadership changes. The leader of the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI), Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, is gravely ill with lung cancer. His organization is officially being guided by one of his sons, but the real power is likely to be a technocrat highly regarded in the West, Adil Abd al-Mahdi. Adil is not a cleric and is reportedly unpopular with the rank-and-file of the ISCI, but he is apparently an effective organizer and may be able to put together a more coherent and less combative organization. Similarly, Jalal Talabani, President of Iraq and leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, has been hospitalized in Jordan and the U.S. this year with unspecified ailments. Talabani is in his 70s and showing his age after long years of combating both Saddam Husayn and his primary rival for leadership of the Kurdish community, Kurdistan Regional Government President and Kurdish Democratic Party head Masoud Barzani. The two Kurdish factions are still negotiating the unification of their organizations and militias, and the rising generation of Kurdish leaders may be willing to challenge the autocratic control wielded by these powerful warlords over the Kurdish economy, politics, and civil society. It is possible that an opening up of the political system within Iraqi Kurdistan could lead to a reexamination of long-unchallenged assumptions about how the Kurds' relate to the rest of Iraq-for better or worse.
• Shifting political alliances. In recent months several prominent Iraqi leaders have attempted to create political alliances that cross sectarian lines. For example, Iyad Allawi, a secular Shi'a and ex-Ba'thist who headed the second provisional government and now controls 25 seats in the National Assembly, has been trying to rebuild his organization by appealing to both secular Iraqis and religious Iraqis who prefer a secular government. Allawi is a well-known quantity admired for his decisiveness and courage, but he is also seen as corrupt and criticized for being too close to the U.S. More significantly, Muqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shi'a cleric who heads the Sadr Movement and the Mahdi militia, has begun trying to broaden his appeal, inviting religious Sunnis and Christians under the protective umbrella of his movement. Sadr's attraction has two sources: first, the effective social and humanitarian programs that he runs, which benefit a large number of poor Shi'a, especially in Baghdad, and second, the ability of his Mahdi army to retaliate against Sunni extremists and protect Shi'a neighborhoods. Some Iraqis believe Sadr's goal is to be the Spiritual Guide of Iraq seated in the shrine city of Najaf, a position paralleling that of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, a political ayatollah who (like Muqtada) lacks authentic religious credentials.
• Kurdish maneuvering. Iraq's Kurdish factions have been ominously quiet while Sunni and Shi'a extremists-both Arab-fight each other for power in the name of Islam. The Kurds are determined to gain Kirkuk by the end of this year by de-Arabizing the city and then holding a referendum that will approve Kurdish control. Turkey would like the referendum postponed while it considers the potential impact that an expanded Kurdish regional authority virtually independent of Iraq might have on its own Kurdish population. Iraq's Kurds, however, may be crafting another dramatic political shift. Representatives of some Kurdish factions claim their leaders are considering changing loyalties and allegiances from Baghdad to Ankara. It is unclear what arrangements Kurdish leaders may be considering, and it is equally unclear what benefit Ankara would perceive in allying with Iraq's Kurds. Such a move might arguably provide short-term solutions to Kurdish-Arab power struggles in Iraq and to Turkey's problems with anti-Turkish Kurdish terrorists (the PKK) operating from safe havens in northern Iraq, but Turkish leaders would seem far more likely to see it as increasing separatist tendencies among Turkish Kurds rather than easing them.
What Can the U.S. Do?
There is little consensus between policy advocates in either the United States or Iraq on what can or cannot work in Iraq. Some policy analysts argue that the U.S. should abandon a strategy based on maintaining the central government in Baghdad for a province-centric, locally-based strategy that focuses on building local community capacity rather than strengthening central government authority. Others urge re-inventing a strong, central governing authority in Baghdad rather than relying on a weak, decentralized political system that lacks the authority or will to act in defense of the nation.
Another debate focuses on the question of whether the United States should continue to work with Iraq's elected government, cultivate new alliances with tribes or factions that are security-focused and anti-Iranian, or support replacement of Maliki's government. A policy of cultivating new allies raises a number of practical questions: Who can the U.S. trust? How do you win over these new allies? Do you arm them and assist them in their inter-tribal, clan, ethnic or sectarian battles? Will tilting towards specific groups because of their sectarian identification or mutual antipathy for Iran help or harm the U.S. in the longer term? Can one buy a tribe or only rent one? On the other hand, continuing to work through the elected central government, regardless of who leads it, implies U.S. confidence that the government and a new Iraqi army can rise to defend the interests of Iraq as a whole and not just those of a sectarian or ethnic subset of the Iraqi people. Is the creation of such a government and force, with the necessary public credibility, possible? Not in the short term. Creation of a democratic culture and a government and armed forces willing to act constitutionally takes time and training. The decisions and actions of Iraq's current leaders reflect their long years as leaders of opposition movements in exile rather than their brief roles as politicians in the brief years since Saddam's long and violent rule ended.
While outsiders debate the next stages of U.S. policy in Iraq, the insurgencies continue and local sectarian and ethnic leaders and their militias grow in influence and strength. The U.S. by itself lacks the resources necessary to build national political, military and security institutions and economic infrastructure and at the same time invest in local neighborhood and community-building. Iraq needs technical experts in economic reconstruction, agriculture, and a wide range of skills to support the reconstruction efforts already underway in many regions. To sustain these efforts and initiate new programs aimed at building security, the U.S. will need to enlist the resources of the international community as well as the skills of Iraq's diverse populations. One thing is clear. The U.S. will not again enjoy the kind of confidence or influence it possessed in the first days after Iraq's liberation. It will need to pick its way carefully through the dangerous zones of Iraqi politics and security. U.S. political and military leaders need to:
• Continue to support the elected government in Baghdad and help it act decisively to establish its authority through a consensual exercise of power. We need to reward positive behavior-passage of de-Ba'thification which can lead to greater political and security inclusiveness, success in military training and expanded Iraqi operations, and oil legislation. U.S. talks with Iran may help strengthen the ability of the Maliki government or its successor, to move forward on decision making in critical areas, but the U.S. must be careful not to present such any agreement as collusion by external actors to dictate Iraq's future. Even the appearance of acceding to demands from Washington or Tehran could undermine whatever base of support Maliki has now. The Iraqi government must walk a fine line between its dependence on support from the U.S. and Iran to deliver services or security to the Iraqi people and its vulnerability to charges from all sides of being too acquiescent to either American or Iranian influence. U.S. efforts to manipulate the government or realign political factions will weaken the elected government without either enhancing American credibility or introducing a more effective replacement regime.
