EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) was established by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). USCIRF is an independent and bipartisan federal agency created to monitor religious freedom in other countries and advise the President, Secretary of State and Congress on how best to promote it.

IRFA also authorized the Commission to appoint experts to conduct a study to advise whether certain legislative changes to asylum, enacted in 1996, were impairing America’s obligation – and founding tradition – of offering refuge to those suffering persecution.

The Study examined how the new immigration procedure – known as “Expedited Removal” – was affecting asylum seekers, regardless of whether or not the claim was based on religion, race, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

EXPEDITED REMOVAL

In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), the most comprehensive immigration reform legislation in over 30 years. Among other reforms, the legislation established Expedited Removal, which was intended to strengthen the security of America’s borders, without closing them to those fleeing persecution.

Specifically, prior to IIRAIRA, immigration inspectors could not compel an improperly documented alien to depart the United States. The inspector had the discretion to offer the alien the opportunity to withdraw his application for admission, or to refer the alien to an immigration judge for a hearing. If the inspector did refer the alien to an immigration judge, the alien could be detained until the hearing, but would generally be released due to bed-space shortages.

Under IIRAIRA, immigration inspectors were authorized to summarily remove aliens who lacked appropriate travel documents, or who obtained their travel documents through fraud or misrepresentation. Concerned, however, that bona fide asylum seekers not be removed to countries where they may be persecuted, Congress also included provisions to prevent the Expedited Removal of refugees fleeing persecution.¹ Specifically, an alien who indicates an

¹ Under the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which the United States has ratified, as implemented by the Refugee Act of 1980 and other amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, the United States may not return any individual to a country where that individual may face persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. In addition, the United States has ratified and implemented regulations to execute the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and may not remove anyone to a country where (s)he is, in danger of being tortured.
intention to apply for asylum or a fear of return is entitled to a “credible fear interview” by an asylum officer. If the asylum officer determines that an alien has a “significant possibility” of establishing eligibility for asylum, he is entitled to ask the immigration judge for relief from removal. If credible fear is not found, the asylum officer orders the alien removed (although this decision is subject to review by an immigration judge).

Congress also required that aliens, including asylum seekers, subject to Expedited Removal be detained until the United States physically removes them, after which they may not return to the United States for five years. If an asylum officer determines that an alien has credible fear, however, the alien may be considered for release while waiting for an asylum hearing. While decisions of release (“parole”) are discretionary, agency memoranda instruct that “parole is a viable option and should be considered for aliens who meet the credible fear standard, can establish identity and community ties, and are not subject to any possible bars to asylum involving violence or misconduct.”

On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the lead agency on Expedited Removal, was abolished by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The functions of the former INS were dispersed to various components within the newly created Department of Homeland Security. The immigration judges, however, remained in the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice.

Expedited Removal is mandatory for aliens arriving at ports of entry. Congress, however, also authorized the Attorney General to exercise discretion in applying Expedited Removal in the interior of the United States to undocumented aliens apprehended within two years after entry. On November 13, 2002, Expedited Removal was expanded by the INS to apply to undocumented non-Cubans who entered the United States by sea within the prior two years.

On August 11, 2004, the Department of Homeland Security announced that, effective immediately, it was exercising its discretion to further expand Expedited Removal authority to the Border Patrol for undocumented aliens apprehended within 14 days after entry and within 100 miles of the border, in the Tucson and Laredo Border Patrol sectors.

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4 EOIR oversees the Immigration Judges who review negative credible fear determinations made by asylum officers and who hear asylum claims from aliens placed in Expedited Removal. It also houses the Immigration Judges’ appellate review unit, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
THE STUDY

In the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), Congress authorized the USCIRF to appoint experts to examine whether immigration officers, in exercising Expedited Removal authority over aliens who may be eligible for asylum, were:

(1) Improperly encouraging withdrawals of applications for admission;
(2) Incorrectly failing to refer such aliens for credible fear determinations;
(3) Incorrectly removing such aliens to countries where such aliens may face persecution; or
(4) Improperly detaining such aliens, or detaining them under inappropriate conditions.

Congress authorized the USCIRF-appointed experts to have virtually unrestricted access to Expedited Removal proceedings.

IRFA also required the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to complete its own study on asylum seekers in Expedited Removal, which was released in September 2000. That study found that, in spite of some deficiencies in the process, INS was generally in compliance with its own Expedited Removal procedures. GAO, however, relied primarily on the review of INS records, statistical analyses, and whether INS was following its own procedures. GAO chose not to critically review legal determinations made by INS or the Executive Office for Immigration Review.