• Encourage political reform. Demanding transparent governance, strict accountability, and the passage of specific kinds of legislation without reforming the electoral system will only increase resentment of the U.S. and undermine the legitimacy of the elected government. Iraqis talk about needing the rule of law, which the U.S. represents in theory, but they first need the kind of security and protection that creates an environment able to sustain the rule of law in practice and the experience of government change through democratic, legitimate means. The U.S. should encourage holding provincial elections as called for in Iraq's constitution and shifting from the current list-based, nation-wide system, which reinforces sectarian and ethnic-based lists, to geographically defined districts. This way, candidates known to the electorate, directly elected by them, and responsible to them may encourage the emergence of local-based leaders representing Iraq's diverse groups. The result could be the rise of new political players who enjoy bona fide popular legitimacy, have the local political bases to govern more effectively, and who ultimately can present a constructive challenge to the factions currently holding national politics hostage to personal pique.
• Carefully prioritize demands on a fragile government in Baghdad-is it in American or Iraqi interests to hold Baghdad hostage to demands that it pass legislation on oil or de-Ba'thification, for example, if doing so ensures the total collapse of the current government?
• Emphasize political affiliation over ethnic or sectarian identity. Deal with Iraqi political players in terms of parties and factions, and not as ethnic or sectarian blocs. Emphasizing sectarian or ethnic identity reinforces separateness rather than encouraging inclusion.
• Urge an end to bickering over which party or faction ‘owns' which post or ministry and to awarding positions to family, friends and clients rather than to technocrats and experts. In particular, urge the removal of the most offensive and extreme appointees in the Defense, Interior and Intelligence Ministries. Finding replacements for them and the militias embedded in these ministries will be difficult but is necessary before Iraqis can look to their own rather than to the U.S. for protection and justice.
• Avoid picking sides in Iraq's internal political battles or personalizing confrontations with tribal, sectarian, or ethnic leaders. A strategy that tilts towards seemingly compliant Sunni Arab tribes and leaders today could produce unintended consequences tomorrow, such as the creation of a new, well-armed militia focused on attacking Americans rather than al-Qaida terrorists or Iranian elements. On the other hand, today's rogue may be tomorrow's key to resolving a security or political dilemma.
• Continue efforts to create a national military force. Emphasize recruitment from all sectors of the population, provide training in military tactics and civil-military relations, and provide the means for the Iraqis to defend themselves against well-armed insurgents. Iraq's neighbors can have no role in this critical task-all are seen as having more interest in a militarily and politically weak Iraq than in an Iraq able to defend itself. And all are probably planning their actions once the U.S. withdraws.
• Use the uncertain outcome of U.S. elections in 2008 and prospect of a precipitous drawdown of forces to underscore the need for progress in Iraqi governance, national reconciliation, and security operations. The withdrawal card may be our strongest lever. This might pressure a recalcitrant central government and self-absorbed allies, such as the Kurds, to cooperate. None of the key players wants immediate U.S. withdrawal. Fear and mistrust of "the other" (Kurd of Arab, Shi'a of Sunni, Sunni Arab of everyone) outweigh opposition to the U.S. presence, although few Iraqis would admit this openly. Make clear to Iraqis that we are serious about long-term withdrawal and that our policy is not dependent of the status of the insurgencies in Iraq; it is based on protecting our national interests.
• Try to engage Iraq's neighbors to take positive measures to assist the Iraqis in securing their borders and blocking the transit of terrorist recruits and money to stoke the insurgencies in Iraq. The neighbors, for now, are part of the problem. Gulf Arabs claim former Iraqi Ba'thists and Sunni Arab extremists living in the Gulf are given safe haven and in some cases citizenship, serve in local police and security services, and facilitate the transfer of assistance from individuals in those countries to Sunni extremists in Iraq. Their recruitment of young men for Sunni insurgent operations in Iraq and collection of money allegedly has the tacit support of the ruling Sunni families in several Gulf countries. None of the Gulf governments appears to have much interest in an Iraq led by non-Sunnis or non-Arabs, although all would deny it.
A Cautionary Note
Iraqis warn that a U.S. military withdrawal, especially a precipitous one, will create a security vacuum that religious extremists, terrorists, and possibly some neighbors will rush in to fill. Their neighbors agree that the result will be a worse chaos than has been witnessed to date. They say anticipation of a U.S military withdrawal is already encouraging Iraqi factions, militias, and terrorists to prepare for the day after we leave.
Effective governance may still be possible. As Iraqi politics and politicians mature, they may see the benefits to be gained from thinking nationally, and not merely factionally. While the major groups-Kurds, Shi'a factions, and Sunni parties-issue demands they characterize as non-negotiable, these may in fact be maximalist bargaining positions. There may yet be room for compromise, even over the critical issues of oil exploitation and revenue distribution, federalism, and the role of Islam in governance. The fate of Kirkuk and the repeal of the de-Ba'thification law appear more problematic, but even in these areas there have been signs of willingness to compromise on the margins and where factional interests overlap.
True integration of the armed forces is probably not yet feasible. Popular perceptions of an ethnically and religiously mixed military are highly polarized. Sunnis see the army as a Shi'a dominated, illegitimate occupying force, while Shi'a Arabs and Kurds profess fear if alleged ex-Ba'thists (meaning Sunni Arab officers who served in Saddam's army) return. Iraqis say they prefer regional militias under local control, but local control is an ambiguous concept in regions where mixed populations live and ethnic cleansing conducted by militias in uniform is a reality. There is little public confidence in the Interior and Intelligence Ministries or the police, all of which are militia-led and uncontrollable. Given the violence perpetrated by Shi'a militias in police uniforms, Sunnis in military leadership positions, and the factional infighting in the Interior and Intelligence Ministries, it is difficult to predict when and how these instruments of national power can gain legitimacy and respect. Equally worrisome are indications that officers and civilians trained in or by the U.S. are being marginalized and, in some cases, purged from the Defense Ministry.
Iraq is at a defining moment in its history. Can this state, which was created by imperial artifice after World War I, survive its multiple and overlapping insurgencies, the conflicting visions of what it means to be Iraqi, and the competing egos of its new political leaders? How these contradictions are resolved will determine whether Iraq hangs together as a single state, finds a relatively peaceful equilibrium in what some call a "soft partition," or violently collapses at the cost of the ultimate destruction of the Iraqi state and identity.
* Dr. Yaphe is Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Observations and analysis in this memo are hers and do not reflect the views of the University, the Department of Defense, or any other government agency.
December 17, 2008
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UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
PRESS CONFERENCE ON RELEASE OF USCIRF REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS IN IRAQ
WELCOME AND MODERATOR:
FELICE GAER,
CHAIR, USCIRF
SPEAKERS:
REPRESENTATIVE FRANK WOLF (R-VA)
MICHAEL CROMARTIE,
VICE CHAIR, USCIRF
ELIZABETH PRODROMOU,
VICE CHAIR, USCIRF
DON ARGUE,
COMMISSIONER, USCIRF
IMAM TALAL Y. EID,
COMMISSIONER, USCIRF
RICHARD D. LAND,
COMMISSIONER, USCIRF
NINA SHEA,
COMMISSIONER, USCIRF
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 2008
Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
FELICE GAER: Good morning. My name is Felice Gaer; I'm chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. I'm joined this morning by fellow commissioners and I'll introduce you to them in just a moment. First of all, thank you for coming to this press conference in religious-freedom violations in Iraq. We are presenting you today with the conclusions of the United States Commission Policy Focus on Iraq. Joining me from this end of the table is Commissioner Nina Shea, Commissioner Richard Land, Commissioner and Vice Chair Elizabeth Prodromou and on this side Commissioner and Vice Chair Michael Cromartie, Commissioner Talal Eid and Commissioner Don Argue.
We expect Representative Frank Wolf, co-chair of the congressional human rights Tom Lantos Commission to be joining us this morning. We have also received statements from Representative Chris Van Hollen, Senator Ben Cardin, Alcee Hastings, and the co-chairs of the Helsinki Commission; those are outside and you'll have copies of them there as well as Senator Carl Levin. We want to thank Congressman Anna Eshoo, who helped arrange our presence in this room and who had testified at an earlier commission hearing.
Today the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom is recommending that Iraq be designated as a country of particular concern under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. In light of ongoing, severe abuses of religious freedom and the Iraqi government's toleration of these abuses, particularly abuses against Iraq's smallest, most vulnerable religious minorities. The lack of effective government action to protect these communities from abuses has established Iraq among the most dangerous places on Earth for religious minorities. This point was driven home once again this past weekend when seven members of a Yazidi family were gunned down in their home in northern Iraq.
The commission's policy recommendations to the United States government are contained in this report. They are voluminous, they are detailed, but they boil down to a pretty straightforward message: The United States must keep religious freedom and other fundamental human rights high on the agenda as it develops and implements policies to help Iraq and the entire Gulf region achieve stability and security. As we work with other governments we must never lose sight of the impact of these U.S. policies on people, on human rights, on religious freedom. I'd like to turn the floor over to my fellow commissioners, who will highlight various different recommendations. They'll introduce themselves before they speak; afterwards we'll be happy to answer your questions when Congressman Wolf comes in we will also give the floor to him at some point. So we begin with Commissioner Nina Shea.
NINA SHEA: Good morning. Thank you, Madam Chair. The situation is especially dire for Iraq's smallest religious minorities, including Chaldo-Assyrian and other Christians; Sabean, Mandeans and Yazidis. These groups do not have militia or tribal structures to protect them and do not receive adequate official protection. Their members continue to experience targeted violence and to flee to other areas within Iraq or other countries, where the minorities represent a disproportionately high percentage among Iraqi refugees. The commission has a number of recommendations aimed at making the prevention of abuses against religious minorities a high foreign-policy priority.
We are asking the U.S. government to urge the Iraqi government to replace existing prime minister's minorities committee with one that is independent and includes representatives of all of Iraqi's ethnic and religious minority communities who are selected by the communities themselves, to work with minority communities and their representatives to develop measures to implement Article 125 of the Iraqi constitution, which guarantees, quote, "the administrative, political, cultural and educational rights of the various nationalities, such as Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians and all the other constituents," end of quote, in Nineveh and other areas where these groups are concentrated; to direct the ministry of human rights to investigate and issue a public report on the abuses against and the marginalization of Iraq's minority communities and making recommendations to address such abuses.
And to enact constitutional amendments to strengthen human-rights guarantees in the Iraqi constitution, including by: one, clarifying sub-clause B in Article II that no law may contradict the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this constitution, quote, unquote, "to make clear that these rights and freedoms include the principle of equality and non-discrimination and the human rights guaranteed under international agreements to which Iraq is a state party. And two: deleting sub-clause A in Article II that no law may contradict, quote, "the established provisions of Islam," end of quote, because it heightens sectarian tensions over which interpretation of Islam prevails and improperly makes theological interpretations into constitutional questions. And three: revising Article II's guarantee of the, quote, "Islamic identity of the majority," end of quote, to make certain that this identity is not used to justify violations of the individual right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief under international law.
MS. GAER: Thank you very much. (Inaudible.)
ELIZABETH PRODROMOU: Our concerns about religious-freedom conditions in Iraq of course extend beyond the country's smallest minorities. There has been some reconciliation between Shia and Sunni Iraqis since we last issued - we issued our last report in May of 2007 - but concerns remain regarding attacks and the tense relations between these two groups. Indeed, considerable progress remains to be made regarding the elimination of remaining sectarianism in the Iraqi government and in the Iraqi security forces and there also needs to be progress towards reducing sectarian violence and human-rights abuses across Sunni-Shia lines.
Now, towards these goals, our commission calls on the U.S. government to urge Baghdad, number one, to ensure that the Iraqi government revenues are neither directed toward not indirectly support any militia, any para-state actor or any other organization that's credibly charged with involvement in severe human rights abuses; number two, to suspend immediately any government personnel charged with engagement in sectarian violence and other human rights abuses; number three, to undertake transparent and effective investigations of such charges and to bring the perpetrators to justice; and number four, to continue the process of ensuring greater integration across communal lines in the government and in the security forces so that they better reflect the religious diversity of the country as a whole.
We also finally call on our government in Washington to continue to speak out at the highest levels to condemn religiously motivated violence by both Shia and Sunni groups in Iraq, including violence targeting women and likewise, to condemn efforts by local officials and extremist groups in Iraq to enforce religious law in violation of the Iraqi constitution and in violation of international human rights standards.
MS. GAER: Thank you very much.
We're going to interrupt our presentation and invite Congressman Frank Wolf to the podium. Congressman Wolf, as I - I already introduced you, Congressman, as one of the co-chairs of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission and one of the stalwarts of human rights and religious freedom in the Congress.
REPRESENTATIVE FRANK WOLF (R-VA): Thank you. I apologize for being late, but thank you very, very much. I want to thank the commission for its continued work on the critical issue of religious freedom. I'm eager to read - I have not read - their complete findings with regard to the state of religion liberty in Iraq. And I stand here today ready to voice my shared concern for the plight of Iraq's ethno-religious minorities including the Chaldean Assyrian Christians and other Christians in Iraq.