The Commission began its effort in the Fall of 2003, after the absorption of most Expedited Removal operations into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Like the GAO, USCIRF appointed experts chose to avoid reviewing legal analyses performed by the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, focusing instead on building on the file review and statistical analyses gathered by GAO. The USCIRF Study, however, also differed from GAO in several respects. Specifically, the USCIRF-appointed experts chose to:

• Observe inspections at seven major ports of entry (GAO did not collect data from observations of Expedited Removal proceedings);
• Compare the detention standards to correctional standards, and ascertain whether correctional standards where “appropriate” for a non-criminal asylum seeker population (GAO instead accepted the INS detention standards, and measured INS compliance with some of those standards);
• Review the use of documents created during the Expedited Removal process are used as evidence during asylum hearings; and
• Examine the impact of representation on asylum claimants subject to Expedited Removal.

In collecting data for the Study, under the guidance of a chief methodologist and other experts in research methods, the experts:

• Observed, and collected data from, 404 secondary inspections and interviewed 194 aliens in Expedited Removal proceedings (with 155 of those aliens being both interviewed and observed);
• Reviewed randomly selected subsamples of an additional 339 files from the Ports of Entry; 32 files of aliens who dissolved their asylum claims; 163 records of proceeding from the Board of Immigration Appeals; and 321 Alien Files of Asylum Seekers who were referred for credible fear;
• Surveyed all eight asylum offices and 19 detention facilities;
• Interviewed, and collected data from, 39 asylum seekers who were dissolving their asylum claim;
• Reviewed 50 files provided by DHS of negative credible fear determinations; and
• Compiled nation-wide statistics with the assistance of EOIR and DHS.

OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE USCIRF STUDY

The Study found mandatory procedures in place to ensure that asylum seekers are protected under Expedited Removal. Some procedures were applied with reasonable consistency, but compliance with others varied significantly, depending upon where the alien arrived, and which immigration judges or inspectors addressed the alien’s claim. Most procedures lacked effective quality assurance measures to ensure that they were consistently followed. Consequently, the outcome of an asylum claim appears to depend not only on the strength of the claim, but also on which officials consider the claim, and whether or not the alien has an attorney. Similarly, while DHS has developed criteria relating to the release of detained asylum seekers, the implementation of these criteria also varies widely from place to place.

There are a few areas, however, where the Study identified problems other than inconsistent practices. For example, with regard to detention, the Study found that asylum seekers are consistently detained in jails or jail-like facilities, which the experts found inappropriate for non-criminal asylum seekers. There were, however, a small number of exceptions to this rule, the most prominent being a contract facility in Broward Country, Florida, which represents a secure, but appropriate and non-correctional, environment for non-criminal asylum seekers.

The Study also found that asylum seekers without a lawyer had a much lower chance of being granted asylum (2%) than those with an attorney (25%). This difference was consistent whether the alien resided – or was detained – in an area with a high rate of representation, or a low rate of representation. The Study does, however, identify a number of locations where public-private initiatives involving DHS, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and non-governmental organizations, have put legal assistance within reach of more detained asylum seekers. These programs, however, have also been implemented unevenly.

With regard to credible fear determinations, the Study found that asylum officers screened-in more than 90% of credible fear applicants, and made a negative credible fear finding in only 1% of cases. Quality assurance procedures – requiring much more extensive documentation and review of negative claims than of positive ones, may have created a built-in bias in the credible fear screening, undermining the objectivity of the process.

Each stage of the Expedited Removal Process relies upon the information collected in previous stages:
(1) The alien is referred by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for a credible fear interview, or removed; then
(2) Referred by an asylum officer at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for an asylum hearing, or ordered removed (subject to immigration judge review of the negative credible fear determination); then
(3) Detained or paroled by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); and then
(4) With the participation in the courtroom by an ICE Trial Attorney, granted or denied asylum, withholding, or Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief by the immigration judge (in the Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review – EOIR).

The impediments to communication and information sharing within DHS, however, are serious. By the end of the process – the asylum hearing – unreliable and/or incomplete documentation from CBP and USCIS is susceptible to being misinterpreted by the ICE Trial attorney, misapplied by the Immigration Judge, and may ultimately result in the denial of the asylum-seeker’s claim. The Study did not seek to determine whether asylum claims were incorrectly denied, but did determine that immigration judges, even within the same court, had significantly different rates of granting or denying asylum claims. Furthermore, in denying asylum applications on the basis of credibility, immigration judges frequently cited documents which the Study found to be unreliable and incomplete records. The unreliability of the documentation was documented by the Port of Entry study (Keller, et al), and its incompleteness and its use in immigration proceedings were documented by the File Review (Jastram, et al).