I was there last year. We were up in Nineveh and we spoke to a number of the representatives of the community and heard first hand of what we all read every day in newspapers. But when you talk to somebody direct and there are soldiers and guards and guns and everything around, it sort of changes the perspective. So what is taking place that you read about is real. In fact, the reality of it, obviously, is probably much worse that what you're reading.
Back in 2006, the Iraq study group advised the administration that, quote, "The rights of all minority communities in Iraq must be protected." But we stand here today at a time of diminishing - and I say rapidly diminishing - religious pluralism in Iraq, a development which is deep the troubling for both the future of Iraq and the region as a whole. More than 500,000 Christians or roughly, they say, 50 percent have fled Iraq from 2003. Many are living in abject, miserable, rotten conditions in Syria and some in Lebanon and other places. And even though Christians make up only 3 percent of the country's population, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, they comprise nearly half of all refugees leaving Iraq.
Again, very little is being done by this administration. Very little is being done by the Iraqi government. I would almost say nothing is being done by the Iraqi government to help the Iraqi - the Chaldean Christians who are living in slum conditions in Syria or in some other countries. Even as Iraq has continued to stabilize - and we're appreciative and thankful that it has - these minority populations, including the ancient Christian community, some of whom still speak Aramaic, the language of Jesus.
And it's interesting; the church in the West has really failed. When I see how little activity there is on behalf of the Christians and other religious minorities in the Middle East and the failure for the church to speak out and yet we see this condition here in an area that Nineveh, from the Bible and Abraham came - my first trip to Iraq, I went down into the area, the place they told me was the actual location of Abraham's house and yet you find our government and other governments and the Iraqi government willing to just turn a blind eye and, frankly, to do almost nothing.
The minority suffered an additional blow this fall when a provincial election law passed by the Iraqi parliament was at the last minute stripped of a provision that would have guaranteed precious seats in the provincial councils to the minority. When an amendment was later adopted, it included fewer seats than originally proposed. The Chicago Tribune recently reported the following, quote, "Iraq's Christians appear powerless against greater forces and the community in Mosul was divided between those who believe this still have a place in Iraq and those who fear their days here may be numbered," end of quote.
"We normally have about 200 to 300 people attend mass," said the Reverend Peter Gethea, a priest at the Seda al Bashara Assyrian Church. And I think the former, if I recall, I remember meeting the former Catholic bishop from Basra. I believe he now lives in - in Australia, again, somebody who's had to leave yet was raised in the country. Last Sunday, he went on to say they only had 20 people. People are still scared. Their fear is understandable. All you have to do is visit and see what they go through each and every day to be a Christian. And, yet, the ironic thing is our government has spent billions of dollars and we've shed blood of some of the finest Americans that we have in this country. And the men and women who served in the military, every time I go there, how impressed you are when you see the young men and women who serve in our military and are there for freedom, and yet you find the United States government not doing a darn thing with regard to the freedom and the safety - forget even freedom, if you will - the safety of the Christians in Iraq! Just talking about it kind of makes me angry.
I mean, I think Secretary Rice has failed when it comes to this point. And I think nobody should go away thinking this is a mixed picture. They have failed. They still have an opportunity, but they have failed. And as you see what may very well take place, I think the failure is clear. And the fall - this fall was marked by chilling targeted killings in which attackers approached people and ordered them to hand over their ID cards which list religion affiliations. Once again, they were recognized as Christians. They were killed. Thousands fled in the wake of these events, and you would flee too if you were in the same situation.
And, in closing, as I made it clear throughout this comment, I've been disappointed by the administration and the secretary's lack of coherent policy as it relates Iraq's Christian minorities. And I urge the incoming Obama administration to take steps to ensure that these communities are afforded the necessary protection. We must not allow the extinction from the Nineveh old and the Nineveh of the Bible to happen during our watch. It has been happening, clearly. So there's no misunderstanding - and I'm a Republican. It has been happening under the previous administration's watch; fact, not a debatable fact but a real fact.
The question is, will it continue to deteriorate and change during the next administration? And I hope that Secretary Clinton and the others that come in reverse and put some commitment and determination, whether you go CPC or whatever you do is a different issue, but to make sure that the administration stands up for the Iraqi Christians who go back to the days of the Bible and make sure that that community that has been there for the long, long period of time, continues to exist.
So I thank the commission for the good work. I hope the commission will meet with the new secretary. I hope you'll give them ideas of people who ought to be the assistant secretary in these areas and that you'll speak out and be bold and be controversial on these issues both with the Iraqi Christians but also to take this opportunity with regard to the Christians in China and the Christians, quite frankly, around the world that are just being persecuted - and the Baha'is and all of the other minorities: the Tibetans and the Buddhists in Tibet and all the others. But I thank the commission and look forward to - and I'll just listen to some of the other things you're going to say. Thank you.
MS. GAER: Thank you, Congressman.
We're going to continue with the presentation of our conclusions and recommendations from the report. I now turn the floor over to Commissioner Michael Cromartie.
MICHAEL CROMARTIE: Thank you, Madam Chair.
We're concerned about the provincial elections scheduled for next month. In the elections four years ago, many non-Muslims in the Nineveh Governate were disenfranchised due to fraud, intimidation and the refusal by Kurdish security forces to permit ballot boxes to be distributed. And now, most recently, the provisional elections law passed in late September 2008 by the Iraqi government was, at the last minute, stripped of a provision that would have guaranteed a set number of seats in provincial councils for minorities. An amendment adopted later set aside fewer seats than the original provision, leading minority leaders to denounce the law.
So to ensure that the upcoming elections are safe and fair and free of intimidation and violence, the commission recommends that the U.S. government do the following: that it lead an international effort to protect voters and voting places and to monitor the elections; that it direct U.S. military and coalition forces, where feasible and appropriate, to provide heightened security for the elections particularly in minority areas such as the Nineveh Governate where there were irregularities in previous elections; and we urge the Iraqi government at the highest levels to ensure security and to permit and facilitate election monitoring by experts from local and international NGOs, the international community and the United Nations, particularly, in minority areas such as the Nineveh Governate where there were irregularities in previous elections.
MS. GAER: Thank you. Commissioner Argue?
DON ARGUE: Thank you, Madam Chair, and good morning. I was among the commissioners who traveled to the Kurdish region last spring. We were struck by the religious minority's plight, caught as they are in the struggle between the Kurdish - Kurdistan Regional Government, KRG, and the central Iraqi government for control of northern areas where the communities - their communities are concentrated.
The commission urges the U.S. government to: one, press the KRG, Kurdistan Regional Government, and the Kurdish officials and neighboring governates to cease alleged interference with creation, training and deployment of representative police forces for minority communities and link progress on representative policing to U.S. financial assistance and other forms of interaction with the KRG; two, demand immediate investigations into and accounting for allegations of human rights abuses by Kurdish regional and local officials against minority communities including reports of attacks on minorities and expropriation of minority property and make clear that the decisions on U.S. financial and other assistance will take into account whether perpetrators are being investigated and held accountable; and, three, work with Iraqi and KRG officials to establish a mechanism to examine and resolve outstanding real property claims involving religious and ethnic minorities in the KRG region and neighboring governance.
MS. GAER: Thank you very much. Commissioner Land will now speak on the internally displaced and refugees.
RICHARD LAND: Good morning. The dire religious-freedom conditions outlined in our report have sparked a grave refugee crisis with up to 4 million Iraqis fleeing abroad or to other regions of Iraq in search of safety. The commission calls on the United States government to, number one, fund a much larger portion of all U.N. appeals for humanitarian assistance to Iraqi internally displaced persons and refugees; second, urge the Iraqi government to fund a much larger portion of all U.N. appeals for humanitarian assistance to Iraqis and to increase its own assistance to IDPs; and, third, utilize diplomatic efforts to urge U.S. allies in Iraq to increase humanitarian assistance to and resettlement opportunities for vulnerable Iraqi refugees and IDPs; and, fourth, amend the U.S. refugee admissions program's new P-2 category to allow Iraq's smallest, most vulnerable religious minorities direct access to the program.
In addition, family reunification should be expanded for these refugees with relatives in the United States to include not only immediate family members but, as has been done in prior refugee crisis situations, to also include extended family such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, et cetera. Also, in order for members of Iraq's smallest, most vulnerable religious minorities scheduled to be resettled to the United States not to be delayed unnecessarily, the commission recommends that the United States government provide adequate personnel to conduct background screening procedures and enforce proper application of the existing waiver of the material support bar to those forced on provide support to terrorists under duress.
Commissioner Imam Talal Eid will now read statements from Representative Chris Van Hollen and Senator Ben Cardin and Representative Alcee Hastings from the U.S. Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, known as the Helsinki Commission.
TALAL EID: Thanks, Commissioner Land.
From the statement of Representative Van Hollen, I will highlight two paragraphs. First, "In the last three months alone, it is estimated that about one of half of the 20,000 Christians in the largely Kurdish city of Mosul have fled that city. Since the U.S. invasion in 2003, over one-third of the Christian population of Iraq, a community of some 800,000, has left the country. According to United Nations High Commission on Refugees, while Christian made up of nearly 4 percent of Iraq's pre-war population, they make up some 40 percent of Iraq's refugees. In just over five years, a unique religious and cultural community with roots stretching back almost 2,000 years in Mesopotamia has been ravaged and could be lost if the current trend is permitted to continue."
Second paragraph, "I join the commission in its recommendation to include Iraq among the countries of particular concern and to call for the United States to bring its unique influence to bear to change this situation."
From the statement of Congressman Hastings and Senator Cardin I will also highlight two paragraphs. First, "Religious extremism in Iraq continues to threaten all minority communities. The decline of religious pluralism is most troubling, which has the potential of emptying Iraq of its minority communities. The Iraqi government has a moral obligation to protect the rights of all minority communities by implementing concrete solutions to ensure their safety.
Second, "The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom's report not only offers an insight for look into abuses against religious minorities but also the need to improve conditions for refugees and internally displaced persons. As their resources are depleted and did they remain stranded, jobless and deprived of essential services, they will look for any means to survive. This is a recipe for disaster. The United States must take the lead and provide a humanitarian surge in responding to this crisis. The future of the Middle East depends on it."
MS. GAER: Thank you very much.
We also received a letter from Senator Carl Levin, who is the chair of the Armed Services Committee, and I won't read all of it. We hope to make it available to you, but I'll just quote one sentence, two sentences.
He says, "The tragic situation requires the attention of the new administration and U.S. military commanders on the ground. I have urged the Multinational Division North commander to concentrate as much attention as possible on the plight of the Iraqi Christian community. It is critical that this attention is sustained as we transition to a new administration. The timing of your commission's report will assist in keeping this issue at the forefront of the policy debate."
Now, with these in mind, you've got our report. You've got our press release. You've heard from our commissioners. You've heard from Congressman Wolf and the others who have sent statements. We now will move to your questions. We'd like to ask you to identify yourself before speaking. And in the interest - given that we have a very short period of time, I want to use it most effectively, please try to keep your question brief. We will try to do the same with our answers.
Yes, sir?
Q: (Inaudible, off mike) - religious freedom coalition. One of the concerns that we have is the problem with the United Nations in that area. They have clearly done a very, very poor vetting job. I personally have witnessed families who even work for the coalition that were not able to get through to, you know, to our embassy or our people; the United Nations is playing favoritism. There is corruption in Jordan. There is corruption in Syria. These were our - we created these refugees. Doesn't the commission see a need for the United States to do the job and not the United Nations? They didn't create the refugees; we did.
MS. GAER: Thank you very much. You'll see in our report that we call on the U.S. government to take steps to ensure the security. Now, one has to be practical about how one ensures that security. There are Iraqi forces. There are United Nations forces. There are coalition forces. And there are U.S. forces. The job is everyone's.
Q: I'm talking about refugees in Jordan and other places where we handed them off to the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees and said they aren't our problem.
MS. GAER: Once again, if you'll read our report, you will see in the section on refugees, we call on the United States to take a much greater role and much larger percentage of responsibility regarding the financing. We call on others - the Iraqi government to do the same. And, obviously, there's much to be done. These people are - there are too many, too many places, and they're in too much distress.
Yes, ma'am?
Q: (Inaudible.) I wondered if the commission had any contact with the Obama transition team - (inaudible) - on this matter?
MS. GAER: This commission report was carried out by the commission and the commission staff. And we have not had any such contact. Commissioner Argue?
MR. ARGUE: I would like to come back to the first question and affirm what Congressman Wolf mentioned this morning. I interviewed, along with fellow commissioners, refugees in Jordan. We've had people interviewing refugees in Syria and in Sweden. And their plight is horrendous. Where's their advocate? And our government has fallen far short in stepping to assist these people. So not only is it a dual issue with the United Nations, but it certainly, I would think, would be first order of our government.
MS. GAER: There was a question here? Yes, ma'am?
Q: (Inaudible) - World Magazine. I'm wondering - this seems to be as much a condemnation of our government as it is the Iraqi government. I'm wondering if you could talk about the difficulty of declaring Iraq a - (inaudible) - when we have such a strong presence there.
MS. GAER: Well, I think our report will speak for itself as to what the causes are, first of all. Secondly, the determination of a CPC - for those of you who don't know, country of particular concern - under the Religious Freedom Act, the standards are that it has to be a country that has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Now, "particularly severe violations" mean systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom of a variety of kinds. The commission has named many other countries and recommended others as CPCs. The administration has named quite a number.