The Study also noted that Expedited Removal has been expanded twice in recent years, without first addressing the flaws in the system which undermine the protections for asylum seekers.

The Study urges the incoming Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure that it is no longer he – but a high ranking official who reports to him – who is responsible for coordinating refugee and asylum matters among the various bureaus. Without day-to-day oversight of asylum policy and its implementation department-wide, the flaws in the system identified in this Study cannot be effectively addressed, leaving asylum seekers in Expedited Removal at risk of being returned to countries where they may face persecution.

SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FINDINGS

Question One

ARE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS, EXERCISING EXPEDITED REMOVAL AUTHORITY, IMPROPERLY ENCOURAGING ASYLUM SEEKERS TO WITHDRAW APPLICATIONS FOR ADMISSION?

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) procedures and training materials make it clear to CBP inspectors that the withdrawal of an application for admission is “strictly voluntary” and “must not be coerced in
any way.” While most officers observed complied with these procedures, in one port of entry the Study observed a few instances in which immigration officers improperly encouraged asylum seekers to withdraw their applications for admission.

**Question Two**

**ARE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS, EXERCISING EXPEDITED REMOVAL AUTHORITY, INCORRECTLY FAILING TO REFER ASYLUM SEEKERS FOR A CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEW?**

DHS regulations state that an immigration inspector must refer an alien for a credible fear determination if that alien indicates “an intention to apply for asylum, a fear of torture, or a fear of return to his or her country.” In accordance with these regulations, nearly 85 percent (67/79) of arriving aliens observed by the Study expressing a fear of return were referred for a credible fear interview. CBP Guidelines, however, provide the inspector with more discretion than the regulations, allowing the inspector to decline referral in cases where the fear claimed by the applicant is unrelated to the criteria for asylum. Indeed, in 15 percent (12/79) of observed cases when an arriving alien expressed a fear of return to the inspector, the alien was not referred. Moreover, among these twelve cases were several aliens who expressed fear of political, religious, or ethnic persecution, which are clearly related to the grounds for asylum. Of particular concern, in seven of these twelve cases, the inspector incorrectly indicated on the sworn statement that the applicant claimed he had no fear of return.

While DHS guidance requires that asylum seekers at land ports of entry be placed in Expedited Removal and referred for a credible fear interview, the Study interviewed two groups of aliens (one from the Middle East, the other from East Africa) who requested the opportunity to apply for asylum but were refused and “pushed back” at primary inspection. We became aware of these cases only because in each case, the asylum seekers tried again on a different day and were referred into Expedited Removal as well as for a credible fear interview. CBP has stated that it is “very concerned and dismayed that this is happening contrary to policy, and is taking steps to address this.”

**Question Three**

**ARE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS, EXERCISING AUTHORITY UNDER EXPEDITED REMOVAL, INCORRECTLY REMOVING ASYLUM SEEKERS TO COUNTRIES WHERE THEY MAY FACE PERSECUTION?**

The second Study question concerned bona fide asylum seekers who are improperly denied a referral for a credible fear determination. While such asylum seekers may be removed to a country where they may face persecution, those findings are not repeated here. Rather, to respond to this question, the focus is on asylum seekers who are removed after the credible fear interview. In addressing this question, it is also appropriate to examine asylum seekers ordered

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removed by the immigration judge at the conclusion of their asylum hearing, focusing on the characteristics of the proceeding which are unique to cases that originate in Expedited Removal.

Asylum officers reach a negative credible fear determination in only one percent of cases referred. Moreover, a negative credible fear determination is subject to strict quality assurance procedures by Asylum headquarters, and may then be reviewed by an immigration judge, who vacates negative credible fear findings reached by asylum officers more than ten percent of the time.

Under the current system, immigration judges – not asylum officers – determine eligibility for asylum for aliens in Expedited Removal proceedings. We found very significant variations in the asylum approval rates of individual judges. Furthermore, in over one-fourth of the immigration judge decisions examined where relief was denied, the judge cited that the applicant “added detail” to his or her initial asylum claim, as expressed to the immigration inspector or the asylum officer at the time of the credible fear interview. Such negative credibility findings fail to take into account that the records of these prior statements are, according to the findings of the Study, often unreliable and incomplete. Finally, immigration judges granted relief to 25 percent of represented asylum applicants but only two percent of unrepresented asylum seekers.

After being denied asylum, an alien who continues to claim a fear of persecution or torture may appeal a negative immigration judge decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). While the BIA sustained 24 percent of Expedited Removal asylum appeals in FY2001, only two to four percent of such appeals have been granted since 2002, when the court began allowing the issuance of “summary affirmances” rather than detailed decisions. Statistically, it is highly unlikely that any asylum seeker denied by an immigration judge will find protection by appealing to the BIA.