In the commission's judgment, the religious freedom violations in Iraq are serious, ongoing and egregious. And so we have reached that determination. And I think that it was not an easy - it was not done casually, let me put it like that. Nina?
MS. SHEA: Yeah, I mean, I think what you're seeing here is that the responsibility for the violence, the egregious abuses, the marginalization of the minority groups that are addressed in this report are squarely placed on the government. Sometimes, the - the federal government, the Maliki government, sometimes on the Kurdish government, but the recommendations are addressed to the U.S. government. And that's the way we are mandated to make them.
And, also, as you pointed out, the U.S. does have a big presence in Iraq even now. And so part of the solution lies in making this a high foreign policy priority. And one of the things that we're calling for to make that happen is the revitalization of an interagency task force to come up with a policy solution for this dire - what we see as a dire problem.
Q: (Inaudible.) How do you reconcile that with trying to increase Iraq's sovereignty?
MS. SHEA: Well, the U.S. can't directly do this, but the U.S. can have a foreign policy towards Iraq like it has a foreign policy toward every other country in the world. And we've had a military policy towards Iraq. We're shifting into another relationship with Iraq where the State Department, diplomacy, soft power becomes even more important. And so the United States will have to address these very important issues of public diplomacy and aid for - our foreign aid.
Q: Steve Coleman with Associated Press. Question for Dr. Land or whoever else would like to take it: How would you respond to those who say the Christians in Iraq were better off under Saddam's secular regime than they are under the quasi-democracy at this time?
MR. LAND: Well, I wouldn't imagine that anyone who choose to be in either situation. I think that they're, certainly, the people who have benefited the least from the change have been the Christian minorities. But our report addresses where the current situation is and how we - recommendations that we've made to our government to make the situation better for those who are the persecuted minorities at present.
Q: I guess another way of phrasing it is, at least from a Christian perspective, have we made things worse for Iraqi Christians by our invasion than they were before?
MR. LAND: Well, you're asking for a personal opinion. And my personal opinion is no.
MS. GAER: Yes, sir. Oh, I'm sorry. I interrupted.
MR. EID: I'd like to add to that. I was in Jordan. I interviewed many Christian refugees. And most likely, most of them, they also brought this fact that they were under - they were better off under the Saddam regime.
MS. GAER: Yes, sir? Could you identify yourself?
Q: I'm sorry. Keith Roberts from Christian - (inaudible, off mike). One of your recommendations was for the U.S. government to lead international efforts to protect voters and voting places. With the provincial popular elections coming up in late January, is there any indication that the U.S. government has been requested by Iraqi government to provide assistance for monitoring polling places? We met with the Iraq Embassy a couple of weeks ago, and it was a concern, but I'm not real confident that anyone has approached the United Nations or anyone has really - is really leading the effort. And I'm just wondering maybe you have some information that would be helpful.
MS. GAER: Thank you for that. In point of fact, we don't have that information. The concern is a serious concern, and I was looking for the report - which I can't seem to find - because we have an extensive section of it dealing - I held it up to you - we have an extensive section dealing with this question of the elections. It is the first of the recommendations in our report. We're very aware of the importance of that. And as Commissioner Cromartie said, there are three recommendations there. But the key - but the key point is that we want to see action that will ensure that the upcoming provincial elections are safe, free, fair and free of intimidation and violence. Now, that requires action, not inaction. And that's what our report is about.
Further questions? Yes, sir?
Q: Just two real quick questions. First...
MR. LAND: Identify yourself, please.
Q: Oh, Ken Joseph with the Syrian Universal Alliance. I'm a little bit confused as to have you had any problems with the Iraqi government. In other words, are you seeing the Iraqi government condoning these types of things? Or is this part of more a general difficulty for everybody in Iraq? And are you aware of the fact that the Iraqi government has offered monthly payments to all the refugees as well as $9,000 per family for those returning?
And my final question is: A little bit - there's a tension between holding out the possibility of visas, which, if you're not careful has the reverse effect of keeping all the refugees because they hold onto the hope of being able to leave. So, first of all, the Iraqi government, have you had any difficulties with the Iraqi government? Is this a part of the Iraqi government effort or - and then, also, the Catch 22 of holding out visas perpetually keeps the refugees. For example, just recently, a large number of people are coming to the embassies that have come out of Iraq requesting to go back. It might be good to speak to the Iraqi Embassy. They're getting regular calls of refugees that want to go back home after having come here.
MS. GAER: Yes, thank you very much. We're going to comment on that. We've had any number of conversations directly in the countries nearby with Iraqi and other officials on these issues. We're well aware of that and Commissioner Prodromou is going to comment on this. And then several other commissioners have asked for the floor.
MS. PRODROMOU: Regarding the first point, you asked whether or not we have any problems with the Iraqi government. I'm assuming you mean in terms of the situation as a whole or with refugees in particular. The answer to both is yes in any event. The report underscores the fact that the CPC designation is based on an evaluation of what the Iraqi government does. That's what we are, as the commission, are mandated to do, evaluate how governments perform. So, indeed, the designation is made on that basis. And if you read the report, it's a long report, but what we've tried to do with care and with great detail and thoroughness is to - to illustrate how it is both by acts of omission and commission the Iraqi government has failed to provide religious freedom adequately and uniformly for all of its citizens.
Now, with regard to the refugee issue, I was part of the group of commissioners who met with Iraqi refugees in Damascus. And what we heard quite uniformly from those refugees was that the few refugees who had actually returned and their families had returned, they had suffered violence and/or death so that the option to return was one that the refugees no longer considered feasible because fundamental security conditions on the ground did not provide them with the confidence and empirical evidence suggests that they should not have the confidence to return.
Regarding the Catch 22 that you mentioned, holding out visas as a, I think, you suggested kind of a false promise or a Catch 22 in the sense that if there's the option of visas to go somewhere else, then the likelihood of return is less, that may, indeed, be the case. But as I said, based on our interviews and the literature we've read and the many meetings we've had with refugees and those who deal with the refugees, there is demonstrable consensus that the desire to return is very low based on the poor security conditions on the ground.
Now, obviously, this is a moving picture. But at least presently, and certainly over the last year-and-a-half since we issued our last report - yes, a year-and-a-half - that's the message we've heard quite loudly.
MR. LAND: Also, I think if you'll look at page one of our report, you'll see that there's a footnote. And the footnote points out that there are four commissioners, including myself, who dissented in naming Iraq as a country of particular concern, which it was, by the way, when Saddam Hussein was in control. You know, we have moved the plight of all Iraqis down to now the plight of some Iraqis under this current government. But I want to make it very clear that there's no - there's no disagreement on this commission when it comes to the serious plight of religious minorities and the fact that they are being abused.