Question Four

ARE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS, EXERCISING AUTHORITY UNDER EXPEDITED REMOVAL, DETAINING ASYLUM SEEKERS IMPROPERLY OR UNDER INAPPROPRIATE CONDITIONS?

Asylum seekers subject to Expedited Removal must, by law, be detained until an asylum officer has determined that they have a credible fear of persecution or torture, unless release (parole) is necessary to meet a medical emergency need or legitimate law enforcement objective. The Study found that most asylum seekers are detained in jails and in jail-like facilities, often with criminal inmates as well as aliens with criminal convictions. While DHS has established detention standards, these detention facilities closely resemble, and are based on, standards for correctional institutions.

In one particularly innovative Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contract facility, located in Broward County, Florida, asylum seekers are detained in a secure facility which does not closely resemble a jail. While Broward could be the model in the United States for the detention of asylum seekers, it is instead the exception among the network of 185 jails,
prisons and “processing facilities” utilized by DHS to detain asylum seekers in Expedited Removal.

DHS policy favors the release of asylum seekers who have established credible fear, identity, community ties, and no likelihood of posing a security risk. However, there was little documentation in the files to allow a determination of how these criteria were actually being applied by ICE.

In FY2003, only 0.5 percent of asylum seekers subject to Expedited Removal in the New Orleans district were released prior to a decision in their case. In Harlingen, Texas, however, nearly 98 percent of asylum seekers were released. Release rates in other parts of the country varied widely between those two figures.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation One

In order to more effectively protect both Homeland Security and bona fide asylum seekers, the Department of Homeland Security should create an office—headed by a high-level official—authorized to address cross cutting issues relating to asylum and expedited removal.

Recommendation Two

The burden on the detention system, the immigration courts, and bona fide asylum seekers in Expedited Removal themselves should be eased by allowing asylum officers to grant asylum in approvable cases at the time of the credible fear interview, just as they are already trained and authorized to do for other asylum seekers. Aliens who establish credible fear but, for whatever reason, have not yet established an approvable asylum claim, should continue to be referred to an immigration judge.

Recommendation Three

DHS should establish detention standards and conditions appropriate for asylum seekers. The agency should also promulgate regulations to promote more consistent implementation of existing parole criteria, to ensure that asylum seekers with a credible fear of persecution—who establish identity and that they pose neither a flight nor a security risk—are released from detention.

Recommendation Four

Expand existing private-public partnerships to facilitate legal assistance for asylum seekers subject to Expedited Removal, and improve administrative review and quality assurance procedures to improve consistency in asylum determinations by immigration judges.
Recommendation Five

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SHOULD IMPLEMENT AND MONITOR QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCEDURES TO ENSURE MORE RELIABLE INFORMATION FOR HOMELAND SECURITY PURPOSES, AND TO ENSURE THAT ASYLUM SEEKERS ARE NOT TURNED AWAY IN ERROR.

Specifically, it should:

- **Create a reliable inter-bureau system that tracks real-time data of aliens in expedited removal proceedings.**
- **Reconcile conflicting field guidance to require that any expression of fear at the port of entry must result in either a referral for a credible fear determination or, in cases where the inspector or border patrol agent believes the alien would “clearly not qualify” for asylum or CAT relief, contact with an asylum officer to speak to the alien via a telephonic interpretation service to determine whether or not the alien needs to be referred.**
- **Improve quality assurance by expanding and enhancing the videotape systems currently used at Houston and Atlanta to all major ports of entry and border patrol stations to unintrusively record all secondary interviews, and consider employing the use of undercover “testers” to verify that expedited removal procedures are being properly followed.**
- **Include, on sworn statement form I-867B, an explanation of the specific purpose for which the document is designed to serve, and its limitations.**
- **Enhance the efficiency of the expedited removal process by amending DHS quality assurance procedures for the credible fear interview to subject negative and positive determinations to similar quality assurance procedures.**

Recommendation Summary

This study has provided temporary transparency to expedited removal— a process which is opaque not only to the outside world, but even within the Department of Homeland Security. As a result of this transparency, serious— but not insurmountable— problems with expedited removal have been identified. The study’s recommendations concerning better data systems, quality assurance measures, access to representation, and a DHS refugee coordinator would all contribute to a more transparent and effective expedited removal process. We also recommend that Congress require the departments of justice and homeland security to prepare and submit reports, within 12 months of the release of this study, describing agency actions to address the findings and recommendations of this study.