The only difference is whether or not the Iraqi government's capacity - the national government. Now, we're not talking here about the Kurdish government, but the national government's capacity to stop this is - and if you look at the footnote on page one, it says in other words, the requisite intent and a discernible pattern of recurring affirmative acts of abuse are not present. And so the only difference of agreement - the only disagreement here was on whether or not the Iraqi national government's failure to address this adequately is a product of will or a product of lack of capacity to do so. And so we - there were four of us who voted to keep it on the watch list, and there were five who voted to go ahead and make it a country of particular concern. But that should not, in any way, dilute the fact that we are very, very concerned and want our government to be very, very concerned about the plight of religious refugees.
And on the second point, I would say that, you know, if - if the Iraqi government wants these refugees to come home, all it has to do is make - make them - make clear to them that they will be safe once they return. And that's the Iraqi government's responsibility. And I think it's our responsibility to give these people an opportunity to make that choice which would then give them leverage with their own government.
MR. CROMARTIE: Dr. Land - Commissioner Land took the words right out of my mouth. I call your attention to the footnote on page one.
MR. EID: In my opinion, I think the issue is not that the Iraqi government did not do anything, but I think in my opinion, the issue is whether the Iraqi government has done enough or not. In my opinion, the Iraqi government has not done enough to protect the minorities, in particular. Just for example, yesterday or the day before, seven members of the Yazidi family - seven people were killed. They were targeted. So the minority - minorities are facing extinction in Iraq. And I would like to see the Iraqi government doing more efforts to protect them.
MS. GAER: Commissioner Shea?
MS. SHEA: Yes. I agree with Talal Eid on that score that it doesn't take a whole lot of very armed and determined people to terrorize a vulnerable population if the government just steps aside and lets it happen. And that's what we've seen again and again with the Christians, with the Yazidis, with the Mandeans. By the way, the Mandeans have - I've been told - reached the point of no return in Iraq. About 90 percent of them have left the country and they are not coming back, they say.
These are communities that are - have either been destroyed or are being destroyed. The government has marginalized them both in terms of security, they have been thwarted in forming a police force to guard their own communities; they - and that is being integrated into the national police force but to serve locally. When they have been allowed to enlist in the police, they've been sent to the Syrian border or to other parts of the country. And they've been marginalized economically.
And if you look at Nineveh, which is a minority center, you will see that according to the auditor for reconstruction aid, the United States, the official one comes out with a report every quarter. A fraction of the aid given - allocated toward Nineveh has actually been spent by the Nineveh Province - Governate as opposed to other - relative to other areas of Iraq. In response to the Pope speaking out to Maliki, he formed - Maliki formed a minority's council, and we've met with them, talked with them just recently. And we then spoke with the representative of the Mandean community who had not even heard of the minority council. These people - we came away with the impression that this was basically for show, that these people really did not have a good line of communication back to their - the communities that they supposedly represent.
So we still have not seen more than words. We have not seen a determined effort on the part of the Iraq government to help these people. We've seen indifference.
MS. GAER: Well, you've energized all of our commissioners. Commissioner Prodromou wants to also comment.
Q: (Inaudible, off mike.)
MS. GAER: Thank you. We appreciate your work.
MS. PRODROMOU: Yeah, just a brief footnote. I think, you know, return is just the start of the story. You know, it's what happens upon return that really matters. And I think what we have found is that when people return again, their fundamental security conditions are not provided for. They're not sustainable. And the other thing is oftentimes when refugees return, they find that their property has been appropriated and/or expropriated so that their houses are no longer available. They literally have nowhere to live. So there are a host of conditions, economic as well as security, that we've seen that over time that provided a huge impediment to refugee return ergo our set of recommendations at the end.
MS. GAER: And you will see in the report the argumentation as to why these are severe violations. They are targeted violations. They are continuing. They are egregious. They are in more than one part of the country that the government has engaged in a failure to investigate, a failure to prosecute and a failure to protect in many instances. This is all outlined in the report. Thank you.
Are there further questions because we just have about three more minutes, and then we have to leave the room. Yes, ma'am?
Q: Hi, Amanda Sully (sp) with the office of Congressman Steven Lynch. This last question seems to have really, like you said, energized folks. I just wanted to get some clarification. While I understand that there is not a consensus on whether to designate Iraq as a country of particular concern, is there a consensus on the recommendations because some of these recommendations are built on the idea that the Iraqi government is not doing enough or -
MS. GAER: Yeah, let me be very clear. The position of the commission is to recommend that this country be designated a country of particular concern. That is number one. There are some dissents. This is not the first time we've had dissents. We've had that over the years. Any commissioner can dissent. And last year, commissioners dissented when we designated Iraq as on the watch list.
Now, you must understand, there are only 20 countries in the world that have ever been on either the watch list or the CPC list. We're talking about a very small number of countries. And the distinction between these two is based on a determination. Those determinations are outlined in our report. As to your question about the conclusion, I think when you hear is there is - there is agreement on the facts. There is agreement on the conclusions. These are unanimous by the entire commission. The only question that remains is whether if falls in category CPC or category watch list.
Q: As far as the steps to take or -
MS. GAER: As far as the steps to take, we are - we are in unanimous agreement.
MR. LAND: Felice, can I - as one who was a dissenter, let me confirm that. There's no - there's no disagreement about what we think needs to be done. There's just a technical disagreement about the Iraqi government's capacity. And so in terms of the recommendations about what the - our government and the Iraqi government need to do, there's no dissent.
MS. GAER: We're just about at the end. Commissioner Argue?
MR. ARGUE: Just a comment. It might help us if we have a definition of what it means to be a country of particular concern. And CPC is a country where the government has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Particularly severe violations means systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religion freedom including violations such as: one, torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; two, prolonged detention without charges; three, causing the disappearance of persons by the abductions or clandestine detention of those persons or; four, other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty or the security of persons by the government. On that definition, my view was - no question - a CPC.
MS. GAER: Thank you very much. Thank you for joining us. And we look forward to staying in touch. If you have further questions, our - you can reach our staff and you can also find the reports on www.uscirf.gov.
(END)
December 17, 2008
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STATEMENT OF
REPRESENTATIVE CHRIS VAN HOLLEN
I would like to commend the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, its members and staff for drawing attention to the serious problem of religious persecution in Iraq today and, in particular, to thewidespread physical and political persecution of Christians and other small religious minority groups, such as the Mandaeans andYazidis. It is a travesty that what we are seeing in Iraq today is persecution of Christians and other minorities, simply becauseof their religious affiliation --in many cases by groupswho themselves suffered at the hands of Saddam Hussein's brutality.
In the last three months alone it is estimated that about one half of the 20,000 Christians in the largely Kurdish city of Mosul have fled that city. Since the US invasion in 2003 over one third of the Christian population of Iraq, a community of some 800,000, has left the country. According to UNHCR, while Christians made up nearly 4 percent of Iraq's pre-war population, theymake up some 40 percent of Iraq's refugees. In just over five years, a unique religious and cultural community with roots stretching back almost 2000 years in Mesopotamia has been ravaged andcould be lost if the current trend is permitted to continue. This is a far cry from the 'new' Iraq that Americans were told was going to rise out of the ashes of Saddam Hussein's departure and serve as a beacon for the Middle East region.
I join the Commission in its recommendation to include Iraq among the "countries of particular concern" and to call for the United States tobring its unique influence to bear to change this situation.
With the release of this report, the Commission states its clear determination to prompt the Iraqi government to address the root causes of the wave of religious persecution sweeping its country. U.S. foreign policymakers need to answer the Commission's call and use the leversat our disposal to help put an end to religiously motivated violence in Iraq.
March 20, 2008
July 25, 2007
The grave, life-threatening conditions faced by Iraq's minority religious communities have not been fully aired in Washington, much less the national media. Representatives from these communities have been requesting such an opportunity. Likewise, the Iraq Study Group encouraged the Commission to bring out more information on the status of these communities. This hearing aims to tell their stories. It is the first of its kind.
What is more, U.S. refugee policy on Iraq is currently under debate both in the Administration and in the Congress. One key issue in that debate is whether or not the non-Muslim minorities face particularized persecution in Iraq such that they should have greater access to the U.S. Refugee Program. The testimony at this hearing will help stress the importance of enhancing U.S. assistance to Iraqi refugees, a disproportionate number of which come from vulnerable minority religious communities.
9:00 Opening Remarks
Mr. Michael Cromartie
Chair, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
9:15 Panel I: Religious Freedom in Contemporary Iraq
The Reverend Canon Andrew White
President & CEO, Foundation for Reconciliation & Reconstruction in the Middle East and Vicar of St. George's Anglican Church, Baghdad
10:00 Panel II: The Persecution of Iraq's Communities of Antiquity
Ms. Pasqual Warda
Former Iraq Minister of Migration & Displacement and President, Assyrian Women's Union
Dr. Donny George
Former chairman of the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage and former director of the Iraqi National Museum
Mr. Michael Youash
Project Director, The Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project
Dr. Suhaib Nashi
General Secretary, The Mandaean Associations Union.
11:30 Close
February 08, 2008
July 25, 2007
The grave, life-threatening conditions faced by Iraq's minority religious communities have not been fully aired in Washington, much less the national media. Representatives from these communities have been requesting such an opportunity. Likewise, the Iraq Study Group encouraged the Commission to bring out more information on the status of these communities. This hearing aims to tell their stories. It is the first of its kind.
What is more, U.S. refugee policy on Iraq is currently under debate both in the Administration and in the Congress. One key issue in that debate is whether or not the non-Muslim minorities face particularized persecution in Iraq such that they should have greater access to the U.S. Refugee Program. The testimony at this hearing will help stress the importance of enhancing U.S. assistance to Iraqi refugees, a disproportionate number of which come from vulnerable minority religious communities.
9:00 Opening Remarks
Mr. Michael Cromartie
Chair, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
9:15 Panel I: Religious Freedom in Contemporary Iraq
The Reverend Canon Andrew White
President & CEO, Foundation for Reconciliation & Reconstruction in the Middle East and Vicar of St. George's Anglican Church, Baghdad
10:00 Panel II: The Persecution of Iraq's Communities of Antiquity
Ms. Pasqual Warda
Former Iraq Minister of Migration & Displacement and President, Assyrian Women's Union
Dr. Donny George
Former chairman of the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage and former director of the Iraqi National Museum
Mr. Michael Youash
Project Director, The Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project
Dr. Suhaib Nashi
General Secretary, The Mandaean Associations Union.
11:30 Close
July 25, 2007
Senate Russell Office Building
July 25, 2007
Hearing Agenda
Opening Remarks- Michael Cromartie, Commission Chair
Statement (as Delivered)- Representative Anna G. Eshoo, (D-CA)
Statement (as Delivered)- Representative Christopher Shays, (R-CT)
Panel
- Reverend Canon Andrew White, Vicar of St. George's Anglican Church, Baghdad Prepared Testimony
- Pascale Warda, Former Minister of Migration and Displacement Prepared Testimony
- Dr. Donny George, Former Chairman of the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage Prepared Testimony
- Michael Youash, Project Director of the Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project Prepared Testimony
- Dr. Suhaib Nashi, General Secretary of the Mandean Associations Union Prepared Testimony
July 25, 2007
Senate Russell Office Building
July 25, 2007
Hearing Agenda
Opening Remarks- Michael Cromartie, Commission Chair
Statement (as Delivered)- Representative Anna G. Eshoo, (D-CA)
Statement (as Delivered)- Representative Christopher Shays, (R-CT)
Panel
- Reverend Canon Andrew White, Vicar of St. George's Anglican Church, Baghdad Prepared Testimony
- Pascale Warda, Former Minister of Migration and Displacement Prepared Testimony
- Dr. Donny George, Former Chairman of the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage Prepared Testimony
- Michael Youash, Project Director of the Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project Prepared Testimony
- Dr. Suhaib Nashi, General Secretary of the Mandean Associations Union Prepared Testimony
July 25, 2007
Senate Russell Office Building
July 25, 2007
Hearing Agenda
Opening Remarks- Michael Cromartie, Commission Chair
Statement (as Delivered)- Representative Anna G. Eshoo, (D-CA)
Statement (as Delivered)- Representative Christopher Shays, (R-CT)
Panel
- Reverend Canon Andrew White, Vicar of St. George's Anglican Church, Baghdad Prepared Testimony
- Pascale Warda, Former Minister of Migration and Displacement Prepared Testimony
- Dr. Donny George, Former Chairman of the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage Prepared Testimony
- Michael Youash, Project Director of the Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project Prepared Testimony
- Dr. Suhaib Nashi, General Secretary of the Mandean Associations Union Prepared Testimony
December 17, 2008
Event Transcript
Commissioner Statements
Statement of Rep. Alcee Hastings (D-FL) and Sen. Benjamin Cardin (D-MD), Co-Chairmen of the Helsinki Commission
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Statement of Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI)
Statement of Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD)
Full Text of the 2008 USCIRF Report on Iraq